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JESUS' ALLEGED CONFESSION OF SIN

The pericope of "the rich young ruler" is found in all three of the Synoptic Gospels, and it is associated in all of them with narratives of a common type. In all three it immediately follows the account of Jesus' receiving and blessing little children; and it is clear from Mark's representation (as also indeed from Matthew's¹) that the incident actually occurred in immediate sequence to that scene. In Luke, these two narratives are immediately preceded by the parable of the Pharisee and Publican praying in the Temple; in Matthew they are immediately succeeded by the parable of the workmen in the vineyard who were surprised that their rewards were not nicely adjusted to what they deemed their relative services. It cannot be by accident that these four narratives, all of which teach a similar lesson, are brought thus into contiguity. It is the burden of them all that the Kingdom of God is a gratuity, not an acquisition; and the effect of bringing them together is to throw a great emphasis upon this, their common teaching.

Perhaps this teaching finds nowhere more pungent intimation than in the declaration of our Lord which forms the core of the account of His reception of the children: "For of such is the kingdom of heaven," (or "of God": Mt. xix. 14; Mk. x. 14; Lk. xviii. 16). These "little children" were, as we learn from Luke, mere babies (Lk. xiii. 15: τὰ βρέφη), which Jesus held in His arms (Mk. x. 16: ἐναγκα-

¹ Accordingly, Th. Zahn, *Das Evangelium des Matthaeus ausgelegt*, 1903, p. 589 says correctly (on Mt. xix. 16): "The close chronological connection is assured by the καὶ ἰδοὺ, verse 16, after ἐπορεύθη ἐκείθεν, verse 15."

λυσάμενος ; cf. ix. 36 and also Lk. ii. 28).² What Jesus says, therefore, is that those who enter the Kingdom of God are like "infants of days". Such infants are not to be debarred from coming³ to Him, because forsooth they cannot profit by His teaching or profit Him by their service. It is precisely of such⁴ as they that the Kingdom of God consists. "And verily I say unto you," He adds, "who-soever shall not receive the Kingdom of God as a little child, he shall in no wise enter therein" (Mk. x. 15; Lk. xviii. 17). The meaning is accurately expressed in Alford's paraphrase (the emphases are his own): "In order for us who are mature to come to Him, we must cast away all that wherein our maturity has caused us to differ from them and *become LIKE THEM*. . . . None can enter God's Kingdom except *as an infant*." But when Alford comes to explain what "as an infant" means, he loses the thread and

² Therefore Zahn, p. 587-8, is quite right when he comments on Matthew's *παιδιά*: "Little children who were still in the arms (therefore, Lk. xviii. 15 *βρέφη*), were brought by their mothers or nurses to Jesus."

³ T. R. Glover, *The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire*, 1909, p. 121, remarks: "We are apt to forget that 'come' is a Greek verb carrying volition with it." This is scarcely true. *Ἐρχομαι* expresses rather mere motion, progress: cf. e.g. Mt. ii. 9, vi. 10, vii. 25, 27, ix. 15, x. 13, xviii. 7, xxiii. 35.

⁴ That is, not of infants like those now in His presence, but of people like those infants in the qualities which had led to their debarring. Zahn, however (p. 588), reasonably argues that in the *τῶν τοιούτων* there is included also a *τούτων*, or rather a *καὶ τούτων*. He soon, however, transforms this into its opposite, as if he were arguing that in a designated *τούτῳ* there was also a *καὶ τοιούτων* included: "not only do the little children belong to the Kingdom and the Kingdom to them, but the Kingdom belongs only to them and to such as have become like them." Similarly Loisy, *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*, 1908, II, p. 205. What our Lord says is that the Kingdom consists not of children, but of those who are like children; actual children are no doubt included, but we must not reverse the emphasis. Even Calvin (*Inst.* IV, xvi. 7 *ad fin.*), arguing for infant baptism, yields to the temptation to reverse it: "When He commands that infants should be permitted to come to Him, nothing is clearer than that He means true infancy. That this may not seem absurd He adds: 'Of such is the kingdom of heaven'. But if infants must be included, it cannot be doubtful that by the term 'of such' there are designated infants themselves and also those who are like them."

thinks of the innocence, the simplicity, the trustfulness of childhood, or the like.⁵ That in which maturity differs from infancy, however, lies just in its self-dependence and power of self-help. We become "as a little child" when, in the words of the revival hymn which was such an offence to James Anthony Froude, "we cast our deadly doing down" and make our appeal on the sole score of sheer helplessness.

Zahn, therefore, strikes a much truer note when he comments:⁶ "Over against the fancy (*Diünkel*) of the disciples, who ground their claim that the Kingdom belongs to them on their intelligence and will, Jesus reminds them that they must rather, by renunciation of their own intelligence and will, obtain the receptivity (*Empfänglichkeit*) for the blessings and benefit of the Kingdom which the immature children possess of themselves." And so does Wendt:⁷ "But in this very respect, of having no claim, so that they could offer nothing but only wish to have something, Jesus finds the ground for the children being permitted to come to Him, that He might show them His love and give them His blessing. For in their unpretentious receptivity He recognizes the necessary condition which must exist in all who would enter the Kingdom of God." "Under this childlike character, He does not understand any virtue of childlike blamelessness, but only the receptivity itself (which is the notion impressively emphasized by Him) on the part of

⁵ It would be difficult to go more astray here than A. Loisy does (p. 205): "He profits by the occasion to remind them of the moral worth of infants, and of the merit which belongs to the spirit of infancy. . . . Nothing is opposed to Jesus' having in view infants and those who resemble them in the spirit of candor and of simplicity." C. G. Montefiori (*The Synoptic Gospels*, 1909, I, p. 243) is better, though still confused: "The child symbolizes or represents the temper in which the Kingdom must be received. Humble trust, a complete lack of assertiveness, no consciousness of 'merit' or desert, simple confidence and purity,—these are the qualities which Jesus means to indicate in the character of a true child. The Kingdom can only be entered by those who can approach it in such a spirit." New-born babies represent no particular temper, and exemplify no particular spirit: they illustrate a particular condition.

⁶ Pp. 588-9.

⁷ H. H. Wendt, *The Teaching of Jesus*, E. T., II, pp. 49-50.

those who do not regard themselves as too good or too bad for the offered gift, but receive it with hearty desire." The emphasis which these expositors throw on "receptivity" as the characteristic of infancy—as if it were an active quality—is not drawn from the text but belongs to the habits of thought derived by them from a Lutheran inheritance. It requires to be eliminated before the meaning of our Lord's enunciation can be purely caught. Infancy is characterized by "receptivity" as little as by "blamelessness" or by "trustfulness"; its characteristic is just helpless need. He who receives⁸ the Kingdom of God "as a little child" receives it (in this sense) passively; is the pure recipient, not the earner of its blessings. What our Lord here declares is thus, in brief, that no one enters the Kingdom of God save as an infant enters the world, naked and helpless and without any claim upon it whatever.

No more illuminating comment on our Lord's teaching here could easily be imagined than that which is supplied by the immediately succeeding incident, that of the rich young ruler. No sooner had our Lord announced that "whosoever shall not receive the Kingdom of God as a little child, he shall in no wise enter therein", than one appeared before Him bent on making his way into the Kingdom in quite another fashion. And, indeed, if any could hope to acquire it for himself, it might well be supposed to be this eager young man. He had everything to commend him. He was young, he was rich, he was highly placed, he was clean. He was accustomed to desire good things, and, desiring them, he was accustomed to obtain them for himself: and, with the resources at his command,—resources of youthful energy, wealth, position, moral earnestness—he was accustomed to obtain them without much difficulty. He had heard of Jesus, perhaps had heard Him; and he recognized in Him a good man whose counsel were well worth

⁸ Δέχομαι, not λαμβάνω (or αἰρέω) is the word our Lord uses, and despite the wearing off of the edges of the distinction in usage, the difference remains fundamentally good that λαβεῖν is taking, δέξασθαι is receiving.

having. And he had conceived a commendable desire for the eternal life which Jesus was proclaiming. What remained but to learn from this good teacher what needed to be done, in order to obtain it? It never occurred to this rich and influential youth, accustomed to get what he wanted, but that this good thing which he now desired might be obtainable at its own proper price; and was he not prepared and fully able to pay the price and so to secure it? It seemed to him an easy thing to purchase eternal life.

It was our Lord's painful task, in response to the young man's appeal for guidance, to reveal him to himself in the shallowness of his nature and outlook; to open his eyes to the nature of that eternal life which he sought, in its radical difference from the life he was living; and to make it clear to him that what he had thought so easy to acquire was to be had only at a great price, a price which he might not be willing to pay, a price which he might find it was impossible for him to pay. And it was our Lord's task, further, on the basis of this incident, to carry home poignantly to the consciousness of His disciples the lesson He had already taught them in the incident of the blessing of the little children, that the Kingdom of God is not a thing into which in any case men can buy their way; that they stand before it helpless, and can make their way into it as little as a camel can force itself through the eye of a needle. It may be conferred by God: it cannot be acquired by men.⁹

As the result of his conversation, the young man departed with his countenance fallen,¹⁰ exceeding sorrowful,¹¹

⁹ Nothing could be more inapt than to say with Montefiori (I, p. 243); "Wellhausen points out most aptly how Shakespeare [Rich. II, act v, scene v] has felt the contrast between this section [on the blessing of the children] and the section which follows it [on the rich young man]. For *here* the Kingdom is a gift which one must accept as a child, *there* it is only to be won by effort and self-denial." In both sections alike the Kingdom is a pure gift and cannot be earned.

¹⁰ Mk. x. 22, *στυγνάσας*, full of gloom; cf. Swete's note *in loc.*

¹¹ Lk. xviii. 23, *περίλυπος*, hemmed in on all sides by sorrow, so that there is no escape; cf. *Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies*, 1912, p. 76.

—the eternal life which he had expected to reach out his hand and take was not for him. And the disciples had had borne in upon them with tremendous force the fundamental fact that salvation¹² in every case of its accomplishment is nothing less than an authentic miracle of divine grace; always and everywhere in the strictest sense impossible with man, and possible only with God, with whom all things are possible. The effect of this teaching, if it was naturally to depress those who sought eternal life by their own efforts, was equally naturally to exhilarate those who were looking to God alone for the blessings of the Kingdom, giving them a higher sense of both their certainty and their value. This surely is the right account to give of Peter's question (Mt. xix. 27; Mk. x. 28; Lk. xviii. 28), with our Lord's response to which the conversation closes. We cannot say, then, with Edersheim:¹³ "It almost jars on our ears, and prepares us for still stranger and sadder things to come, when Peter, perhaps as spokesman for the rest, seems to remind our Lord that they had forsaken all to follow Him." Peter rather, his heart swelling with freshly inflamed hope (*spe ex verbis Salvatoris concepta*, remarks Bengel accurately) inquires eagerly (not boastfully but in humble gratitude) into the nature of the blessings which God has in mind for those who have entered the Kingdom.¹⁴ Our Lord meets the inquiry in its own spirit and grants to His followers

¹² It is worth noting how the terms "eternal life", "the kingdom of God", "salvation" are interchanged in the narrative, as an indication of the sense put upon them by our Lord. In the conversation with the young man, the term used is "eternal life" (Mt. xix. 17, "life"). But on our Lord's turning to His disciples (Mt. xix. 23; Mk. xvi. 23; Lk. xviii. 24) "the Kingdom of God [heaven]" is substituted for this with no substantial change of meaning. This in turn in all three narratives (Mt. xix. 25; Mk. x. 26; Lk. xviii. 26) is understood by the disciples to be equivalent to "salvation". "Eternal life" appears again at the end (Mt. xix. 29; Mk. x. 30; Lk. xviii. 30).

¹³ *Life and Times of Jesus*,¹ II, p. 343; cf. the even more condemnatory note of Swete on Mk. x. 28, where he seems to suggest that a "tactless frankness" of speech meets us in Mark's report, which Luke already found it desirable to soften, and that Matthew's "what then shall we have" we may hope was never spoken.

¹⁴ Cf. A. Plummer, on Lk. xviii. 28.

a splendid vision of their reward,—only closing with words which would leave fixed in their minds the consciousness that all things are reserved to the Divine discretion: “And many shall be last that are first; and first that are last.”

There are no substantial differences between the three reports which are given us of this remarkable incident. Each of the Evangelists records details peculiar to himself. Each narrative has its own tone and coloring: Mark's is distinguished by vividness, Luke's by plain straightforwardness, Matthew's by clearness. But it is precisely the same story which is told by them all: the same story in its contents, in its mode of development, in its dénouement, in its lesson. Having any one of the three we have it all, presented after the same fashion and with the same force. It has no doubt been common to represent the descriptions of the opening scene, by Mark and Luke on the one hand and by Matthew on the other, as divergent; and this divergence has been magnified, and serious inferences have been drawn from it, derogatory to Matthew's integrity as a historian and injurious to our Lord's dignity as a Divine person and even to His moral perfection. All this rests upon misunderstanding. The wide-spread vogue it has obtained requires, nevertheless, that it shall be carefully looked into.

A simple reading of the opening two verses in the three accounts reveals at once, of course, a formal difference between Mark and Luke on the one side and Matthew on the other in their reports alike of the words in which the young man addressed Jesus and of those in which our Lord responded to his inquiry. In Mark (and Luke) we read that the young man addressed Jesus as “Good Master” and asked Him broadly, “What shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?” In Matthew, he is represented as addressing Him simply as “Master,” and asking Him with more exact definition, “What good thing shall I do that I may have life?” Correspondingly, Jesus is represented in Mark (and Luke) as replying, “Why callest thou me good? No one is good except one, God. Thou knowest the commandments . . .”;

but in Matthew, "Why askest thou me concerning the good? One there is that is good. But if thou wishest to enter into life, keep the commandments" We have spoken of these differences as formal; it would seem to be difficult to magnify them into anything more. Though, naturally, a matter of curious interest, they in no way affect the significance of the story itself. Despite them the two narratives, even at this precise point, yield exactly the same general sense and differ only in the details through which this common sense is brought to expression. To make this evident we need only to attend separately to what each mode of telling the story actually places before us.

According to Matthew, then, scarcely had Jesus issued from the house in which He had received and blessed the children,¹⁵ when an individual (there is a slight emphasis upon his being *one* out of the multitude) came to Him, and, addressing Him as "Master", (that is, "Teacher", or "Rabbi"), asked Him, "What good thing shall I do that I may have eternal life?" He is asking, not for general prescriptions of righteousness, but for a particular requirement by doing just which he may secure the eternal life he seeks; and so set is his mind upon this particular good thing that when Jesus refers him to the divine commandments in general, he still demands (verse 18), "Which?" In response to his demand, nevertheless, Jesus points him just to the divine commandments, thus in effect repelling the implication that eternal life can be grounded on anything but that entire righteousness reflected in the law of God; and, behind that, suggesting that it was not instruction in righteousness that the young man needed but the power of a new life. Jesus' reply amounts, thus, to saying: "Why make inquiry concerning the good thing needed? There is One who is good and He has given commandments; keep them." It is the equivalent of, "They have Moses and the Prophets; let them hear them" of Luke xvi. 29. What Jesus actually says is: "Why askest thou me concerning

¹⁵ So Zahn correctly, p. 589.

the good? There is One that is good, and,¹⁶ if thou wishest to enter into life, keep His commandments."

The thing to be noted particularly is that no emphasis falls on the enclitic $\mu\epsilon$, and therefore no contrast is intimated between Jesus and the One that is good. The contrast intimated is wholly between the good thing inquired of and the known commandments of God. To avoid the almost inevitable emphasizing of the "me" in a translation, it might be well to omit it altogether for the moment and to paraphrase simply: "Why dost thou inquire about the good as if that were a matter still in doubt? God, who is goodness itself, has published the eternal rule of righteousness." Keim,¹⁷ it is true, scoffs at the notion that no contrast is drawn between Jesus and God. "But $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\varsigma$," he cries, meaning that quite apart from the $\mu\epsilon$ the contrast is inherent in the mere declaration that "there is One"—that is to say, only One—"who is good". There is, however, an inadvertence apparent in this. The declaration that "there is One that is good" does set God in contrast with all others: it is to God in His already published will, not to anyone else whatever, that we are to go to learn the law of life. But it does not set God in contrast specifically with Jesus. So soon as it is read as contrasting God specifically with Jesus an emphasis is necessarily thrown on the enclitic $\mu\epsilon$ which it will not bear. Jesus is therefore not contrasting Himself here with God. He is only in the most emphatic way pointing to God and His published law as the unique source of the law of life. His own relation to that God is completely out of sight, and nothing whatever is suggested with reference to it. Zahn is accordingly entirely right when he writes:¹⁸ "For the question of the position Jesus assigns Himself between the one good One who is God and men who are evil, little occasion is given by this paedagogic conversation."

¹⁶ It is the continuative $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$, like *autem*: cf. Meyer *in loc.*

¹⁷ *Jesus of Nazara*, E. T., V, p., 37, note.

¹⁸ P. 590, note 64.

Mark, like Matthew, connects the incident of the rich young man closely with that of the blessing of the little children. It was while Jesus was in the act of coming forth from the house (verse 10) in which the blessing of the children had taken place, for His journeying,¹⁹ that an individual from the crowd (ἐξ) came running, and fell on his knees, and, addressing Him by the unusual title of "Good Master", demanded of Him what he should do to inherit eternal life. It is the strangeness of the address, "Good Master"—apparently unexampled in extant Jewish literature²⁰—which attracts attention here; and naturally it was this which determined the response of Jesus.²¹ It threw into relief—as it would not have done had it been more customary—the levity with which the young man approached Jesus of whom he knew so little, with so remarkable a demand. Jesus' response naturally, therefore, takes the form, "Why callest thou me good? No one is good except one, God. Thou knowest the commandments" This response

¹⁹ Cf. B. Weiss *in loc.*

²⁰ Cf. Edersheim, *Life and Times*, II, p. 339: "In no recorded instance was a Jewish Rabbi addressed as 'Good Master'"; A. Plummer, on Lk. xviii. 19: "There is no instance in the whole Talmud of a Rabbi being addressed as 'Good Master': the title was absolutely unknown among the Jews. This, therefore, was an extraordinary address, and perhaps a fulsome compliment"; G. Dalman, *The Words of Jesus*, E. T., p. 337: "This address was at variance with actual usage, and, moreover, in the mouth of the speaker was insolent flattery." F. Spitta, *ZNTW*, ix (1908), p. 14, strangely wishes to divide the "Good Master" into two independent designations: "If we keep Mark and Luke alone in view, there is to be remarked first of all, with respect to the address to Jesus common to them, διδάσκαλε ἀγαθέ, that the difficulty adverted to above, of connecting רַבִּי with the predicate טוֹב, is removed if we take ἀγαθέ as a second address by the side of διδάσκαλε (cf. von Hofmann on Lk. xviii. 18). By this, of course, the stress on the designation of Jesus as ἀγαθός is further strengthened", . . . Lagrange on Mk. x. 17, very properly remarks: "No example is known of a Rabbi being designated thus (רַבִּי טוֹב), but this is no reason for cutting the appellation in two (against Spitta). It is only necessary to note that it exceeds usage and accustomed courtesies."

²¹ Cf. Edersheim, II, p. 339: "The strangeness of such an address from Jewish lips giving only the more reason for taking it up in the reply."

at first sight seems in itself to be capable of two constructions. We may either fill out: "Thou art wrong in calling me good; this predicate, in any worthy sense of it at least, belongs to none but God." Or we may fill out rather: "There is a great deal involved, if only you appreciated it, in calling me good; for there is no one that is good but one, that is God." The primary objection to the former view is that it presses the contrast beyond the power of the enclitic *με* to bear. For the *με* is enclitic here as well as in Matthew, and can be emphasized here as little as there. The emphasis certainly falls not on it, but on the *ἀγαθόν*.²² The sense is therefore certainly not that the young man had called specifically *Jesus* good; but that he had called Jesus specifically *good*. There is no contrast therefore instituted between Jesus and God. This is the fundamental fact regarding the passage which must rule its whole interpretation.

The sense need not be, however, that Jesus identifies Himself here with God, though the words are in themselves flexible to that interpretation: "Why is it that thou dost thus address me as *good*? Dost thou fully apprehend what is involved in this? Art thou really aware that I am indeed that God who alone is good?" It may rather be that Jesus, without implication as to His own real personality, is only directing attention to God as the only true standard of goodness: "Why dost thou use this strange address of '*Good Master*'? Art thou seeking some one good enough to give sure directions as to eternal life? Hast thou forgotten God? And dost thou not know His commandments?" If it be thought that some slight contrast between Jesus and God is still discoverable, even in this understanding of the pas-

²² So Swete *in loc.* correctly: "The emphasis is on *ἀγαθόν*, not on the pronoun. The Lord begins by compelling the enquirer to consider his own words. He had used *ἀγαθέ* lightly, in a manner which revealed the poverty of his moral conceptions. From that word Christ accordingly starts. . . . The man is summoned to contemplate the absolute *ἀγαθωσύνη* which is the attribute of God, and to measure himself by that supreme standard."

sage, and the enclitic *με* is appealed to in order to forbid even so much emphasis on Jesus' person, the remark may be in place here as truly as it was with regard to Matthew's phrase, that the contrast involved in the words "No one is good except one, God", is not between God and Jesus, but between God and all others. There can be imported into the passage, in any case, no denial on Jesus' part, either that He is good or that He is God. It is again merely the "They have Moses and the Prophets; let them hear them." The whole emphasis is absorbed in the stress laid upon God's sole right to announce the standard of goodness. The question of the relation of Jesus to this God does not emerge: there is equally no denial that He is God, and no affirmation that He is God.²³ The young man is merely pointed to the rule which had been given by the good God as a witness to what it is requisite to do that we may be well-pleasing to Him. He is merely bidden not to look elsewhere for prescriptions as to life save in God's revealed will. The search for a master good enough to lead men to life finds its end in God and His commandments.

Obviously the drift of the conversation in Mark (and Luke) is precisely the same as in Matthew. The two narra-

²³ So J. A. Alexander, on Mk. x. 18: "The goodness of our Lord Himself and His divinity are then not at all in question, and are consequently neither affirmed nor denied"; Swete: "Viewed in this light the words are seen not to touch the question of our Lord's human sinlessness, or of His oneness with the Father"; Wohlenberg: "Whether this predicate does not belong to Him in its complete and full sense is a question into which our Lord does not enter." Lagrange: "But it may be said that the most traditional opinion is that Jesus glorifies His Father without comparing Himself with Him. The question of His own nature is not raised; in responding to the young man He only takes account of the state of his mind. . . . There cannot be drawn from this passage any conclusion for or against Christological doctrine." Cf. also Plummer on Mt. xix. 10 ff.: "The explanation of 'Why callest thou me good? None is good save one, even God', belongs to the commentators on Mark (see Swete). Suffice it to say here that Jesus was neither questioning His own sinlessness, nor intimates that the rich man ought not to call Him good unless he recognized Him as divine. The rich man could not have appreciated either of these points. Rather He turns his thoughts from his own inadequate standard of what may win eternal life to the Standard of the Divine Goodness."

tives are in substance completely consentaneous.²⁴ It is not to be supposed that either has reported in full detail all that was said. Actual conversations are ordinarily somewhat repetitious: good reports of them faithfully give their gist, in condensation. It has been said that Jane Austen records the conversations at her dinner-parties with such, not faithfulness but, circumstantiality that her reports bore the reader almost as much as the actual conversations would have done. There is no reason to suppose that the Evangelists aimed at such meticulous particularity in their reports of our Lord's conversations. Not all that He said, any more than all that He did (Jno. xx, 30, xxi. 25), has been recorded. Each selects the line of remark which seems to him to embody the pith of what was said; and the skill and faithfulness with which they have done this are attested by such a phenomenon as now faces us, where, amid even a striking diversity in the details reported, a complete harmony is preserved in the substance of the discourse. Wilhelm Wagner²⁵ makes himself merry indeed over what he considers the conceit of Olshausen,²⁶ who recognizes in both forms of narrative exact historical tradition, and looks upon each as preserving only fragments of what was said. And, no doubt, if the state of the case were as Wagner represents it,—if, that is, the two narratives were mutually contradictory and exclusive of one another, so that one could not say of them, *Sowohl . . . wie . . .* but only *Entweder . . . oder . . .*, Olshausen's treatment of them would be absurd. Since, however, they are entirely in agreement in substance, Olshausen's assumption is a mere matter of course. Each gives us in any case only a portion of what was said. It may be plausibly argued, indeed, that Mark intimates as much by his employment of the imperfect tense when introducing the words reported from the

²⁴ Cf. Schanz on Lk. xviii. 18: "The *punctum saliens* in both forms is the reference away from Himself and the reference to God. . . . The two differ only in form."

²⁵ ZNTW, viii (1907), p. 144.

²⁶ *Synoptische Erklärung der drei ersten Evangelien*, on Mt. xix. 17.

lips of the questioner: ἐπηρώτα.²⁷ We are told, to be sure, that Mark's imperfects are not significant, that he interchanges them arbitrarily with aorists, and that therefore no inferences can be grounded on them.²⁸ This contention

²⁷ Cf. George Salmon, *The Human Element in the Gospels*, 1907, p. 400: "It had occurred to me as possible that Mark's imperfect (ἐπηρώτα) might be understood to imply that the rich man had put his question more than once, and that thus there would be no contradiction between Evangelists who recorded different forms in which the question had been put. But I am now disposed to think that the imperfect tense indicates that the young man puts a question which he had asked before, and that now, learning of our Lord's approaching departure, he runs up to ask it once more before our Lord goes away." The earlier view is certainly the more plausible.

²⁸ Cf. the discussion on the subject referred to by P. W. Schmiedel, *Encyc. Bibl.*, II, col. 1874, note 1: "Feine, *JPT*, 1887, pp. 45-57, 77; 1888, pp. 405 f.; Holtzmann, *ibid.*, 1878, pp. 168-171, with Weiss' reply, pp. 583-585." B. Weiss, in his *Das Matthäus-Evangelium und seine Lucas Parallelen*, 1870, p. 27, had said of Mark: "The judicious interchange of the descriptive Imperfect, of the vivaciously representative Present, and of the narrative Aorist is far from arbitrary; it is conformed with the greatest accuracy to the whole disposition and intention of the representation, which makes itself clear precisely by means of its careful observation." H. J. Holtzmann declares this overdrawn: the Imperfect is often employed merely to give vividness and an autoptic air to the narrative and is "frequently in use by later writers, especially with verbs of saying, giving, sending." He quotes Alex. Buttmann (*Grammatik des N. T. Sprachgebrauchs*, 1859, p. 173 [E. T., p. 200]) to the effect that the interchange of Aorists and Imperfects in historical writing depends only on the caprice of the writer. In reply, Weiss (p. 584) reiterates his belief that Mark does not use the Imperfect without significance. Feine in response, endeavors to show by examples that Mark uses the Imperfect quite arbitrarily, often in quite the sense of the Aorist (1888, p. 405), and that especially with regard to ἐρωτά which is only a verb of asking. Matthew uses this verb, when it occurs in a historical tense of the finite verb, always in the Aorist (seven times) while Mark uses it in the Aorist only six times, but in the Imperfect fifteen times, often in the Imperfect where Matthew in the parallel passage has the Aorist. Facts like these only show, however, that in narrating the facts the two writers present them to this extent from a different point of view, and this is what Buttmann means in the passage cited by Holtzmann,—not that the tenses do not differ in their implications but that it is often a mere matter of the way a writer looks at the same facts which is involved. For the matter in general, see the grammarians; beside Buttmann, §137, 7, also Winer, §40, 3, *d*, Blass, §57, 4, Jelf, §401, 34.

seems, however, to be overstrained; and in a case—like that now before us—where the present, aorist and imperfect tenses are brought together in close contiguity, their shades of implication can scarcely be wholly neglected. The general fact, however, does not rest upon the interpretation put upon Mark's ἐπ' αὐτῷ. It lies in the nature of the case that two accounts of a conversation which agree as to the substance of what was said, but differ slightly in the details reported, are reporting different fragments of the conversation, selected according to the judgment of each writer as the best vehicles of its substance.

An account of the relations of the two narratives quite different from this, it is true, is very commonly given. The representation which for the moment seems to be most widely adopted, looks upon Mark's narrative as the original one, and supposes it to have been closely followed by Luke but fundamentally altered by Matthew under the influence of dogmatic considerations. This view implies an interpretation of the narrative of Mark different from that offered above, as well as a different account of the relations of the narratives of the Evangelists to one another. According to it, Mark represents Jesus as repelling the attribution to Him of the epithet "good", because He is conscious of creaturely imperfection; and thus as, in His creaturely humility, setting Himself over against God in the strongest possible contrast. Matthew then is supposed to have drawn back from this representation as derogatory to Jesus' dignity as he conceived it, and to have therefore modified the narrative so that it should no longer imply a repudiation on Jesus' part of either goodness or divinity. That the conception of the drift of Mark's narrative which is assumed in this view is exegetically untenable, we have already endeavored to show. It is already wrecked indeed on the simple enclitic με,²⁹ which will not allow the contrast between Jesus and God which is its core. That it throws

²⁹ The matter is explained by Blass, *Grammar of N. T. Greek*, §48, 3 (p. 165). Perhaps Mt. x. 32-33 may be profitably compared with our present passage.

into chief prominence a matter which lies quite apart from the main subject under discussion is also fatal to it. There are, however, general considerations which also quite forbid it. That Matthew should be gratuitously charged with falsifying the text that lay before him in the interests of his doctrinal views is an indefensible procedure. There is no reason to believe Matthew capable of such dishonesty. And why the narrative as it lies in Mark's account should have been less acceptable to Matthew than it was to Mark himself and to Luke remains inexplicable. It is not doubted that the dogmatic standpoint of Matthew was fully shared by Mark and Luke. It is quite certain, that, if the meaning put upon Mark's narrative by this conception of it is its true meaning, that fact was wholly unsuspected by either Mark or Luke. And there is no reason to suppose it would have been divined by Matthew either. There can be no doubt that Mark and Luke supposed, when they were narrating this incident, that they were writing down words in full harmony with their reverence for Jesus the Divine Savior, for the expression and justification of which they wrote their Gospels. To attribute to incidents which they record with this intent an exactly contrary significance, a meaning which flatly contradicts their most cherished convictions and the whole tenor of their Gospels, is to charge them with a stupidity in "compiling" their Gospels which is wholly incompatible with the character of the Gospels they have written. A critical theory which is inapplicable except on the assumption of stupidity and dishonesty on the part of such writers as the Evangelists show themselves to be, is condemned from the outset.

Despite its impossibility, however, this theory has of late acquired wide vogue; and it is perhaps worth while to see how it is presented by its chief advocates. We may perhaps permit P. W. Schmiedel to expound it for us. He is speaking at the moment of the Gospel of John and remarks:³⁰ "And equally unacceptable to this Evangelist

³⁰ *Das vierte Evangelium gegenüber den drei ersten* (Religions-

would be the record in Mark (x. 17 f.) and Luke, that to the address of a rich man, 'Good Master, what must I do to obtain eternal life?' Jesus replied: 'Why callest thou me good? No one is good except God alone'. And yet beyond question this reply came from Jesus' lips. How little it could have been invented by any one of His worshippers who write in the Gospels, is shown by Matthew. With him (xix. 16 ff.) the rich man asks: 'Master, what good thing must I do that I may have eternal life?' And Jesus answers: 'Why askest thou me concerning the good? There is one that is good.' How does Jesus come by these last words? Should He not rather, since He was asked concerning the good, proceed: 'There is one thing that is good'? And that would not only be the sole suitable reply, because of what had preceded, but also because of what follows: for Jesus says further: 'If, however, thou wouldst enter into life, keep the commandments.' Accordingly, in Jesus' view, the good concerning which He was asked, consists in keeping the commandments. How did Matthew come by the words: 'There is one that is good'? Only by having before him as he wrote the text of Mark. Here we have our finger on the way in which Matthew with conscious purpose altered this text in its opening words, so that it should no longer be offensive: and on the way in which at the end he has left a few words of it unaltered, which betray to us the manner in which the thing has been done."³¹ This

geschichtliche Volksbücher, I, 8 and 10), 1906, p. 19. Cf. *Encyc. Bibl.*, II, 1901, col. 1847; "In Mark x. 17 f. the answer of Jesus to the question, 'Good Master, what shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?' is 'Why callest thou me good? None is good, save God only.' In Mat. xix. 16 f. the question runs, 'Master, what good thing shall I do that I may have eternal life?' and the first part of the answer corresponds: 'Why askest thou me concerning that which is good?' Very inappropriate, then, is the second part: 'One (masc.) there is who is the good (ὁ ἀγαθός)'. Had not Matthew here had before him such a text as that of Mark and Luke, he would certainly, following his own line of thought, have proceeded: 'One (neut.) is the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν),' all the more because the immediate continuation also (verse 5 17-19), the exhortation to keep the commandments, would have suited so admirably."

³¹ Cf. also Otto Schmiedel, *Die Hauptprobleme der Leben-Jesu-*

representation turns on three hinges. They are, first, that, according to Mark's account, Jesus repels the ascription of goodness to Him because He is conscious of not deserving it; secondly, that Matthew, offended by this attribution to Jesus of a consciousness of sinfulness, has deliberately³² altered the story so as to remove it; and thirdly, that Matthew has done this so bunglingly as to retain at an important

Forschung,² 1906, p. 47: "Here also belongs the passage which has been mentioned in another place, where Jesus, in Mk. x. 18, said to the rich young man, 'Why callest thou me good? No one is good except God.' Jesus denies therefore His absolute sinlessness. Matthew (xix. 17), seeks to efface that." At the place referred to (p. 27) he had said: "In Mk. x. 18 Jesus says to the rich young man, 'Why callest thou me good? No man is good except God.' To Matthew (xix. 17), this statement seemed dangerous to the sinlessness of Jesus, and so he changed it to: 'Why askest thou me concerning the good (neuter)?' Now, however, the following: 'No one is good', &c., naturally no longer fits on." Cf. also, the similar representation by W. Heitmüller in Schiele and Zscharnack's *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, III (1912), col. 359.

³² Even W. C. Allen declares the differences of Matthew from Mark "probably intentional" changes, and A. Plummer (*Com. on Mat.*, pp. 264-5) elaborately explains: "It is quite easy to see *why* Mt. has made these alterations. He could not bring himself to record that Jesus said, 'Why callest thou Me good? None is good save one, even God.' We have seen how readily he omits anything which seems to detract from the Divine nature of the Messiah, such as His asking for information or exhibiting human emotion, and how he loves to emphasize the wonderful features in His mighty works. Such a writer would feel that our Lord's reply, as recorded by Mk. was likely to mislead, and was not likely to be correctly worded; he therefore substitutes what seems to him to be more probable." Wilhelm Brückner (*Protestantische Monatshefte*, IV, 1900, p. 423), arguing that Mark looked upon Jesus as merely a creature, supposes that he naturally and without hesitation ascribes to Him the repudiation of the ascription of "Good Master", which Lk. xviii. 18, 19 retains, while at Mat. xix. 16, 17 there is found "a perfectly obvious tendential alteration." H. J. Holtzmann (*Die Synoptiker*, p. 268, cf. p. 88) also applies to Matthew's action the opprobrious epithet of "tendential". J. M. Thompson (*Jesus according to S. Mk.*, 1909, p. 160), considers Matthew's text "a clumsy attempt to get rid of what seemed to him a difficulty". F. C. Conybeare (*Hibbert Journal*, I, i, [Oct., 1902], pp. 109, 112), so far improves on this as to attribute this "bit of botching" not to the author of the Gospel of Matthew but to "an ancient corrector who could not bear even the shadow of an insinuation that the Lord was other than 'without sin'."

point, a trait from Mark which is meaningless in his own narrative.³³

The third of these contentions obviously neutralizes the second. A writer shrewd enough to undertake and so skillfully to begin the dogmatic alterations ascribed to Matthew would be shrewd enough to carry them successfully through. Certainly he would not have deliberately altered Mark's "No one is good except God alone", and yet have altered it so little to his purpose. To have supposed that Matthew, after having taken the trouble to reconstruct the first portion of the conversation of the young man with Jesus in order to adjust it to his own views, should have neglected to reconstruct the second portion of it and have left it in staring contradiction to what he had just written, would have been bad enough. But to suppose that he did not neglect to reconstruct the second portion also, but altered it too, but altered it so bunglingly as to leave it essentially the same in meaning as it was before alteration, and still in crass conflict with his reconstructed version of the former part of the conversation, is past crediting. A critical theory which will not hold unless we suppose not only that Mark and Luke were too stupid to perceive the open meaning of the incident they were recording, but also that Matthew, who was intelligent enough to perceive it and dishonest enough to attempt to adjust it to the view of Jesus common to all three, was yet so stupid that he could not carry the

³³ Cf. Wellhausen on Mt. xix. 17: "The εἰς ἀγαθός of his model he has retained, although it no longer makes sense. It should logically be 'There is one thing that is good'"; A. Plummer, *Com. on Mat.*, p. 264, note: "Somewhat illogically he has left εἰς and ἀγαθός unchanged: it should be ἓν and ἀγαθόν: 'one thing is good'"; Montefiori, *The Synopt. Gospels*, 1909, II, p. 696, "Matthew rather awkwardly keeps εἰς ὁ ἀγαθός, which is based on Mark's οὐδεὶς ἀγαθὸς εἰ μὴ εἰς ὁ θεός, although the words have really no meaning without the repudiation of 'goodness' as applied to Jesus." The odd thing is that none of the critics appears to have observed that "One thing is good" could scarcely be said by Jesus in this context, when the young man was inquiring after one good thing that he might do and Jesus was pointing him rather to the comprehensive law: "one thing is good" would be out of the key of the whole conversation.

adjustment through—although it required only the substitution of an obvious neuter for a baldly impossibly masculine,—is clearly unworthy of serious consideration. It is very plain that such a theory is violently imposed on the texts and is driven through in the face of impossibilities. We have already seen that it is based on a failure to catch the meaning, natural and easy, of either narrative the relations of which it professes to expound: we perceive now that the explanation it offers of these relations is nothing less than absurd. There is no reason to suppose that Matthew would put a meaning—and, be it remembered, an intrinsically unnatural and linguistically impossible meaning—on Mark's narrative which it is certain that neither Mark nor Luke put on it; there is no justification for imagining that, if he did, he was dishonest enough to attempt to reconstruct the narrative so as to bring it into harmony with his own conception of Jesus (which, be it remembered, was Mark's and Luke's also); there is no propriety in assuming that if he undertook such a task he was capable of botching it as he is, on this theory, represented as doing. Whatever may be the relations of these narratives, it is certain that Matthew's was not made out of Mark's; and assuredly not as a dogmatic revision in the interests of our Lord's sinlessness and deity.³⁴

³⁴Keim (*Jesus of Nazara*, V, p. 37) insists on the priority of Matthew's narrative. In point of fact neither narrative can be derived from the other. And in general, no form of criticism is more uncertain than that, now so diligently prosecuted, which seeks to explain the several forms of narratives in the Synoptics as modifications one of another. P. W. Schmiedel very properly acknowledges (*Encyc. Bib.*, II, col. 1846) that "every assertion, no matter how evident, as to the priority of one Evangelist, and the posteriority of another, in any given passage, will be found to have been turned the other way round by quite a number of scholars of repute." The illustration he gives is characteristic. It is Mk. vi. 3 as compared with Mt. xiii. 55; Lk. iv. 22. "On the one side it is held that Matthew and Luke are here secondary, because they shrink from calling Jesus an artisan; on the other the secondary place is given to Mark because he shrinks from calling Jesus the Son of Joseph." The fundamental fault lies in the primary presupposition that the Evangelists (or their sources) have manipulated their material in the interests of the glorification of Jesus.

There is no reason, therefore, derivable from this critical speculation why we should desert the natural understanding of Mark's (and Luke's) narrative and its relation to Matthew's which lies on its surface. And our confidence in it will be greatly strengthened, if we will attend for a little to the alternative interpretations of it which have been proposed. These are very numerous and very divergent. They may be arranged, however, in a not unnatural sequence, and we may thus be enabled to survey them without confusion, and to catch their essential significance with some ease.

The interpretation which imposes on Mark's (and Luke's) narrative a repudiation by Jesus of the predicate "good", with its involved contrast of Him with God, was already current among the Arians,³⁵ and possibly even in certain heretical circles of the second century.³⁶ It is only natural that it should be widely adopted again in modern Liberal circles. Wilhelm Wagner in an interesting sketch of the history of the interpretation of the passage³⁷ chooses G.

Omit this unjustified presupposition and no ground remains for either form of conjecture. An (unsuccessful) effort was made long ago by A. Hilgenfeld (*Kritische Untersuchungen über die Evangelien Justins, der Clementinischen Homilien, und Marcions*, 1850, pp. 220 f., 362, 426; *Theologische Jahrbücher*, 1853, pp. 207, 235 f.; 1857, pp. 414 ff.; cf. *ZWT*, 1863, pp. 361-2, note 3) to discover an older form of text of which both Mk. (and Lk.) and Mt. are modifications in doctrinal interests; cf. also W. Bousset, *Die Evangeliencitate Justins*, 1891, pp. 105-106, and (as a curiosity of critical literature) F. C. Conybeare, *Hibbert Journal*, I, i (Oct., 1902), pp. 109-112. See the detached note below (note 87).

³⁵ So we are told explicitly by Athanasius (*Migne, Pat. Graec.*, 26, col. 985 C) and Epiphanius (*Pat. Graec.*, 42, col. 229): see also Ambrose (*Pat. Lat.*, 16, col. 563) and Augustine (*Pat. Lat.*, 42, col. 800); and as well the Clementine Homilies (*Pat. Graec.*, 2, coll. 404, 405), on which see Dom Chapman, *ZNTW*, IX (1908).

³⁶ Marcion is reported by Epiphanius, *H.* 33, 7 (p. 339, cf. p. 315) to have read the passage: "Call me not good; one is good, even God the Father" (but cf. Hippolytus, *Ref. Haer.*, viii, 19). See further Hilgenfeld and Bousset as above, note 34), and especially Th. Zahn *Geschichte des Neutestamentlichen Kanons*,¹ II, 1890, pp. 483 f. See the detached note below (note 87).

³⁷ *ZNTW*, viii (1907), p. 156.

Volkmar as the representative of this mode of interpreting it. In Volkmar's view,³⁸ what is given expression in Jesus' reply is that in the Kingdom of God proclaimed by Him God is the sole Good, to whom homage is due. God is the supreme Good, and the adoration of Him the highest aim of the Kingdom of God. "Jesus is the announcer and even the King of the Kingdom of God on Earth, but not the supreme Good itself, which is to be adored. The Son of Man sought only to lead man to the perfect worship of God." To make his meaning clearer he adds: "Also He went (Mk. i. 9) to the baptism of repentance in consciousness of sin (*sündbewusst*).” Perhaps, however, the spirit of this interpretation is better expressed by no one than by H. J. Holtzmann³⁹ who writes: "We see Him who is addressed, in the consciousness of His own incompleteness, in remembrance of His severe moral battles and conflicts, in prevision of the approaching tidal-wave of a last and most violent trial, draw back, point above, and speak the humbly great word: 'Why callest thou me good? No one is good, except God alone' (Mk. x. 17-18; Lk. xviii. 18-19; cf. with this the deflection of Mt. xix. 16-17 which even the dullest eye must recognize as tendential). There is only one who stands above the world, without variableness or the necessity of ethical development, the eternally unchangeable God. By this, Jesus affirmed the fixed and immovable interval which separates Godhead and manhood in the moral sphere, as in Mk. xiii. 32 = Mt. xxiv. 36 He opens the same gulf between the two natures in the intellectual sphere. On both occasions Jesus takes His stand simply on the side of manhood." He goes on to say that the Lord's prayer, which he insists was not merely given to His disciples but was prayed by Jesus in company with His disciples, bears witness to the same effect, in its petitions for forgiveness and for protection from the evil one.⁴⁰ Among English writers

³⁸ *Die Evangelien oder Marcus und die Synopsis*, 1870, p. 469.

³⁹ *Lehrbuch der NT Theologie*, II, 1897, p. 268.

⁴⁰ Cf. also F. Barth, *Die Hauptprobleme des Lebens Jesu*,³ 1907, p. 251: "On the one side, Jesus takes His place wholly over against

J. M. Thompson affords an example of the same general point of view.⁴¹ "The stress in the last sentence is on 'good' not 'me'," he writes, "but this hardly lessens the force of the passage. It is not enough to suggest that the young man's idea of goodness needed correction, and that Jesus would point him from a wrong to a right meaning of the word. Nor is it Jesus' intention to deny as man any equality with God. The address, 'Good Master' contains no such suggestion. Theology is out of place in this passage, which deals with plain words in a plain way. There is in fact no adequate alternative to the natural interpretation. Jesus did not think Himself 'good' in the sense in which the young man had used the word, and in the sense in which it would be commonly used of God If He did not at this time feel Himself to be good in the sense in which God is good, neither did He think Himself to be divine in the sense in which God is divine." "A broad distinction is drawn—a distinction which cannot reasonably be confined to the simple ground of 'goodness'—between Jesus and God." Perhaps, however, no more pungent emphasis has been thrown upon this view than that thrown upon it by C. G. Montefiori.⁴² "The reply of Jesus," he writes, "is of the utmost significance. It is obvious that no divine being would or could have answered thus. Jesus knew Himself to be a man. . . . Yet it is a noble character which peeps through the fragmentary and one-sided records—none the less noble because we may be sure that of Jesus, both in fact and in his own estimate of Himself, the adage was true: 'there is no man that sinneth not'."⁴³

God on the side of man, and confesses Himself to possess the imperfection of human nature"—laying no claim to omniscience (Mk. xiii. 32), omnipotence (Mk. x. 40) or moral perfection (Mk. x. 17 f.). This last passage is misinterpreted if it is made to imply the deity of Christ: "the Christ of dogma would have spoken thus; the historical Jesus on the other hand refuses the predicate 'good', as belonging to God alone."

⁴¹ *Jesus according to S. Mark*, 1909, p. 159, also p. 254.

⁴² *The Synoptic Gospels*, 1909, I, pp. 246-7.

⁴³ The attitude of P. W. Schmiedel to the sinlessness of Jesus, and

The nerve of this interpretation resides of course in the contention that a repudiation of the epithet "good" is necessarily involved in the question, "Why callest thou me good?" (Mk. x. 18; Lk. xviii. 19). This contention is unjustified: whether the question involves a repudiation of the epithet "good", or is a call to a closer consideration of the implications of the original request, is a matter for the context to determine; and the context very decidedly determines it in the latter sense. Nevertheless the contention is often given very vigorous expression; and by no one is it given more vigorous expression than by Wilhelm Wagner, who writes as follows:⁴⁴ "Whoever cannot attribute to Jesus the use of language more to conceal than to reveal His thought, whoever rather holds the opinion that Jesus really meant His words in the sense in which they must be understood by every unprejudiced hearer,—cannot help allowing that Jesus in Mk. x. 18 distinctly distinguishes between God and Himself, and that He just as earnestly rejects the predicate *ἀγαθός* for Himself here, and reserves it for God, as in Mark xiii. 32 he denies knowledge of the day of the Parousia for His own person and ascribes it to the Father

the bearing of our passage upon it, is revealed in the following words from the paper contributed by him to the volume called *Jesus or Christ?* printed as a "Hibbert Journal Supplement" for 1908 (p. 68):—"As far as Jesus is concerned, it is certain that all the writers of the New Testament assumed His sinlessness, even though they speak of it with remarkable infrequency. But we are surely not at liberty to see a proof in this aspect of the matter, when we consider the attitude of veneration in which they stood towards Him, and the kind of being whom they held Him to be" [the meaning is that the testimony of the New Testament writers is invalid, because from their point of view they must have held Him sinless]. "Nor can we regard the passage in the Fourth Gospel (viii. 46) as an expression of Jesus Himself in view of the character of the book in which it stands. All the more importance attaches to Mark, x. 16-18: 'Why callest thou me good? There is none good save God'. It is true that philologists are now proving with much zeal that the original Aramaic word means 'gracious' [*gütig*]; but they do not reflect that Jesus cannot have justly regarded Himself as morally good, if He repudiated even the epithet 'gracious'."

⁴⁴ *ZNTW*, viii (1907), p. 154.

alone." Wagner does not admit, however, that in thus repudiating the predicate "good" of Himself, Jesus confesses Himself a sinner. Thus we are advised that it has been found possible to hold to the interpretation of Jesus' response to the young ruler which sees in it a repudiation of the predicate "good", and yet escapes from the ascription of conscious sin to Jesus. There are in fact more ways than one in which this has been attempted. A series of variant interpretations of our passage has thus arisen, differing from one another in the sense put upon the term "good" or in the explanation offered of Jesus' intention in repudiating that predicate, but agreeing that He does repudiate it in some sense, not involving the confession of sin on His part. Some account should be given of these mediating methods of exposition.

Wagner himself, in company with a considerable number of recent expositors,⁴⁵ wishes to take the term "good" in the sense, not of moral excellence, but of graciousness, kindness. This, in itself attractive, suggestion is rendered nugatory, however, by the unfitness of the address, "Kind Master" as a preparation for Jesus' reply. Johannes Weiss seems to be right when he remarks of the *ἀγαθέ*: "The questioner clearly wishes to express by it not merely his reverence but also his conviction that Jesus, as a perfect man, is able to give new life and particular information as to

⁴⁵ For example, G. Dalman, *The Words of Jesus*, E. T., p. 337: "The proper translation is 'Kind Master'"; J. Wellhausen on Mark x. 18 (p. 86): "'*Ἀγαθός* means less 'sinless' than 'gracious'"; Karl Thieme, *Die christliche Demut*, 1906, pp. 106-7; M. J. Lagrange, on Mk. x. 17: "Goodness of heart (Schanz, Wellhausen, Spitta) rather than moral perfection (Loisy, etc.); *ἀγαθός* can mean goodness, it is true, but also the goodness of benevolence (Mt. xx. 15) and this is always the case when in the O. T. it is said that God is 'good' (Spitta: cf. W. Wagner, *ZNTW*, 1907, pp. 143-161)"; F. Spitta, *ZNTW*, 14 (1908), pp. 12 ff.; J. Lebreton, *Les Origines du Dogme de la Trinité*, I, 1910, p. 235, etc. *Contra*, e.g. Wohlenberg, *Kom. zu Markus*, p. 273, note 89; P. W. Schmiedel as above, note 41. Wagner thinks that Justin Martyr already took the 'good' here in the sense of 'kind'; but see on this the note of J. Moffat, *The Expositor* for January, 1908, p. 84.

the way to eternal life."⁴⁶ Jesus' reply puts the sense of moral perfection on the address. The advantage sought by reading the predicate as "gracious" rather than "good", is that in that case its repudiation by Jesus does not imply a confession of sin on His part. "If the word should be so understood," remarks Dalman, "then there is no need to inquire in what sense Jesus disclaims sinlessness."⁴⁷ "His sinlessness or moral perfection Jesus has, therefore, not denied in our passage", is Wagner's way of putting it.⁴⁸ The inquiry of P. W. Schmiedel whether the repudiation of "kindness" is not also, however, the repudiation of moral goodness,⁴⁹ is here very pertinent; and it is observable that Wagner at least does not seem prepared with a plausible answer to it. After declaring that, since what is under discussion is "kindness", Jesus does not deny His sinlessness or moral perfection, that there is no question raised as to that, he continues:⁵⁰ "No doubt, however, He does disclaim the predicate 'kind-gracious' (*Gütig-gnädig*) for His own person and reserve it for God. Should this result nevertheless seem to anyone equally objectionable with Volkmar's exposition, mentioned above, the reply is to be made to him that we must adjust our conception of Jesus to that of the Holy Scriptures and not *vice versa*. . . ." No doubt. Therefore the question presses whether it is easy to believe that the Jesus presented to us, we do not say broadly in the Holy Scriptures, but in the Synoptic Gospels, would repudiate the predicate "kind" or "gracious," when applied to Him, especially with the energy which is supposed in this interpretation of His words. It does not appear that the predicate *ἀγαθός* is elsewhere in the Synoptics attributed to

⁴⁶ Wagner (p. 159, note) criticises Weiss' use of the word "perfect" instead of "good" in this remark, but on the very next page himself equates the terms "sinlessness" and "moral perfection". Cf. what Dalman (p. 338) says in opposition to A. Seeberg's explanation which is similar to that of Weiss.

⁴⁷ P. 338.

⁴⁸ P. 160.

⁴⁹ See above, note 43.

⁵⁰ Pp. 160-161.

Jesus, nor is it, for the matter of that, elsewhere attributed to God—and it may be a nice question to which limb of this statement we might consider Mt. xx. 15 a quasi-exception. But surely it is difficult to suppose that the Synoptists, who attribute “compassion” to Jesus more frequently than any other emotion, and one of whose number represents the sponsor of another as summing up Jesus’ career as a “going about, doing good” (ἐνεργεῶν, Acts x. 38), could have understood Him to be repelling here the attribution to Him of “kindness”. And surely this repudiation of the predicate of “kindness” sounds strange upon the lips of the Jesus who is represented by them as declaring that He had compassion upon the multitude (Mt. xv. 32; Mk. viii. 2), and as inviting all those who labor and are heavy laden to come to Him that He might give them rest (Mt. xi. 28).

Wagner endeavors to ease this difficulty by suggesting that like ἐνεργέτης, which Jesus forbids His disciples to permit themselves to be called (Lk. xxii. 25), ἀγαθός, “gracious,” might have come to be employed almost as a divine attribute; and he connects this suggestion with Jesus’ disgust at the “honor-hunger” which characterized “the Scribes and Pharisees” of the time, and which provoked Him to forbid His disciples to be called Rabbi or Leader (καθηγητής, Mt. xxiii. 10). This line of thought had already been carried a step further by Karl Thieme,⁵¹ and before him by Karl Heinrich Weizsäcker.⁵² These writers,⁵³ threw the whole

⁵¹ *Die christliche Demut*, 1906, p. 107.

⁵² *Untersuchungen über die evangelische Geschichte*,² 1901, p. 295.

⁵³ Cf. also J. Lebreton, *Les Origines du Dogme de la Trinité*, I, 1910, p. 235: “It would clearly be a mistake to see in the ‘goodness’ in question here, virtue or moral excellence: and when our Savior attributes it exclusively to God, that is not in order to make it understood that God alone is morally perfect, but no doubt only because He alone is Goodness itself, infinitely beneficent and benignant. Applied to a Rabbi—and the interlocutor of Christ saw in Him nothing more—this designation of ‘Good Master’ was, as Dalman remarks, an ‘insolent flattery’: our Lord repelled it without revealing to an auditor so badly prepared to receive it a property he was far from suspecting. The meaning of the text is very similar to that of a text cited above: ‘Call no man here below Father, for you have but one Father, that is

burden of Jesus' repudiation of the predicate "good" upon His revulsion from Rabbinical vanity, and hence held that "this interdiction of the designation 'Good Teacher' has nothing at all to do with the self-consciousness of Jesus, but is solely a repulsion of the Rabbinical title." From this point of view, Thieme, who also takes the *ἀγαθός* in the sense of "gracious", is able to contend that Jesus by no means repudiates that quality for Himself. "According to this interpretation," he writes,⁵⁴ "Jesus defended Himself from involvement in the Rabbinical title-seeking. He repelled it from Himself without giving a single thought to whether He Himself had or had not a right to the title of 'gracious'. He did not address Himself here to a solemn deliverance as to His distinction from God, but, painfully affected by the extravagances of the rich man, He gave expression to His old aversion to the whole odious behavior of the Pharisees and Scribes, in a quick and sharply spoken word of reprehension. It is therefore rather an emotional declaration from which may be learned how unlike the Pharisees and Scribes He was."

Attractive as this exposition is it is burdened with the insuperable difficulty that Jesus does not, in point of fact, refuse for Himself any of the titles which He forbids His followers to accept. He forbade them to be called Rabbi or Leader; but He claims both titles for Himself (Mt. xxiii. 8 f.). It is not merely in John (xiii. 13) that He vindicates His right to the titles of Master and Lord. Both are put upon His lips with reference to Himself by the Synoptists also (Mk. xiv. 14; Mt. xxvi. 18; Lk. xxii. 11; Mk. xi. 3; Mt. xxi. 3; Lk. xix. 31), and He constantly and without apparent difficulty accepts them both when applied to Him by others. Thieme himself has to acknowledge that "when He was Himself called Rabbi, He found it right, for He was it,

God; and have not yourselves called Masters, for you have only one Master, the Christ.' The only difference between the two texts is that in the second (Mk. x. 17) the Christ effaces Himself far more before God His Father."

⁵⁴ P. 108.

He alone and no other in His little flock."⁵⁵ If He revolted against the lust for empty titles of the Scribes and Pharisees, that was because those titles were empty for them; they did not rightly belong to or describe them; were mere vanities with no other function than to gratify pride. He would not have His disciples like the Scribes and Pharisees in this. But it does not follow that He would repel these titles when applied to Himself, to whom they rightfully belonged: in point of fact He did not.⁵⁶ There is an essential difference between craving vain titles, and accepting just ones. We may be quite sure that Jesus would not have repudiated the ascription of graciousness to Him unless He had felt that it did not rightly describe Him and that He therefore had no right to it.

A far more widely adopted interpretation of the passage, seeking the same end, accepts the term *ἀγαθός* in the sense of morally good, but distinguishes between the quality of goodness which is proper to man, and that absolute and indeclinable goodness which belongs to God alone. Jesus, it is said, when He repels the predicate "good" of Himself, and declares that God alone is good, means the term good in its highest, its absolute, sense, and in no way implies that He is not good as a man wholly without flaw may be good. Sometimes what is meant by this is that only God is Good-of-Himself (*αὐτοάγαθος*), has the source of His goodness in Himself; men, though wholly good, can have only a derived goodness, and must owe all their goodness to the goodness of God. Origen,⁵⁷ indeed, would carry this distinction far beyond the sphere of creaturely relations, into the Trinitarian relations themselves. According to him our Lord speaks here not as a man but as the Son Himself, and yet

⁵⁵ P. 107.

⁵⁶ Cf. R. Stier, *The Words of the Lord Jesus*, Fourth American Edition, I, p. 360 f., note f: "Never has Jesus anywhere said (if He says so here it is the only time) that anyone honored Him too highly; never did He protest against any degree of love, honor, thanksgiving, adoration (Roos, *Die Lehre J. Christi*, p. 79)."

⁵⁷ *De Principiis*, I, ii, 13.

separates Himself in His goodness as Son from the Father, the *Fons Deitatis*, from whom is derived all that the Son is. No other goodness exists in the Son as such save that which is in the Father; and when the Savior says that "there is none good save one only, God the Father", He means to declare, not that He, the Son of God, is not good, but that all the goodness in Him is of the Father. God alone is primarily good; the Son and Spirit are good with the goodness of God: while creatures can be said to be good only catachrestically and have in them only an accidental, not an essential goodness. It is not of the subordinationism of Origen, however, that our modern writers are thinking when they say that our Lord, in denying that He was good and reserving this predicate to God alone, meant merely that His goodness was not original with Himself but derived from God the sole source of goodness. They are thinking of the man Jesus who, they suppose, is here referring His goodness to the Father, the source of all goodness. An example of this mode of expounding the passage is supplied by Karl Ullmann in the earlier editions of his famous book on *The Sinlessness of Jesus*.⁵⁸ According to him what Jesus means is, "If I am good, I am so only in and by means of God, so far as I am one with God", and he expounds his own meaning as follows: "Here, then, *ἀγαθός* is to be taken in the most pregnant sense: as the ultimate highest source of good, as the absolute good; Jesus is good, but only in His inward complete communion with God, as the expression of the divine; and in this sense He demands of the young man:

⁵⁸ *Ueber die Sündlosigkeit Jesu*. Eine apologetische Betrachtung. Hamburg, 1833, p. 112, note; ed. 3, 1836, p. 136. The former of these editions is called the "second, improved and enlarged edition" on the title page, but appears to be the first separately printed edition, the treatise having appeared in the first instance in the *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, I, 1828. Cf. also Ullmann's *Polemische in Betreff der Sündlosigkeit Jesu* in the *TSK* for 1842. An English translation of *The Sinlessness of Christ* (Edinburgh, 1870, newly issued 1902) was made from the seventh German edition. The passage referred to has been so modified in the later editions that the feature for which it is cited has disappeared.

"Thou must rise above the common human goodness,—and in so far also above me, considered as a man detached from God, as merely a good teacher in the sense of the Rabbis and Pharisees—and hold to the supreme source of all good, and thence there will flow to thee the good, and eternal life." Another example seems to be supplied by A. Plummer's comment on Luke xviii. 19. The young man's defect, he tells us, "was that he trusted too much in himself, too little in God. Jesus reminds him that there is only one source of goodness, whether in action (Matthew), or in character (Mark, Luke), viz., God. He Himself is no exception. His goodness is the goodness of God working in Him. 'The Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He seeth the Father doing. . . . For as the Father hath life in Himself, even so gave He to the Son also to have life in Himself. . . . I can of Myself do nothing; as I hear, I judge: and My judgment is righteous, because I seek not my own will but the will of Him that sent Me' (Jno. v. 19-31) *Non se magistrum non esse, sed magistrum absque Deo nullum bonum esse testatur* (Bede). There is no need to add to this the thought that the goodness of Jesus was the goodness of perfect development (see on ii. 52), whereas the goodness of God is that of absolute perfection (Weiss on Mk. x. 18)."⁵⁹ An extraordinary number of

⁵⁹ Similarly, Henri Bois, *La Personne et l'Oeuvre de Jésus* propounds, and in an article in the *Revue de Theologie et des Questions Religieuses*, xxii, 1 (January, 1913), pp. 40-53, defends the view that Jesus does not indeed confess Himself a sinner yet ranges Himself definitely as subordinate to God in the moral sphere also. He thinks this view "the golden mean" between the "rationalistic" view which makes Jesus acknowledge His sinfulness and the "orthodox" view which makes Him proclaim Himself God, and defends it in the Review article against strictures by A. Berthoud, *Jésus et Dieu*, 1912. According to Berthoud (see also *Avant-Garde* for Ap. 15, 1907) Jesus proclaimed Himself *in point of goodness* equal to God. He repels the homage of which he was made the object, not because He felt Himself unworthy of it, but because He felt it to be banal. It was not a sense of imperfection which dictated His response; He speaks rather out of a consciousness of purity without flaw, of perfect holiness. He is thus not assimilating Himself with men, but proclaiming Himself equal with God—not indeed metaphysically, but morally. The ideas of immuta-

expositors have retained the fundamental notion of this interpretation as one, but not the chief, element in their explanations: a clause or two suggesting that the goodness of Jesus finds its source in God is inserted in the midst of other matter. The difficulty with it is that there is nothing in the passage either to suggest or to sustain it. An attempt has, indeed, been made by Karl Wimmer to find a point of attachment for it in what he calls the conditional sense of *εἰ μὴ*. Instead of "No one is good except God", he would render rather, "No one is good if not—that is to say, without,—God"; and then explain this as declaring that goodness cannot exist apart from God. But this is only a curiosity of exegesis.⁶⁰

bility, absoluteness, eternity, are not here in question: goodness is a *moral* conception, and it is from a moral point of view only that Jesus feels on an equality with God. Bois rightly rejoins that the moral and metaphysical cannot be thus separated. If Jesus is equal with God in holiness, He is metaphysically the same with God. He cannot be the prototype of the moral law, the sole inspirer and source of all good, without being God, the creator and conservator of the world. Bois does not himself seem to conceive his own interpretation clearly. He cites *both* Dalman, who denies that *moral* good is here in question, and Swete who denies that Jesus' goodness in any sense is here in question, as if they supported him who thinks that it is precisely of moral good that Jesus is speaking and that He is proclaiming Himself subordinate to the Father precisely with respect to *it*. "Jesus recognizes," he says, "His subordination over against God even in the moral point of view,—subordination, which is, however, perfectly compatible with the absence of sin." In this moral subordination of Jesus to God, he recognizes on the one side that His holiness is positive and not negative; but declares on the other side that it finds its whole source in God—that "every idea of the good is in Jesus, an inspiration which He receives from God, the sole absolute good."

⁶⁰ TSK, 1845, p. 128. He argues that *εἰ μὴ* is fundamentally conditional, not exclusive, in its meaning; and that, therefore, when Jesus says, "No one is good *εἰ μὴ* God", He does not mean that no one except God is good, but that no one without, apart from, God, is good; that the divine goodness is the condition of all other goodness, and all that is good has its ground in God's goodness. Jesus, thus, does not set God over against all others as the only good one, and does not contrast Himself with God, either as not unexceptionally good or as not absolutely good. He only declares that He does not wish to be called good, without the proper recognition that any goodness which belongs to Him, has its source in God.

It has been more common, therefore, to seek the contrast which Jesus is supposed to intimate between His goodness and that of God in the essentially developing character of human goodness as distinguished from the absolute goodness of God. A very clear expression is given to this view by the compressed comment of E. P. Gould:⁶¹ "The reason of the question and of the denial of goodness to any one but God which follows it, is that God alone possesses the absolute good. He is what others become. Human goodness is a growth, even where there is no imperfection. It develops, like wisdom, from childhood to youth, and then to manhood. And it was this human goodness which was possessed by Jesus. See Lk. ii. 52; Heb. ii. 18, v. 8." The longer comment of H. A. W. Meyer on Mark x. 18, which has in substance been retained by B. Weiss through all of his revisions is perhaps, however, more typical.⁶² "Ingeniously and clearly Jesus makes use of the address, διδάσκαλε ἀγαθέ, in order to direct the questioner to the highest moral Ideal in whose commands the solution of the question is given (verse 19). He does this in such a manner that He takes the predicate ἀγαθός in the highest moral sense (against Bleek and Klostermann, according to whom He only denies that man *as such*, and without relation to God can be called good). 'Thou art wrong in calling me good: this predicate, in its complete conception, belongs to none save One, God.' Cf. Ch. F. Fritzsche, in *Fritzschor. Opusc.*, p. 78 ff. This declaration, however, is no evidence against the sinlessness of Jesus; rather, it is the true expression of the distance which human consciousness—even the sinless consciousness as being human—recognizes between itself and the absolute perfection of God (cf. Dorner, *Jesu sündlose Vollkommenheit*, p. 14). For⁶³ the human per-

⁶¹ *International Critical Commentary on Mark*, Mk. x. 18.

⁶² Meyer on Mark, E. T., vol. I, p. 164: We quote from the sixth German edition, which is the first of those prepared by Weiss, p. 152: in ed. 8 (p. 176) which announces itself as revised by Bernhard and Johannes Weiss, it is somewhat compressed; and in ed. 9 in which Johannes Weiss' name falls away again, it remains much as it appears in ed. 8.

⁶³ This important last sentence is retained verbally through the ninth edition.

fection is necessarily a *growing* (*werdende*) one, and even in the case of Jesus was conditioned by His advancing development, even though it can respond at every point to the moral ideal (Lk. ii. 52; Heb. v. 8; Lk. iv. 12, 22, 28. Cf. Ullmann in the *TSK*, 1842, p. 700); the absolute being-good that excludes all having become and becoming so (*das absolute, alles Gewordensein und Werden ausschliessende Gutsein*) pertains only to God who is *verae bonitatis canon et archetypus* (Beza)."⁶⁴ "Even the man Jesus," adds Meyer (omitted by Weiss) "had to wrestle until He attained the victory and peace of the cross." Quite similarly E. K. A. Riehm⁶⁵ writes: "The emphatic 'No one is good except one, God', or, as the words stand in Matthew, 'One is good', does not fit in well with the explanation according to which Jesus does not wish to refuse the predicate 'good' for Himself, but wishes to say only that the young man should not, *from his standpoint*, that, namely, He was only a human teacher, address Him as 'Good Master'. We

⁶⁴ Cf. here Paul Feine, *Theologie des NTs*, 1910, p. 28: "He, who had given out of the perfection of His inwardness all the ideal commandments of the Sermon on the Mount, and had conceived the nature of God out of the pure ground of His life in an ethical purity hitherto unknown, declines to be called good. That predicate belongs to God only." He adds in a note: "It is wrong when many seek to make capital of this declaration in favor of the contention that Jesus was ethically imperfect. When Jesus says to the rich young man, 'Why callest thou me good?' or 'Call me not good' (*μή με λέγε αγαθόν*), as Conybeare, *Hibbert Journal*, 1902, I, 92-113 represents the oldest form, after Marcion, the Clementine Homilies, Tatian, Origen, &c., in Mk. and Lk. xviii. 19), 'No one is good except *one*, God'—that is as much a refusal of the address as in the case of the Syro-phoenician woman, Mt. xv. 25 f. As nevertheless in that case, Jesus yet fulfilled the request of the repulsed one, so there occurs here too in the end an answer to the question, 'Good Master, what shall I do to have eternal life?' He knows the way, and indeed He alone, for His answer culminates in the word, 'Come and follow me' (Mk. x. 21). He could not have said that, in the loftiness of His requirement for entrance into the Kingdom, had He not been 'good'. We must have an eye for the antithetical, contrast-loving manner of Jesus. Then we can avoid such essential misunderstandings as the repulsed young man fell into."

⁶⁵ *Lehrbegriff des Hebräerbriefes*, 1867, p. 383.

are of the opinion that Christ wishes the word 'good' to be taken in the absolute sense (cf. the *ὁ ἀγαθός*) and really refuses the predicate in this sense for His own person, and ascribes it to God only. When so understood, the expression does not at all show that Jesus had any other consciousness than that of essential unity with the God-will, but it does show that He was conscious that in His moral development He had not yet reached the highest stage of absolute perfection, which still was therefore proper to God alone."

Following Wagner's example we may add some further examples of this exposition, taken from dogmaticians. He selects for the purpose R. A. Lipsius and J. Kaftan. The former⁶⁶ maintains for Jesus, indeed, a development free from the consciousness of guilt, but nevertheless conceives of Him so humanly as to open a great gulf between His hardly retained integrity and the absolute perfection of God. To wish to deny for Him the possibility of sin or natural temptability, he declares, would abolish the reality of His humanity, for to it the *σάφξ* of necessity belongs. Jesus was tempted, and that shows that He was not free from inner vacillations and momentary obscurations of His God-consciousness. All of this He no doubt victoriously overcame: but certainly we cannot wonder that He felt impelled to distinguish His goodness, if He so conceived it, from God's absolute goodness. In much the same spirit, Kaftan,⁶⁷ will not hear of the attribution of impeccability to Jesus. This would yield, he thinks, only an unmoral notion of Him. Jesus' sinless perfection was a truly moral condition and receives its content from the uninterrupted moral trial to which He was subjected. In Mk. x. 18 "the predicate *ἀγαθός* applies in its absolute sense to God only, who is *ἀπελπιστος*, not to man who, while living and walking in the world, remains always subject to temptation. If we would wish to find expressed in this declaration of Jesus, instead of this, the consciousness of a moral fault attaching

⁶⁶ *Lehrbuch der Evangelisch-protestantischen Dogmatik*,² 1879, p. 596 f.

⁶⁷ *Dogmatik*,³ and ⁴ 1901, p. 441.

to Him, that would come into contradiction with His testimony with respect to Himself elsewhere. He is the sinlessly perfect man, but He became such by His own act and confirmation, by virtue of actual ethical decision through temptation." If we may appeal to a prophet of our own, we may find the whole tendency and significance of this mode of interpreting the passage very clearly expounded by H. R. Mackintosh.⁶⁸ The salutation of the young ruler, he tells us, Jesus "waved back with the uncompromising rejoinder, 'None is good save one, even God'." And then he continues: "The words cannot be a veiled confession of moral delinquency, which certainly would not have taken this ambiguous and all but casual form. What Jesus disclaims, rather, is *God's* perfect goodness. None but God is good with a goodness unchanging and eternal; He only cannot be tempted of evil but rests for ever in unconditional and immutable perfection. Jesus, on the contrary, learnt obedience by the things which He suffered, being tempted in all points like as we are (Heb. v. 8, iv. 15). In the sense of transcendent superiority to moral conflict and the strenuous obligation to prove His virtue ever afresh in face of new temptation and difficulty, He laid no claim to the absolute goodness of His Father. Which reminds us emphatically that the holiness of Jesus, as displayed in the record of His life, is no automatic effect of a metaphysical substance, but in its perfected form the fruit of continuous moral volition pervaded and sustained by the Spirit. It is at once the Father's gift and progressively realized in an ethical experience. This follows from the ethical condition of incarnation."

That the goodness of Jesus' human nature was a developing goodness, and was not only not while He was on earth but never can be the infinite goodness of God is a matter of course. It is further not inconceivable that in referring to His moral quality He might on occasion quite readily speak of the moral quality of His human nature

⁶⁸ *The Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, 1912, p. 37.

only, as, in a famous instance, in referring to His knowledge, He has spoken only of His human mind (Mk. xiii. 32). It is certain, still further, that in speaking of God's goodness in our present passage He has the absoluteness of His goodness in view. So far we encounter no grounds of objection to the general line of interpretation which we have just been illustrating. There is no reason in the nature of the case why Jesus might not have contrasted His human goodness with the infinite goodness of God, which is here adverted to. But neither is there any reason obvious why we should suppose Him to wish, at this moment and in the midst of the irrelevant conversation recounted, to interpose a bit of instruction upon the developing character of His human goodness. The remark of Fritzsche seems also pertinent: "the words, *τί με λέγεις ἀγαθόν*, do not mean *in what sense* do you call me good? but *why* do you call me good?"⁶⁹ If this question has, as Fritzsche also insists, the force of an "objurgation", and means "You wrongly call me good", it is hard to see how Jesus could have expected His interlocutor to understand Him as meaning no more than that His goodness (as respects His human nature) was not the absolute goodness of Deity. To say, 'You are wrong in calling me good, because though, even in my human nature, I am really good, good through and through, good without flaw, I am nevertheless (in my human nature) not good as the infinite God is good', would not only be a subtlety which this interlocutor could not be expected to follow, but as addressed to him inconsequent. If Jesus means to contrast Himself as not good with God as good, He can scarcely mean less in this context than that He is in the common sense of the word, not good; that is, that He is not free from sin. The interpretation which would pare this down to a contrast between immaculate goodness and absolute goodness is a refinement unconformable with the simplicity of the language employed and the directness with which the conversation develops. It is idle to appeal to

⁶⁹ *Fritzschorum opuscula academica*, 1838, p. 79.

such passages as Job iv. 18, xv. 15, xxv. 5; for the point is, not that the distinction in question is not real, nor that it cannot be expressed in natural language, but that it is not suggested by the language of the present passage and breaks in upon the course of its development.⁷⁰ From the dogmatic point of view this interpretation is of course more acceptable than that which sees in the passage a plain confession of sin. It has moreover the great advantage of not giving us a Jesus wholly out of harmony with the Jesus of the rest of the Synoptic tradition, and even perhaps with the Jesus of the remainder of this very narrative—where He speaks of “following” Him as the foundation of the new life. But from the narrower exegetical point of view it is at a disadvantage in comparison with the other; and yet lies open to all the exegetical objections which are fatal to that view.

Still another modification of the interpretation which supposes Jesus in our passage to repudiate the predicate good, has had large vogue. Jesus, it is said, repudiates this predicate not from His own but from His questioner's point of view. This interpretation, which is very common among the Fathers, is well illustrated by a passage in one of Athanasius' anti-Arian tracts.⁷¹ “And when He says,” we read, “‘Why callest thou me good? No one is good except one, God’, God, reckoning Himself among men, spoke this according to His flesh, and with respect to the opinion (*νόος*) of him who came to Him. For that one thought Him man only and not God, and the response keeps this opinion in view. For, if you think me a man, He says, and not God, call me not good, for no one is good. For the good does not belong to human nature but to God.” It is obvious, that to say that Jesus repudiates the predicate only from the point of view of His interlocutor is to say that He does not really repudiate it at all. It is not strange, therefore, as Montefiori

⁷⁰ Cf. what R. Stier excellently says in criticism of Oettinger and Ullmann, in *The Words of the Lord Jesus*, I, pp. 360b-361b.

⁷¹ Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, xxvi, col. 993 A and B.

seems to find it,⁷² that "the capable Roman Catholic commentator," Schanz, "who honestly insists on the correct translation of this verse," understanding its repudiation to be meant *ad hominem*, adds that "the words do not exclude 'that Jesus as respects His higher nature, may belong to this divine Being'."⁷³ And Olshausen is quite logical when he writes:⁷⁴ "The questioner saw in Christ a mere διδάσκαλος. To such a conception, however, the ἀγαθός was not suitable. He [Jesus] repudiates, therefore the name and directs him to Him who is Goodness itself. By this, however, the Lord does not deny that He is Himself just the ἀγαθός, because the true God is reflected in Him as His image; only this teaching could not be dogmatically presented to the young man, but should vitally form itself in his own heart." And Keil:⁷⁵ "Jesus, taking this predicate in its full sense, uses this address to direct the young man to God as the Supreme Being, when He replies: 'Why callest thou me good?', that is, 'Call me not good', 'no one is good except one, God'. Jesus by no means repudiates goodness or sinlessness by this, but only says that the predicate would not be suitable for

⁷² I, p. 264.

⁷³ Schanz's comment on Mk. x. 18, runs as follows: "Jesus makes use of the address διδάσκαλε ἀγαθέ, in order to teach the young man that the word ἀγαθός in its full sense, as the designation of essential, immutable goodness, belongs to God only, so that it is only by conforming to the will of God that blessedness can be attained. Since, however, the young man had addressed Jesus, according to his conception, as a human teacher, even though exalted far above others, Jesus replied to him, as He often does elsewhere, from the standpoint of the questioner (Chrysostom, Jerome, Bede, Euthymius, Theophylact, and all Catholic expositors; Bengel, Olshausen, Ebrard, Keil), an explanation to whom of His Sonship to God was not now in place. No doubt, there must be supplied with οὐδεὶς not λέγεται but only ἐστί (Krüg, 62, 1, 1, Kühn, 417, 21) and the sense of οὐδεὶς εἰ μὴ is nothing else than *nemo nisi*, i.e., 'none but'; but all this does not exclude that Jesus, with respect to His higher nature, can Himself belong to this Divine Being: 'and He does not say, "Except my Father" that you may learn, that He did not ἐξεκάλυψεν Himself to the young man' (Chrysostom)."

⁷⁴ *Erklärung der drei ersten Evangelien*,² p. 735 (quoted by Wagner, p. 153).

⁷⁵ On Mark x. 18 (Wagner, p. 153).

Him if He were nothing more than a διδάσκαλος, for which the young man took Him. This question gives no occasion, however, to instruct the young man thoroughly as to His Divine-human nature." This interpretation, therefore, readily passes into the essentially different one—with which we are on the entirely different ground that Jesus does not in any sense repudiate the goodness attributed to Him—which understands Jesus in His response to be really announcing His deity. The transition from the one to the other of these interpretations is perhaps indicated by such a comment as that of M. Lepin, who writes as follows:⁷⁶ " 'Why callest thou me good?' says He to the young man who accosts Him; 'No man is good except God only.' The young man, no doubt, saw in the Master only an ordinary Rabbi. Seemingly Jesus refuses, as due to God alone, a title which is given Him only as man. Perhaps, however, He does not refuse it absolutely, and wishes discreetly to insinuate to His interlocutor, or to His disciples, who surrounded Him, that He to whom this title is given and who, as they well know, thoroughly deserves it, is not merely man but is God also. There is indeed nothing to show that our Savior wishes formally to decline such an attribution; that would indeed be strange and out of keeping with His usual attitude; had He not said, 'Learn of me, for I am meek and lowly of heart?' The turn of expression employed, 'Why callest thou me good?' seems rather intended to cause the young man to reflect upon the unconscious bearing of his appellation. It is thus that on another occasion the Divine Master asked the Jews, 'Why do the Scribes say that the Christ is the Son of David?' Considering the subsequent reflection made by the Savior, the method employed when He remitted the sins of the paralytic is recalled: 'God only can forgive sins, as you say; well, I claim to forgive sins; and thus I prove my authority to do so!' Similarly here: 'Thou callest me good. The title is de-

⁷⁶ *Jésus Messie et Fils de Dieu*,³ 1907, pp. 336 ff. (E. T. *Christ and the Gospel*, 1910, pp. 412 ff.).

served: thou thyself hast judged me in comparison with ordinary masters; I therefore do not decline it; but consider well! there is none that is good but God alone!"

A comment like this brings us to the point of turning away altogether from the "objurgatory" interpretation of our Lord's demand, "Why callest thou me good?" It remains therefore only to read the question simply as a question, that is to say as an incitement to inquiry on the part of the questioner.⁷⁷ In that case only two lines of interpretation lie open. Either the question, along with the succeeding clause, "no one is good but one, God", is intended to suggest to the interlocutor that Jesus is Himself divine, or else it is intended to turn attention for the moment away from Jesus altogether and focus it on God. The former line of interpretation has been taken by many and was for long indeed the ruling view.⁷⁸ As so understood, so far from suggesting that our Lord is neither divine nor good, it is an assertion that He is both good and divine. Ambrose will supply us with a good example of this interpretation.⁷⁹ Inveighing against the Arians who make out that our Lord

⁷⁷ A. Plummer, commenting on Lk. xx. 42 (p. 473) suggests that the question there may be intended only to make the Scribe think; and illustrates by a reference to our present passage: "The question 'Why callest thou Me good?' appears to serve a similar purpose. It *seems* to imply that Christ is not to be called good (Mk. x. 18). But it need mean no more than that a young man who addressed Jesus as 'Good Master' ought to reflect as to the significance of such language before making use of it." He compares also Lk. xi. 19 as possibly a similar case.

⁷⁸ Cf. Schanz on Lk. xviii. 18: "The most of the Fathers, if they do not call the question an ensnaring one (*versuta*, Ambrose; *tentans*, Jerome, Cyril) and therefore look upon the reply as a repulse, *arguta responsio*, assume that it is meant for the young man's instruction as to the deity of Christ. Jesus, it is said, reproves the ruler for calling Him a good teacher instead of a good God." He cites as expressing this latter view, Ambrose, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nanzianzus, Basil, Cyril, Chrysostom, Hilary, Jerome, Augustine, Bede. Cf. A. Plummer, on Lk. xviii. 19 (p. 422, note 1), where Cyril and Ambrose are quoted and Jerome, Basil and Epiphanius referred to (with Maldonatus and Wordsworth among the commentators).

⁷⁹ *De Fide*, II, 1 (Migne, *Patr. Lat.*, 16, col. 563; E. T., *Post Nicene Fathers*, second series, X, p. 226).

here denies that He is good, he asks that we consider when, where and with what circumspection our Lord speaks here. "The Son of God," he continues, "speaks in the form of man, and He speaks to a Scribe,—to him, that is, who called the Son of God 'Good Master', but denied Him to be God. What he does not believe Christ adds, that he may believe in the Son of God, not as a Good Master but as the Good God. For, if wheresoever the 'One God' is named, the Son of God is never separated from the fullness of the Unity, how, when the one God is declared good is the Only-begotten excluded from the fullness of the divine goodness? They must therefore either deny that the Son of God is God, or confess that He is the good God. With heavenly circumspection, then, He said, not 'No one is good but the Father only', but 'No one is good but God only'. For 'Father' is the proper name of Him who begets, but the 'one God' by no means excludes the Godhead of the Trinity, and therefore extols the Natures: goodness is therefore in the nature of God, and in the nature of God is also the Son of God, and therefore what is predicated is not predicated of the Singularity but of the Unity. Goodness is, then, not denied by the Lord, but such a disciple is rebuked. For when the Scribe said, 'Good Master', the Lord responded, 'Why callest thou me good?' And that means, 'It is not enough to call me good whom thou dost not believe to be God. I do not seek such disciples, who rather believe in a good master according to manhood than according to Godhead the good God.'

It is not easy to turn up a modern comment moving on precisely these lines. Perhaps something like it is intended by Friedrich Köster, when he writes:⁸⁰ "Should it, now, seem as if Jesus in the words, 'Why callest thou me good', repels the predicate of goodness from Himself, it is already remarked by Wolf (in *Curis* ad h. l.), *Haec quaestio non negantis est, sed examinantis*. 'Dost thou consider well, when thou callest me good, that this predicate belongs to God

⁸⁰ TSK, 1856, p. 422.

alone?' It belongs to Jesus, therefore, only by virtue of His perfect union with the Father." And Rudolf Stier plays upon the same note amid others which go to make up his chord, when he writes:⁸¹ "Christ takes care not to say, *I am not good*, for One only is good, *my Father*. . . . He deals more exactly with the word than the rationalists, who 'exhaust themselves in phrases, call Him the best, noblest, most excellent, most perfect, etc.', and yet deny His divine dignity. He said then to the young ruler what He must say still more strongly to these modern panegyrists, not in kindness but in anger: 'Why callest thou me good?' He, however, at the same time attests His divinity (although He does not speak plainly of what is concealed) when He who knew no sin affirms: 'None is good save One, that is God'." In support, he quotes in a note⁸² the following dilemma: "Choose then, ye friends of reason, between these two conclusions dictated by reason itself. None is good but the one God; Christ is good; therefore Christ is the one God. Or: none is good but the one God: Christ is not the one God; therefore Christ *is not good*." The sober and pregnant comment of Bengel may also find a place here. "Nevertheless," he writes,⁸³ "He does not say, I am not good; but, Why dost thou call me good? Just as in Mat. xxii. 43 He does not deny that He, the Lord of David, is at one and the same time, also the Son of David. God is good: there is no goodness without Godhead. This young man perceived in Jesus the presence of goodness in some degree: otherwise he would not have applied to Him: but he did not perceive it in the full extent; otherwise he would not have gone back from Him. Much less did he recognize His Godhead. Wherefore Jesus does not accept from him the title of goodness without the title of Godhead (cf. the

⁸¹ *The Words of the Lord Jesus*, I, p. 360b. Cf. p. 361a: "Thou speakest with too much readiness of *doing* good (I too should not be good as thou thinkest, if I were a man as thou supposest)."

⁸² From the *Hom. lit. Correspondenzblatt*, 1826, p. 176. He tells us that the same dilemma is well presented also in a sermon by Nitzsch.

⁸³ *Gnomon*, on Mk. x. 18.

'Why call ye me Lord, Lord', Lk. vi. 46); and thereby He vindicates the honor of the Father with whom He is one. See Jno. v. 19. At the same time He causes a ray of His omniscience to enter into the heart of the young man, and shows that the young man has not as yet the knowledge concerning Himself, Jesus Christ, worthy of so exalted a title, which otherwise is altogether appropriate to Him. Wherefore, He does not say, *There is none good save one, that is my Father*, but, *There is none good save one, that is, God*'. Our Lord often adjusted His words to the capacity of those who questioned Him (Jno. iv. 22)."

Most recent writers, however, who have come to see that our Lord's question is *non negantis sed examinantis*, have also come to see that His purpose here is not inconsequently to proclaim His own deity, but in accordance with the demands of the occasion to point the young man inquiring after a law of life to Him who had once for all proclaimed a perfect law of life.⁸⁴ They have, of course varying ways of

⁸⁴ Cf. J. A. Dorner, *Ueber Jesu Sündlosigkeit*, 1862, pp. 13-14. After showing that Jesus had no intention of leading the young man to suppose that he could enter into life apart from Him, or of pointing him away from Himself when He pointed him to God, Dorner continues: "But the first thing he had need of, as Jesus saw from the light, easy way in which he used the word 'good' was self-knowledge, not the announcement of Christ's mission and dignity, for the understanding of which he still lacked the preconditions; concerning which therefore, in accordance with His method as elsewhere manifested, Jesus meanwhile preserved silence. . . . The purpose of the passage is, therefore, not to deny goodness to the person of Christ, nor to make a positive declaration as to what He is, but to rebuke the frivolous attribution of goodness to a teacher at the cost of reverence to God, and by a striking declaration, which would conquer through its humility, to reveal to the young man his fundamental fault, namely that he took goodness too lightly. That Jesus intended to ascribe sinfulness to Himself is impossible, since that would be out of accord with His other self-expressions as to His redemptive vocation, both in the Synoptics and in John, and with the position He takes in the Kingdom of God. The Evangelists too, as little as the primitive church so understood Him. . . ." Dorner thinks, however, that there is nevertheless intrinsic in the passage a contrast between Jesus' goodness, as human, and God's, as absolute—"since no earthly, creaturely goodness can yet be called perfect, because it is not yet perfected, and is not yet raised beyond temptations and change."

expressing the general understanding of the passage common to them all; and they inevitably bring out its implications and connections with more or less completeness, and with more or less penetration.⁸⁵ The emphasis seems to be particularly well distributed in a passage in A. Schlatter's *Theology of the New Testament*,⁸⁶ and we therefore venture to quote it here. "To him who sought from Him the Good Master, direction as to the work by which he could secure for himself eternal life, He replied that no one is good except God, but God is really good; and instead of meeting his wish and Himself giving him a commandment, He binds him to the divine commandments in their simple clearness. The desire to obtain, instead of them, a new prescription which should now for the first time assure eternal life, Jesus calls impious, a denial of God, which is made no better by being attributed to Him too. To permit Himself to be praised as good, while at the same time, or even thereby, God's goodness is denied, could not be endured by Jesus. Against this kind of religion He ever spoke as the Son who defended the goodness of the Father against every doubt, and hallowed His commandments as perfect. A glorifying of His own dignity at the cost of God's, a trust in His judgment along with distrust in God's commandments, an exalting of His own goodness along with reproaches against God—meant to Him absolute impossibility." No doubt, there are elements in this statement which are open to criticism. But the main matter comes in it to clear announcement. Jesus' concern here is not to glorify Himself but God: it is not to give any instruction concerning His own person whatever, but to indicate the published will of God as the sole and the perfect prescription for the pleasing of God. In proportion as we wander away from this central thought, we wander away from the real meaning of the passage and misunderstand and misinterpret it.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ See above, note 23, for some of the commentators of this class.

⁸⁶ A. Schlatter, *Die Theologie des NTs*, I, 1909, p. 303.

⁸⁷ *Detached note on some attempts to discover a more original text than that transmitted by our Gospels, especially F. C. Conybeare's* (see

notes 34, 35, 36).—H. J. Holtzmann, *Hand-Commentar zum N. T.*, I, *Die Synoptiker*,³ 1907, p. 88, writes: "This section concerning riches early aroused doubts on the score of the repudiation of the predicate 'good' (Mk. verse 17 = Lk. verse 19). Instead of recognizing the distinction between deity and humanity (see on Mat. vi. 12), which is obliterated by Matthew (verse 18) in a tendential manner, but is otherwise manifoldly witnessed in the early ecclesiastical literature (Bousset, *Justin*, 105 f.), the patristic exegesis found here instruction on the deity of Christ, as if Jesus' reply presented the major and the address to Him the minor premises of a syllogism, of which the reader is expected to draw the conclusion." At the place referred to in this cautious allusion (*Die Evangelienentate Justins*, &c., 1891, pp. 105-6) Bousset seeks to show from certain early citations of our passage that there existed an early form of the text—from which Matthew's text was derived "by dogmatic adjustment"—in which the latter part of our Lord's response stood something like what we find in Justin, *Dial.* 101^e: εἰς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ πατήρ μου ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς. How the first part of our Lord's reply ran, he seems to be less sure. He supposes, however, that there lay behind Justin a form of text in which were combined a repudiation of the address of "Good Master" and a response to the demand "What shall I do to inherit eternal life?"—much as we find them combined in the Gospel according to the Hebrews. This text, though an earlier source than our Synoptic Gospels, he does not consider the original text (p. 106, note 3). The form preserved in Justin, or something like it, he judges to be more likely to be that. In *Dial.* 101^e this stands merely τὶ με λέγεις ἀγαθόν;

In this discussion Bousset makes no advance upon what Hilgenfeld had argued a half-century before (*Kritische Untersuchungen über die Evangelien Justins, der Clementinischen Homilien und Marcians*, 1850, pp. 220 f., 362, 426; *Theologische Jahrbücher*, 1853, pp. 207, 235 f.; 1857, pp. 414 ff.; cf *ZWT*, 1863, pp. 361-2, note 3). That the reading attributed to Marcion by Epiphanius, *H*, 42,⁵⁰ p. 339: μὴ με λέγεις (p. 315 λέγετε) ἀγαθόν, εἰς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς ὁ θεὸς ὁ πατήρ is a divergent text-form and not an interpretation, Hilgenfeld is sure; and that this text-form was in circulation beyond Marcionite, or even Gnostic, circles he thinks is shown by its occurrence four times in the Clementine Homilies (*Th. Jhbb.*, 1857, p. 415). Our present Matthew-text preserves from this earlier form the positive clause εἰς ἐστὶν ὁ ἀγαθός. This positive clause is not to be supposed, therefore, to have been made out of the negative form found in our Mark and Luke: οὐδεὶς ἀγαθὸς εἰ μὴ εἰς ὁ θεός. The contrary is the fact: the negative clause (first found in Justin, *Apol.*, I, 16) is rather a correction of the positive clause in an anti-Gnostic interest. For the Gnostics interpreted the εἰς ἐστὶν ὁ ἀγαθὸς ὁ πατήρ (in which the ὁ πατήρ is the essential thing) as a distinguishing declaration that the only good God was the Father of Jesus Christ. The difference between the positive and the negative forms is, then, far from unimportant; it was of deep polemical significance. "If this difference seems small, it is nevertheless by means

of the negative turn that the contrast between the perfect God and the imperfection of all men is made the sole possible interpretation. And if, now, in our present Matthew-text there is apparent a purpose to exclude the distinction of Jesus from the perfect goodness of God, we recognize in this just a second alteration of this expression, at the basis of which lies already the doctrine of the deity of Christ" (*Theol. Jhbb.*, 1857, p. 416). It is an illusion to suppose therefore, that Matthew is made out of Mark: Matthew preserves a reading earlier than Mark's which Mark has set aside in an anti-Gnostic interest. But our present Matthew is a product of a still later revision,—in the interests of the deity of Christ.

A further attempt is made by F. C. Conybeare (*Hibbert Journal*, I, i, Oct., 1902, pp. 109-112) to validate the Marcionite text as underlying all three of the Synoptics, with the interest shifted now, however, to the opening (instead of the closing) words of our Lord's reply. The contention in which Conybeare is particularly interested is that, in the original text, we have not a question but a categorical injunction: "Call me not good!" And he endeavors to show that this reading held its ground into the fourth century, not in heretical circles only, but also, as at least an alternative reading, among the orthodox (Origen, Athanasius, Didymus, Ephrem). Conybeare does not write with judicial balance or in the spirit of scientific objectivity. He has a thesis to sustain, and pushes matters to such an extreme as to be self-refuting. There would be no reason for entering upon any examination of his contentions except for the fact that some tendency has shown itself of late to accept these speculations whether of Hilgenfeld or of Conybeare as findings of fact, and even to build critical conclusions upon them.

Thus, for example, F. Barth, *Die Hauptprobleme des Lebens Jesu*,³ 1907, p. 251, describing Jesus' testimony to His person, writes as follows: "That Jesus saw Himself compelled to make clear His position with reference to God by a self designation, we see better in proportion as we closely contemplate this position in detail and convince ourselves that it is a thoroughly peculiar, almost an enigmatical one. On the one hand, Jesus takes His place wholly on the side of man, over against God, and confesses Himself to possess the imperfections of human existence. He lays claim to no omniscience, but declares that He does not know the time of the parousia (Mk. xiii. 32); nor to any omnipotence, for it is not His to make determination as to the places of honor in the Kingdom of heaven (Mk. x. 40). We may be most struck, however, that He also seems to repudiate absolute moral perfection in the answer to the rich young man who asked Him, 'Good Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?' (Mk. x, 17 f.; Lk. xviii, 18 f.). Jesus responded: 'Why callest thou me good? No one is good but *one*, God.' The reading: 'Why callest thou me good?' (or 'Call me not good!') 'No one is good but one, my Father in heaven'* is no doubt a Gnostic heightening. It would originally emphasize the contrast with the world-maker, the Jewish

God, who is not the Father of Jesus and not good (gracious), but righteous and wrathful. The Catholic counterpart to this is formed by the rare reading: "No' one is good except God only who has made all things"; here the sole good one is identified precisely with the world-maker. Still more decisively in contrast with it is the change which the Gospel of Matthew contains. . . ." At the point marked by an asterisk he gives a list of vouchers which certainly show that a reading in which "the Father" or "my Father who is in heaven" took the place of "God" in our Lord's response was in early circulation: but it is not so clear that this reading was manufactured by the Gnostics, though no doubt it was utilized by them; and neither is it clear that the alternative reading in the first clause "Call me not good" is a genuine "various reading". And it is certainly not clear that the readings which Barth enumerates, Justin's and Matthew's, illustrate how readily "uncomfortable readings are pushed out of existence". An even better example of the unjustified use of these textual speculations is supplied by Paul Feine, *Theologie des NTs*, 1910, p. 28, note, who, in explaining the meaning of our Lord in His response to the young ruler, incorporates quite simply, these words: "When Jesus says to the rich young man: 'Why callest thou me good.' or 'Call me not good' ($\mu\acute{\eta}\ \mu\epsilon\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\ \alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\nu$, as Conybeare, *Hibbert Journal*, 1902, I, 96-113, represents the oldest form, after Marcion, the Clementine Homilies, Tatian, Origen, in Mk. and Lk. xviii. 19). . . ." A phenomenon like this seems to require that we should subject Conybeare's argument to a sufficiently close scrutiny to bring out its real character.

Conybeare is engaged in seeking out doctrinal modifications of the original text occurring in the text of our Gospels. In the present state of critical opinion it is not unnatural that he fixes at once upon Mt. xix. 17 as an instance. This "bit of botching", as he calls it, however, contrary to the common critical opinion, he attributes not to the author of the Gospel, but, in accordance with his present quest, to an ancient corrector, working on the original text of Matthew "before Matthew was joined in one book with the other two gospels". He is not content however to find "doctrinal modifications" in Matthew's text; he discovers them in the text of Mark and Luke as well. The evidence on which he relies for this discovery, he gives as follows. Marcion, according to Epiphanius, read at Lk. xviii. 19: $\mu\acute{\eta}\ \mu\epsilon\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\ \alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\nu\ \epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \epsilon\sigma\tau\iota\nu\ \alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\varsigma\ \acute{o}\ \theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma\ \acute{o}\ \pi\alpha\tau\acute{\eta}\rho$. "And Marcion's evidence goes back far behind any other." It is *a priori* unlikely, from Marcion's philosophical views, that he himself made the reading, "Call me not good". And that he did not make it is put beyond doubt by its appearance in the Clementine Homilies also, where, although it appears rather as a citation from Matthew than from Mark-Luke, it *a fortiori* argues the presence of the imperative reading in Mark-Luke. All this is borne out by the persistence of the imperative reading in later writings. In the Old Armenian version of a tract of Athanasius, it appears four times, and though in the present Greek text it is found in only one of these places, the editor tells us it occurs in the best manuscripts

in another of them; and we may believe that if the best manuscripts were scrupulously followed it would occur in all four of them. It seems to be presupposed in certain passages in the Armenian version of Ephrem's commentary on Tatian's *Diatessaron* "though the actual citations have been conformed to the ordinary text". It seems likewise to be presupposed in some passages in Origen's commentaries "though the text has been conformed either by the scribes or editors of his MSS".

As marshalled by Conybeare there seems to be presented here a considerable body of evidence. This is, however, illusory. The whole of the later evidence, from Origen to Didymus and Ephrem, may be at once dismissed. No question of reading is raised by it but only of interpretation. To suggest that Tatian must have read the imperative in his text because Ephrem, in commenting on this passage, speaks of Christ as "renouncing the appellation of 'good'" is nothing less than monstrous (cf. Zahn's *Tatians Diatessaron*, p. 173). To intimate that Origen must have read the imperative in his text, because he understands the Lord to reject the epithet "good", is so absurd that it reaches almost the level of the sublime. Not only does Origen repeatedly quote the passage and always with the interrogative, not the imperative (e.g. in the first two volumes of the Prussian Academy's edition, I, 9, 5; II, 12, 19; II, 355, 16; in the Commentary on John in the same series, 45, 10; 261, 28); but he explicitly tells us that the interrogative stood in his text of Mark and Luke,—that while Matthew reads, "Why askest thou me concerning the good", "Mark and Luke on the contrary say that the Savior said: 'Why callest thou me good? No one is good except one, God'" (*Com. in Mat.*, Tomus xv, 10; Lommatzsch iii, p. 346). Conybeare's dealing with Athanasius and Didymus, however, is so characteristic and therefore so instructive as regards his methods, that it deserves to be quoted at large and examined in some detail. "Among the writings of Athanasius," he writes, "is one called 'About the Epiphany of the Flesh of the God word and against the Arians', printed in Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, vol. xxvi, col. 984 foll. The text is cited from Mark or Luke four times, viz., col. 985 C, col. 993 A and B, col. 1012 B. In only one of these passages, 993 B, has the imperative, *μή με λέγε αγαθόν* survived the efforts both of editor and copyist to keep it out, and won its way into the printed text. But in 985 C the editor, Montfaucon, in his note states that it was so read in the three best MSS. In all four passages the old Armenian version renders, 'Call thou me not good' so testifying that the Greek MSS had it. Perhaps a more accurate editing of these would show that they have it still. In his treatise on the Trinity (c. 377) Didymus also cites the text in the form 'Call thou me not good', but with condemnation." Possibly it is Conybeare's predilection for things Armenian which has led him astray with reference to Athanasius' reading. The fact is that Athanasius cites the text of Mark and Luke in the form in which it now finds a place in these Gospels, and never otherwise. It stands in this form, therefore in 993 A and 1012 B where he is directly citing the text: in 993 B he is not making a citation; and in

985 C, he is citing the text not directly but from the lips of his Arian opponents. There is no evidence to be derived from these passages, therefore, that the text was read by Athanasius in the form "Call me not good". It will repay us to look at the passages.

In 1012 B, Athanasius is directly citing Scripture to support a proposition. He argues: "For unless the Holy Spirit were of the essence (*τῆς οὐσίας*) of the Only Good (*τοῦ μόνου ἀγαθοῦ*) He would not be called good, since the Lord prohibits Himself to be called good, in so far as He had become man, saying, 'Why callest thou me good? None is good but one, God.' The Holy Spirit, however, is not forbidden by the Scriptures to be called good, as David says, 'Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land'." What we read in the continuous passage embracing both the references, 993 A and B, is this: "And when He says: 'Why callest thou me good? No one is good but one, God', God, reckoning Himself among men, spoke this according to His flesh, and with respect to the opinion of him who came to Him. For that one thought Him man only and not God, and the response keeps this opinion in view. For, if you think me a man, He says, and not God, call me not good, for no one is good. For the good does not belong to human nature but to God." Obviously the "Call me not good" here is not a citation but a free rendering of the sense of the "Why callest thou me good?" which is immediately before formally cited. The final passage, 985 C, is more complicated. Athanasius is talking of his Arian opponents. "And now, these people," he says, "if they knew the Holy Scriptures, would not dare to blaspheme the Creator of all things as a creature and a piece of handiwork. For they distort them to us, saying How can [the Son] be like [the Father], or of the Father's essence, when it is written, As the Father has life in Himself, so He has given also to the Son to have life in Himself. There is, they say, a superiority in the giver above the receiver. And, Why callest thou me good? they say, No one is good but one, God. And again, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? And once more, Of the last day no one knoweth, not even the Son, except the Father. And again, Whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world. And again, Whom the Father raised from the dead. How then, they say, can He that is raised from the dead be like or of the same nature (*ὁμοούσιος*) with Him that raised Him?" Here is a series of Scriptural texts in use by the Arians and cited from their lips—Jno. v. 26; Mk. x. 18; Mt. xxvii. 47; Mk. xiii. 32; Jno. x. 26; Gal. i. 1. Some of them are quoted with accuracy (Jno. v. 26; Mt. xxvii. 47; Jno. x. 36). But some of them merely reproduce the sense (Gal. i. 1). Mk. x. 18 is printed as an accurate quotation. But the editor tells us in a note that in some of the MSS. it is read rather: *μή με λέγε, φησὶν, ἀγαθόν*, that is to say, "Call me not, they say, good". It may well be, as Conybeare contends, that this reading should be put into the text. In this context this would not mean that Athanasius so read it in his Mark, but only at the most that the Arians so read it in their Mark. We say "at the most", for there would be little more reason for

supposing that even they so read it in their Mark than for supposing that they read also in their Mark (at xiii. 32): *περὶ τῆς ἡμέρας τῆς ἐσχάτης οὐδεὶς οἶδεν, οὐδὲ ὁ υἱός*. If this is merely a paraphrase of the meaning, that may equally well be so too.

We presume that the "c. 377" attached to the reference to Didymus' treatise on the Trinity is meant to indicate the column in Migne, *Patr. Gr.*, where the passage referred to may be found. No such passage, however, is found at that reference. In cols. 349-352, however, there is a passage which we take to be the one intended. Heb. ii. 24 had just been quoted and commented on; and the discourse continues: "The Son also, however, showed that the deity is one, when He said, 'Why callest thou me good? No one is good but one, God'; but that the three hypostases are of equal dignity and of equal power, by the teaching concerning baptism [that is, by Mat. xxviii. 19]. Not responding to the lawyer who questioned Him temptingly, "Call me not good' but 'Why callest thou me good?' He showed that He too is good equally with the Father, and from His Father's goodness manifests His own, and demonstrates that He is good generated from God" It is, of course, conceivable that Didymus is referring here to a rival reading of Mk. x. 18 rejected by him. But there is no likelihood of that being the case. On the face of it, what he says is that this reading is *not* found in Mk. x. 18. We observe in passing that Didymus elsewhere also quotes Mk. x. 18 in the form "Why callest thou me good?" without betraying any consciousness of another reading; e.g. at col. 864: "And the response to the lawyer who temptingly addressed our Lord as a man, 'Good Master' and heard 'Why callest thou me good?' is of this kind"

Thus nothing is left as evidence of the currency of a reading "Call me not good!" but Epiphanius' representation that this was the reading of Marcion's Gospel, supported by the appearance of the passage in this form in the Clementine Homilies. Conybeare seems very sure that Marcion's text read as Epiphanius represents. A glance at the very full note of Zahn at the place (*Geschichte des Neutestamentlichen Kanons*,¹ II, 1890, pp. 483-4) will show how little this confidence is justified. Zahn himself prints Marcion's text in the hesitant form: *τί (or μή) με λέγετε αγαθόν; εἰς ἐστὶν αγαθός, ὁ (?) θεός ὁ πατήρ (?)*; tells us that it is "variously transmitted"; and suggests that the *μή* transmitted by Epiphanius may be only a transcriptional error for *τί*, —unless, he adds, the *τί* transmitted by Hippolytus is a transcriptional error for *μή*. "We ought not to let it fall out of sight, that there is no evidence for the currency of the phrase "Call me not good", as a reading at Mk. x. 18; Lk. xviii. 19, Mt. xix. 17 earlier than the fourth century, for it seems that the Clementine Homilies should be assigned to that century (cf. Dom Chapman, *ZNTW*, IX, 1908). When Hippolytus (*Refut.*, VII, 31) cites this text from a Marcionite book—apparently from Marcion himself—he gives it in the form, *τί με λέγετε αγαθόν*. Our own inclination is to suppose that the reading *μή με λέγε αγαθόν* stood in Marcion's Gospel as it was in circulation in the fourth century,

but was not original in it. We are led to this view by the circumstance that in the Clementine Homilies too (where this reading occurs four times; iii. 57, xvii. 4, xviii. 1, 3) it seems to appear (xviii. 1) as a Marcionite reading (Zahn, pp. 469, 483). But it is to be observed that in this understanding of the matter, all appeal to the Clementine Homilies as evidence that this reading was in circulation elsewhere than in Marcionite circles, or earlier than the fourth century, is precluded. Conybeare is as sure that Marcion (he would doubtless extend this to the Marcionites as a body) could not have invented the reading "Call me not good" as that it was read by Marcion. One would think a simple reading of Hippolytus' chapter just referred to (*Refut.*, vii, 31) would disabuse anyone's mind of this misjudgment. Whether, however, the reading arose by "doctrinal modification" on the part of the Marcionites or by simple transcriptional error as Zahn supposes, is of little moment. The point of importance is that there is no convincing evidence that such a reading was known earlier than the fourth century and no evidence whatever that it ever had any currency outside (later) Marcionite circles and perhaps among the Arians, to whom it was transmitted by the Clementine Homilies; for this is apparently the significance of the Clementine Homilies in this matter—that they formed the connecting link between Marcionite and Arian. It is meaningless, therefore, when Conybeare remarks: "Marcion's evidence goes back far behind any other", though that remark would be inexplicable in any case. It is probably not Marcion's personal evidence that is in question, but only that of the later Marcionites. And were it his personal evidence that was in question, Justin who quotes the text in the interrogative form was his strict contemporary, Tatian but a little younger contemporary, to say nothing of Marcosians and Naasenes with whom Irenaeus and Hippolytus connect the text in its interrogative form. In any case the total direct transmission of the text of the New Testament is not to be treated with this levity. On the face of it, apart from all citations of as early a date as Marcion, the text as set down in the critical editions of the New Testament is older than Marcion and was already in his day in wide circulation in versions as well as in the original Greek. When we speak in terms of relative originality—instead of in those of mere chronology—there is no room for question here. Any history which may be back of our existent manuscript-text of Mark and Luke in this passage (as indeed of that of Matthew too) is not a textual history but a literary history. What emerges from the ruck of confusion into which Conybeare has gratuitously cast the matter is thus simply that there may have been in circulation in heretical circles in the fourth century a reading in Mk. x. 18 or Luke xviii. 19 which substituted an imperative for the interrogatory form. Needless to say such a fact affords no slightest justification for looking upon this form as "the original" form.

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ASSYRIOLOGICAL RESEARCH DURING THE PAST DECADE¹

Assyriology is still a comparatively young science. It is but a life-time—three-score and ten years—since the first excavations were conducted in the vicinity of Mosul by French and English excavators.² And only within a decade have the last of the pioneers—Jules Oppert, Rassam and Schrader—passed away. The work of Oppert as excavator and decipherer carried us back almost to the very beginning of Assyriology. He was a member of the second French expedition, which was sent out in 1852, and in 1857 he helped to place this science on a firm basis and to win for it the confidence of scholars by his translation of the cylinder inscription of Tiglath-Pileser I.³ Rassam in 1854 discovered the famous Library of Assurbanapal at Nineveh, from which 20,000 tablets or fragments of tablets, many of them of the greatest value, have been recovered. Schrader, rightly called “the father of Assyriology in Germany”, carried us back into the sixties; and his investigations, which were especially along historical and geographical lines, won for him an international reputation.

The labors of these men, and many others whose names might be mentioned, have made possible the rapid advance which Assyriology has made during the past decades. They have supplied our museums with thousands of inscriptions

¹ This article is in substance an address delivered on September 19th, 1913, in Miller Chapel at the opening of the One Hundred and Second Session of Princeton Theological Seminary. The writer has however claimed the privilege of quite considerably revising and expanding it before its publication.

² Botta began excavations at Nineveh (*Kuyundjik*) in December, 1842, Layard at Calah (*Nimrud*) in November, 1845.

³ Rawlinson, Hincks, Fox-Talbot and Oppert were the members of a committee appointed by the Royal Asiatic Society to make test translations of this inscription. They worked independently of one another and the substantial agreement between their translations did a great deal to establish confidence in Assyriological studies and to remove suspicions regarding their value and reliability.

and antiquities of various kinds. They deciphered the complicated cuneiform script and have solved most of its difficulties. They have published many inscriptions and supplied the student of to-day with grammar and lexicon, with works on history and religion, and with textbooks and helps of all sorts. In fact so rapid has been the progress that the Assyriologist of to-day is being forced to become in ever increasing measure a specialist in some one or more of the many fields of investigation which the cuneiform inscriptions have opened up to us. And even when we restrict ourselves to the work of the decade which is past⁴—the seventh and in many ways the most productive in the history of Assyriology—it is by no means easy to trace the progress which has been made and it is necessary for us to confine ourselves more especially to the most important fields. We shall consider therefore the progress this decade has made in the work of excavation; in philological research; in chronology and history; in the study of legal and business documents, and letters and of the proper names; and in the investigation of the religion.

THE EXCAVATIONS

The work of excavation has been carried on with vigor and although no single finds have been reported which rank in importance with the discovery of the Library of Assurbanapal by Rassam in 1854, the finding of the Tell-el-Amarna letters in 1888 and the unearthing of the Stele of Hammurapi in 1901, some very important discoveries have been made and much valuable information has been obtained.

⁴ This period is counted roughly as beginning with 1903 and extending to the present time. This is a little over a decade, but still is sufficiently accurate for our purpose. For several years back Dr. H. Pick of the Royal Library at Berlin has prepared a brief yearly summary of the progress made in Assyriological research for the *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*. Cf. also H. W. Hogg, *Survey of Recent Publications on Assyriology*, vol. I, 1908; vol. II, 1910, which are favorably spoken of by Pick, and also L. W. King's survey for the years 1910-12 in the *Britannica Year-Book*, 1913, pp. 256-60.

The Germans who were the last to enter the field have done more work during this period than any other single nation. The *Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft*, which was founded in 1898 and began excavations at Babylon in the following year, has continued its work uninterruptedly and although the results of those excavations have been rather disappointing in some ways they have thrown very welcome light upon the topography of Babylon, especially upon the character of the fortifications, palaces and temples of the Babylon of the time of Nebuchadnezzar.⁵ In 1903—just ten years ago—excavations were commenced at Assur, the ancient capital of Assyria, and have been in progress ever since. These excavations have been especially valuable for the light which they have thrown upon the early history of Assyria.⁶

The *Orient-Gesellschaft* has also conducted excavations at Fāra, which is probably to be identified with the ancient Shuruppak, which according to the Babylonian legend was the home of Ut-napishtim the hero of the Flood, and at Abu Hatab, another very ancient ruin, and has recently begun excavations at Warka, the Biblical Erech. Three cities of far less antiquity, Hatra, near Assur, and Samarra and

⁵ Meissner who was for a time connected with the expedition, has recently expressed the opinion (*OLZ*, XV, 416) that the fears entertained by "most German Assyriologists" that these excavations would not be sufficiently successful to warrant the great expense involved, have been proved to have been justified by the results. "Especially as regards literary and archaeological data, the results are quite moderate. Only the architect has thus far perhaps gotten his money's worth." The costs of the 13 years excavations he estimated at \$200,000 or more. For an account of these excavations *cf.* the *Mitteilungen der Deutschen Orient Gesellschaft* also the *Wissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen* of the same society and especially the account of the work of the expedition recently presented by Koldewey in his *Das wiedererstandene Babylon* (1913). Koldewey who has been in charge of the work at Babylon from the very start estimates that about one-half of the necessary work has been accomplished. The magnitude of the task is shown by his statement that 200 to 250 men have been working on it steadily for thirteen or fourteen years.

⁶ *Cf.* pp. 243 ff. For the official accounts of these excavations *cf.* the publications of the *Deutsche Orient Gesellschaft* mentioned in note 5.

Ocheidir in Babylonia have also been visited and studied by German archaeologists.

The French have resumed their excavations at Tello, which were interrupted by the death of de Sarzec in 1901. Capt. Gaston Cros, his successor, reached Tello in 1903 and the work of excavation has been carried on with very considerable success. At Susa where excavation was commenced in 1897 and where the code of Hammurapi, the obelisk of Manishtusu and a number of other very valuable finds were made, the work of the *Délégation en Perse* has been continued and some work has also been done in other parts of Persia. At Oheimir, the site of the ancient city of northern Babylonia, Kish, excavations have recently been carried on by Genouillac and they are reported to be successful.⁷

Of the work of the English excavators little has been heard. King conducted excavations at Nineveh nearly ten years ago, and he, with the assistance of Thompson, made a new copy of the trilingual inscription of Darius the Great at Behistûn.⁸

Only two American expeditions have been at work in this region during the decade.⁹ The expedition of the Uni-

⁷ Cf. Gaston Cros, *Nouvelles Fouilles de Tello* (de Sarzec's monumental work *Découvertes en Chaldée* which was begun about 30 years ago and which gives an account of the excavations of this distinguished archaeologist at Tello, was completed last year by Heuzey and Thureau-Dangin, eleven years after the death of de Sarzec); also L. Heuzey in *Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, 1910. Heuzey reports that Cros has discovered a part of a wall built by Gudea. For the excavations at Susa compare the *Mémoires de la Délégation en Perse* and the other publications of the *Délégation*. It is worthy of note that according to Scheil (*Comptes Rendus*, 1910) it is now possible to trace the old Elamitic language, or as he has named it *Anzanite*, as far back as Naram-Sin. For a reference to the excavations at Oheimir cf. *OLZ*, XV, 426. The French have also been working at Samara cf. Viollet, *Fouilles à Samara en Mésopotamie*.

⁸ *The Sculptures and Inscription of Darius the Great on the Rock of Behistûn in Persia*. A new collection of the Persian, Susian and Babylonian Texts, with English translation, plates, etc. 1907.

⁹ The excavations of the University of Pennsylvania at Nippur have not been continued since 1900.

versity of Chicago under the direction of Dr. Banks excavated the site of Bismaya,¹⁰ the ancient *Adab*, in 1903-4 and the Cornell expedition under Olmstead, Charles and Wrench, which has thus far only published the results of its excavation in the Hittite country of Asia Minor, will also work in Mesopotamia, if it has not already done so.¹¹

Besides these expeditions the natives have done considerable excavating on their own account, notably at Sippar (*Abu Habba*), Drehem, Warka and Dailem, and many hundreds of tablets found by them have been bought by European and American collectors.

Through the excavations just enumerated the material for our study of ancient Babylonia and Assyria has been greatly increased. The inventory-lists of objects excavated at Assur passed the 20,000 mark during the past year. At Babylon No. 30,130 was found on Feb. 20, 1905. At that point the inventory ceases, at least as far as all reference to it in the "Reports" is concerned; but the latter indicate that the number must have grown very considerably since then. The inventory numbers at Susa have passed the 15,000 mark, and judging from the registry-numbers of the British Museum that collection has been increased through excavation or purchase by at least 10,000 objects.¹² The other excavations referred to have yielded less.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to form anything approaching an accurate estimate of the extent of the material which has been recovered. A conservative estimate would probably place the total at about 300,000 objects, of which perhaps one-fourth have been recovered during the past decade.¹³ The collection of the British Museum, which

¹⁰ Cf. Edgar J. Banks, *Bismaya*, 1913.

¹¹ Cf. A. T. Olmstead, B. B. Charles, J. E. Wrench, *Travels and Studies in the Nearer East* (Cornell expedition to Asia Minor and the Assyro-Babylonian Orient).

¹² The figures for the Susa excavations and also for the British Museum are based on the inventory or registry numbers of the tablets of these collections in official publications and they may be considerably too low.

¹³ The Kuyundjik Collection of the British Museum numbers, as has

is by far the largest single collection, has passed the 100,000 mark by several thousand. The Imperial Ottoman Museum at Constantinople probably comes next,¹⁴ then the Louvre and then Berlin, for the European collections. The largest collection in this country is that of the University of Pennsylvania, which has about 17,000 tablets.

An estimate of this kind is also very unsatisfactory because of the heterogeneous character of the collections. A single number may represent a large cylinder, or tablet, or a small tablet or even a fragment of a tablet. It may stand for an uninscribed terracotta figurine—according to Koldewey some 6,000 often fragmentary have been found at Babylon—or for a basalt or diorite stele or statue. Of course the small tablets and the fragments are in the majority.

Still these figures give some idea at least of the extent of the material. And it can consequently occasion no surprise that although the work of publishing and copying the inscriptions was entered upon immediately, the pen of the copyist and the varied labors of the decipherer have never been able to catch up or to keep up with the spade of the excavator. In 1850 Botta and Flandin completed their *Monument de Ninive*. In 1851 Layard published his *Inscriptions in the Cuneiform Character*. The first volume of Rawlinson's *Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia* appeared in 1861 and the fifth volume was published nineteen years later. Other texts and series appeared from time to

been said, over 20,000 tablets or fragments. Rassam estimated that 50,000 were found at Sippar. During the years 1893-5 about 30,000 were excavated according to de Sarzec at Tello. Hilprecht has estimated the Nippur yield at over 50,000. These are the most noteworthy finds of previous decades, as far as numbers are concerned.

¹⁴Under the present regulations of the Turkish government all antiquities are its property and are to be handed over to the Imperial Ottoman Museum. What percentage of these inscriptions, excavated by European and American archaeologists, will eventually reach the Museums which they represent and what percent of the recently excavated material has already been transferred to Constantinople it is difficult or impossible to say. According to report most of the antiquities found at Babylon are still there, and have not been removed to Constantinople.

time; but Rawlinson was, until about twenty years ago, the great *corpus inscriptionum* of the Assyriologist. About thirty years ago Strassmaier, who himself during the eighties and early nineties published several thousand tablets (contracts), complained of the reluctance of scholars to undertake the publication of new inscriptions. And no one who knows the difficulty involved in this work can wonder at this. The texts are often very hard to read, being usually more or less mutilated and often quite fragmentary and the writing is sometimes very difficult to decipher. But yet probably no decade has a better record in text publications than this one. Over ten thousand inscriptions of various kinds have been published. Clay, Ungnad, Thureau-Dangin, Scheil, Genouillac, King, Thompson, Harper and Virolleaud have published a great many inscriptions and a number of others have made more or less extensive contributions.¹⁵ Most of these are texts not previously published. Many of these inscriptions are small and a large proportion of them are contracts or other documents of a business character. A large part of these latter are in Sumerian, the non-Semitic language spoken by the early inhabitants of Southern Babylonia, from whom the Semitic Babylonians borrowed the cuneiform script.

This record for a single decade is quite noteworthy and shows the great interest which is being taken in this field of investigation. With so many new texts constantly appearing, so much new material to be studied, it is no easy task to keep abreast of the work which is being done in Assyriology alone, not to mention the discoveries in other fields, especially Egyptian, Hittite, Cretan and the Greek papyri, which claim attention. And yet despite this great output it is probable that only a comparatively small part, perhaps not over ten to twenty per cent of the excavated material has been published thus far. There are doubtless in many of our

¹⁵ de la Fuye, Messerschmidt, Hilprecht, Barton, Myhrmann, Radau, Langdon, Klauber, Le Gac, Pinches, Poebel, Weissbach, Peiser, Friedrich, Waterman, Lau, Macmillan, Hincke, Hussey, Delaporte and some others.

museums tablets of the greatest value, which are as unknown as if still covered by the dust of ages. The publication by King, in 1907, of a chronicle containing a valuable synchronism between Babylonian and Assyrian history, a tablet which had seemingly lain in the British Museum for some years before its value was discovered, occasioned the humorous comment by Winckler that "excavations in the British Museum seem more successful than those which are conducted on the site of many a capital city of Babylonia".

This witticism was aimed perhaps more at those responsible for the rather unproductive excavations at Babylon than at the Trustees of the British Museum who have shown very commendable zeal in the publication of texts and in the opening up of their treasures to scholars from all parts of the world. And it is to be hoped that future "excavations" will prove even more successful. This great collection has not yet been even fully catalogued. Bezold took over ten years to catalogue the Kuyundjik Collection alone, which is only about a fifth of the whole, and years must elapse before all its treasures shall have been published. And the same is true in a lesser degree of the other large collections. And in the meantime the work of excavation is being pushed.

PHILOLOGY

Considerable progress has been made along the line of linguistic and philological study. Delitzsch and Sayce have published new editions of their Assyrian grammars. Ungnad and Meissner have published short grammars. The first of these latter is especially valuable because of the prominence which it gives to 'old Babylonian'. Prince has published a new chrestomathy for beginners and Delitzsch's well known *Lesestücke* has appeared in a fifth edition. Special problems of grammar have been studied by Ungnad, Bezold, Thompson, Böhl, Ebeling, Ylvisaker, and others. Brockelmann has made use of Assyrian very extensively in his comparative semitic grammar. The first Sumerian

grammar has recently been published by Langdon—and another by Delitzsch will appear very soon. The advance which has been made in this direction is shown by the fact that at Berlin University Professor Delitzsch expects to make Sumerian a distinct discipline instead of as heretofore merely a department of Assyrian. Lexicography has also made great progress. Almost every new inscription of any length brings us some new word or new expression. Muss-Arnolt's lexicon was completed in 1905, and has about 1200 pages. It is rumored that the supplement to Delitzsch's *Handwörterbuch* (1896), which has been promised for half a decade, will be nearly as large as the original dictionary. The glossary in the new edition of the *Lesestücke* contains much new material. Quite recently Holma, a Finnish scholar, has published a monograph of nearly 200 pages on the names given to the different parts of the body in Assyrio-Babylonian (*Die Namen der Körperteile im Assyrisch-Babylonischen*). This study brings together some 350 words and although many of them are still of uncertain meaning, this work shows something of the possibilities of Assyrian lexicography. Prince completed in 1908 his *Materials for a Sumerian Lexicon* and Meissner finished in 1910 his great collection of rare Assyrian ideograms. This work contains approximately 10,000 ideograms and is intended as a supplement to Brünnow's *Classified List*, which appeared in 1889. Other less extensive contributions have been made by Fossey, Virolleaud, Langdon and Hussey.

Barton has been making an elaborate study of the cuneiform script. The material for such a study has increased greatly of recent years. The publication of texts of all periods, especially of so many of the period of Hammurapi and still earlier, has made it possible to trace the stages in the development of the script from very early times in its various modifications.¹⁶ A comparative study of this kind is very helpful and carries on the work of Amiaud, Thureau-

¹⁶ The publication of early Assyrian inscriptions has shown that about the time of Hammurapi the Assyrian script closely resembled the Babylonian although at a later date it developed marked peculiarities.

Dangin, Delitzsch and others. The most ancient script has been especially studied by Toscanne.

The controversy with regard to the character of the Sumerian language, which has been waged with greater or less activity since 1874, when Halévy first put forth the hypothesis that instead of being a non-Semitic language, it was an ideographic or cryptographic script (*allographie*) of Semitic origin, has now been practically settled in favor of the opponents of Halévy. The family to which it belongs is still in dispute. Indeed little light has been thrown upon this subject in the last quarter of a century. But the fact that it is a genuine language is now practically universally admitted. Jastrow, who until recently was a supporter of Halévy, now admits that the proof contained in the "royal inscriptions", which have recently been edited and translated by Thureau-Dangin, that the Sumerian had *phonetic* elements, has convinced him that it was once a spoken language and not merely an ideographic way of writing Semitic-Babylonian.¹⁷ This evidence has seemed to him more convincing even than the evidence produced by Ed. Meyer to show that on the monuments we find representations of two distinct races, the one Semitic, the other the Sumerian. Jastrow was one of the last if not the last prominent supporter of Halévy. So that the latter now stands practically alone and although he has quite recently written a lengthy defence of his standpoint, and predicts that "some day the historians and philologists will be grateful to him for having delivered them from the absurd nightmare, which has troubled their minds for sixty years and which is called 'the Sumarian mystery'", it is hardly likely that he will win many converts to his position.

It is interesting to note in this connection that the cuneiform inscriptions have thrown valuable light on the vocalization of ancient Egyptian. As is now generally admitted, this language was written, like Hebrew and most of the

¹⁷ Cf. Jastrow, *Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens*, vol. II, pp. ix. Many of these inscriptions had been previously edited. But this translation constitutes a great advance in this field.

other Semitic languages, without the vowels. The cuneiform although in many respects a complicated and cumbersome system has the advantage that it does render the vowels. Ranke has collected considerable material bearing upon this subject. And while it is probable that the Egyptologist will have to look in the future as in the past chiefly to Coptic for light upon this important question, the value of the cuneiform is not inconsiderable.

The excavations conducted by Winckler at Boghaz-Keui in 1907 have also made it clear that it is to the Cuneiform, which has unlocked for us the long forgotten Sumerian, that we are to look for the key to the Hittite. Winckler found there Hittite tablets written in the cuneiform script and containing a number of Assyrian words. It is also reported that bilingual syllabaries have been found. Such tablets should make possible that scientific study of the Hittite language, which is necessarily a preliminary step before any thorough study of the hieroglyphs can be made. For it has been the circumstance that the language as well as the script was unknown which has made the problem so exceedingly difficult.¹⁸

CHRONOLOGY AND HISTORY

Important light has been thrown upon chronology and history by chronicles, date lists, dated contract tablets and historical inscriptions of various kinds, published during the past decade. Two new chronicles published by King¹⁹ are especially valuable. One gives us a synchronism between early Babylonian and Assyrian history, by stating that Ilu-shûma, king of Assyria, was a contemporary of Su- (or Sumu-) abu, the first king of the First Dynasty of Babylon—a synchronism which carries us back more than 500 years

¹⁸ Thompson, in his *New Decipherment of the Hittite Hieroglyphs* (1913) has made considerable use of the cuneiform tablets published by Winckler (*MDOG*, No. 35), and his decipherment seems to rest on sound principles. Just how much of it will eventually prove to be correct, it is hard to predict at present.

¹⁹ L. W. King, *Chronicles concerning early Babylonian Kings*, 1907.

before the "Synchronistic Chronicle" starts *i.e.*, to about the beginning of the second millenium B.C.²⁰ Another chronicle states that Samsu-iluna, son of Hammurapi, waged war against Iluma-ilu. As this Iluma-ilu is admitted to be the first king of the Second Dynasty, or, as it is called, the Dynasty of the Sea-Land, this statement proves that the Second Dynasty was contemporaneous with the First for one third to one half its duration. Whether the Second Dynasty held sway at Babylon at all is not yet definitely settled. King thinks that it did not. In this opinion he is supported by Ed. Meyer. The fact that as early as the ninth year of Samsu-iluna the Kassites, as Hilprecht expresses it "knocked at the door of Babylonia", and that no inscription dated in the reigns of these kings has ever been found, goes a long way toward establishing this contention.²¹ That this is the case was argued fifteen years ago by Hommel, following a suggestion of Halévy. This evidence brings down the date of Hammurapi very considerably and largely obviates the difficulty in the way of the acceptance of the identification of this king with the Amraphel of Gen. xiv. The chronology is still too uncertain to warrant an attempt at exact determination,²² but this discovery goes a long way toward harmonizing the two chronologies

²⁰ Another important datum for the history of the early period is the fact that we are able in view of a recent discovery of Thureau-Dangin to assign the Cappadocian Tablets, which have been found near Boghaz-Keui, to about 2300 B.C., *i.e.*, to a period several centuries earlier than the first dynasty of Babylon. Cf. *The Britannica Year-Book*, 1913, p. 259.

²¹ Hilprecht in 1906 expressed the opinion that the Dynasty of the Sea-Lands is for a great part contemporaneous with the Hammurapi dynasty and that the first eighty to one hundred years of the Kassite dynasty run parallel with the closing years of the preceding dynasties (cf. *Babylonian Exped. of the Univ. of Penn.* Series A, XX, 1, p. 43).

²² Auchincloss (*Chronology of the Holy Bible*, p. 61) fixes the date of the Promise to Abraham at 1907 B.C. and states that Rogers on the basis of Babylonian data assigns this event tentatively to 1915 B.C. Beecher (*The Dated Events of the O. T.*) places this event twenty-one years earlier. Both of these scholars accept the view that the Second Dynasty never ruled at Babylon and that the Third or Kassite followed immediately on the First. F. A. Jones (*The Dates of Genesis*) regards

at this point. The fact that this tablet furnishes us with a definite instance of a dynasty being to all appearance regarded by Assyrian chroniclers as successive when it was really contemporaneous in whole or in part with other dynasties is, as King points out, of the greatest importance because it helps in the solution of another problem which has long been puzzling scholars—the date of Naram-Sin. According to Nabunaid, the last king of Babylon, Naram-Sin lived about 3800 B.C. This date has been regarded as too high by many scholars. It could not be accepted without admitting enormous gaps in the history, as known, or inventing new kings or dynasties to fill them. Lehmann-Haupt tried to obviate this difficulty by assuming that the scribe made a mistake of 1,000 years, writing 3200 for 2200 and this view has gained considerable acceptance. But, as King points out, while this correction answers fairly well in this instance, it cannot explain other cases of conflict and is not scientific. King argues with justice that it is far more probable that the scribes of Nabunaid made the same mistake in calculating the date of Naram-Sin which modern scholars have made in estimating the date of Hammurapi, that is, they have regarded as successive dynasties which appear consecutively in the lists but which should really be treated in some instances at least as contemporaneous. We have seen that the evidence that the Second Dynasty did not rule in Babylon at all or at the best only a part of the time assigned to it in the “King-Lists”, brings down the date of Hammurapi approximately 125-350 years. Had the scribes of Nabunaid made this same mistake and also counted several of the earlier dynasties, some of which we know to have been contemporaneous, as consecutive, an error of a thousand years, great as it is, would readily be

1913 B.C., Ussher's date for Gen. xiv, as approximately correct. Toffteen (*Ancient Chronology*, Part I) on the other hand allows an interval of about 150 years between the First and Third Dynasties and his date for the “Promise” is 2090 B.C., very much higher than that proposed by the others.

explicable. King's latest estimate for the date of Naram-Sin is about 2700 B.C.²³

For the history of the earlier period new data are furnished by a dynastic tablet recently published by Scheil, which records the names and reigns of the kings of three new dynasties. Two of these are Sumerian, the third Semitic, the dynasty of Guti. This last dynasty, although only mentioned in the list, clears up several difficulties of the history of the early period, proving as it does a period of Semitic domination lying between the time of Sargon and the Hammurapi dynasty, and King describes this invasion as "an event of the first importance". Hilprecht in 1906 published the latter part of a fragment of a dynastic tablet giving the dynasties of Ur and Isin (preceding the Hammurapi dynasty). He argues from the shape and size of the tablet that it must have contained the names and reigns of about 135 rulers of the period prior to Ur-Engur whose reign he places between the limits 2500-2200 B.C. Poebel has found in the Nippur collection another dynastic tablet which should prove of great interest, since it purports to carry us back to the kings who reigned after the Deluge. How much, if any, historical value it will prove to possess, it is at yet impossible to say. King asserts that "the age of Sumerian civilization can be traced in Babylonia back to about the middle of the fourth millenium B.C., but not beyond".

The tablet referred to above which has proved that the First and Second Dynasties were in part contemporary, contains an additional statement which must be mentioned, namely a reference to an invasion of Babylonia by the Hittites at the close of the First Dynasty of Babylon. This information throws light upon several problems. It accounts perhaps for the fall of the First Dynasty and for the success of the Kassites in establishing their power there. King thinks that it was at this time that the images of Marduk

²³ Hilprecht in 1906 (*op. cit.*) assigned him to a date between 2950 and 2650 B.C. Ed. Meyer in 1909 fixed his date as low as 2450 B.C.

and Sarpanitum were carried off, which more than a century later the Kassite king Argum II brought back from Khani and restored to the temple Esagila in Babylon. This fact is of especial interest because of its confirmation of the book of Genesis, which testifies to the power of the Hittites at this early period. "Among the great political forces of the ancient Oriental world," declares Professor Sayce, "we now know that none exercised a more profound influence than the Hittites of Asia Minor."²⁴ The "nebulous" kingdom of the Hittites is assuming very definite shape!

A number of strictly historical texts have been found coming from all periods. Those from the excavations at Assur have greatly increased our collection of the inscriptions of the Assyrian kings.²⁵ The inscriptions of Adad-Nirari I,²⁶ Salmaneser I (c. 1300 B.C.) and Samsi-Adad are especially worthy of mention and there are a number belonging to subsequent monarchs. About four years ago Scheil and Gautier published a valuable inscription of Tukulti-Ninib II (889-884), a king who until then was practically known only by name. The account which he gives of his military expeditions is especially valuable because of the light it throws on the geography of that period. Recently King has published a cylinder of Sennacherib, acquired by the British Museum, which is of peculiar interest because it gives us an account of the expedition of Sennacherib against

²⁴ Garstang, *The Land of the Hittites*, p. ix.

²⁵ The most recent list of Assyrian kings published by Andrae, the German excavator at Assur, contains 72 names. The discovery of new inscriptions has changed our nomenclature to a considerable degree. Pul is now Tiglath-Pileser IV, not III; Assurnasirpal is now III. Samsi-Adad (823 B.C.) and his son Adad-nirari are now respectively V and IV. Johns indeed calls the former Samsi-Adad VII. A Sargon I has been found, who ruled at Assur about the time of Hammurapi of Babylon, so that it is he and not the founder of the neo-Assyrian empire who first assumed the name of the ancient king of Akkad.

²⁶ Prof. R. D. Wilson has called my attention to the fact that one of the newly discovered inscriptions of this king contains a reference to the Arameans (*Akhلامي*). The earliest previously known reference to them on an Assyrian inscription is from the reign of Tiglath-Pileser I, about two centuries later. Cf. Schiffer, *Die Aramäer*.

Cilicia and the Greeks. This expedition, which is, according to King, the sixth conducted by that monarch, took place in 698. It is described in the Chronicles of Eusebius (Armenian version) but is not referred to at all in the Taylor Cylinder, despite the fact that the latter is dated in 691. This confirmation of an ancient tradition is especially noteworthy because the silence of the "Taylor Cylinder" might easily be construed as discrediting the account given by Eusebius.²⁷ This new cylinder also gives a lengthy account of Sennacherib's extensive building operations at Nineveh and is of value for a study of the topography of the city, giving as it does the names of its fifteen gates and describing the new palace and park.

Another interesting inscription is the Sargon-tablet which has been recently published by Thureau-Dangin. It is a letter and one of unusual length (430 lines). It was written by the king, while residing at Calah, to the officials and citizens of Assur and gives an account of his activities. It is really a war bulletin. It begins, following the epistolary style: "To Asur, the father of the gods, the mighty lord, who dwells in *Eharsaggalkurkurra*, his great temple, may there be most abundant prosperity." Then follows a similar greeting to the other gods and to the citizens of Assur. Sargon writes a letter to his god!

During the course of the excavations at Assur a number of steles have been discovered—nearly 150 in all—which are of not a little historical interest since they usually bear inscriptions. There are two rows of these steles. One is confined to royal personages, the other to officials. About twenty-five of the former have been found, the oldest being that of Erba-Adad, who lived considerably earlier than Adad-Nirari I. One of these is especially interesting because it bears the name of Shammuramat, i.e., Semiramis. This stele shows that she was the wife of Samsi-Adad V and the

²⁷ Cf. L. W. King in *Cuneiform Texts*, XXVI, p. 11 f. Cf. also Professor R. D. Wilson's discussion of the argument from silence in the first volume of his *Studies on the Book of Daniel* which will soon be published.

mother of Adad-nirari IV (800 B.C.). Lehmann-Haupt of Berlin has made a careful investigation of the historical basis of the legend of Ninus and Semiramis, which has come down to us through Greek sources, notably Ctesias, and he believes that this legend must have had its origin not in Assyria but in a foreign country, probably Media. Shammuramat seems to have been a remarkable woman. The fact that her name appears on this stele and on several other inscriptions proves this, for of the Assyrian queens we hear but little. She was a Babylonian, probably of royal birth, and Professor Lehmann-Haupt thinks that her prominence in this legend can be accounted for, if she accompanied her husband and later her son on their warlike expeditions against Armenia and Media and through her prowess and ability won fame and renown as a warrior-queen. That a legend, which represents a queen, who lived in the ninth century B.C., i.e., at a time when the kingdom of Assyria had been in existence for centuries, as being the consort of the founder of the empire, could have grown up on native soil, he believes to be impossible.

In his brief history of the life and times of Assurbanapal²⁸ (Sardanapalus) Professor Delitzsch calls attention to what seems to have been a practice of Assyrian and Babylonian rulers of carrying off dust and rubbish from the cities which they captured and destroyed and pouring it out in a heap at the gates of their royal cities or of the temple of their gods. Sometimes they erected on it a monument recording their exploits. This custom, which seems to be very ancient, is of significance because it is perhaps referred to in the boastful message of Ben Hadad to Ahab recorded in 1 Kings, xx. 10. "The gods do so to me and more also if the dust of Samaria

²⁸ Delitzsch identifies Assurbanapal with the "great and glorious Asnapper" of Ezra iv and points out that as against the Greek and Roman legends which represent him as weak and effeminate, this characterization which we find in the Bible is the only true one. It must be borne in mind, however, that neither the identification of Asnapper with Assurbanapal on the one hand, nor that of Assurbanapal with Sardanapalus on the other can be regarded as certain.

shall suffice for handfuls for all the people that follow me." The vain and ambitious king of Damascus is thinking probably of Nineveh with its victory-columns raised on the ruins of captured cities. He too hopes to erect his monuments before the gates of Damascus. And so, enraged at Ahab's obstinacy in refusing to yield to his demands, he utters this scornful taunt. "You Ahab trust in your city of Samaria, with its walls and its warriors! The dust of your ruined city will not even suffice to fill the hands of my soldiers when I and my two and thirty kings return in triumph to erect before Damascus my victory-stele as conqueror of Samaria!" A braggart speech and one which might well come from the lips of Ben Hadad!

Boundary stones have received considerable attention during the past decade. King has recently published a fine collection of boundary and memorial stones—thirty-seven in all (a number of them are fragmentary)—, and two-thirds of these for the first time. Twenty had been found at Susa up to 1905. Hincke has made a thorough investigation of this class of inscriptions. Their dates range from the Kassite period down to the Persian—*i.e.*, a period of nearly a thousand years. While not historical texts strictly speaking they contain data which are of value to the historian.

LEGAL AND BUSINESS DOCUMENTS, LETTERS, PROPER NAMES

It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the discovery of the Code of Hammurapi in 1901 has in several ways revolutionized our ideas of conditions existing at the time of Abraham. This code has been diligently studied during the past decade. Several editions of the text have been published and a number of translations of it have been made. Its contents have been studied from various aspects, prominent among them being the comparison of it with the Mosaic legislation.²⁹ The proof of the existence of a code of this

²⁹ The text of the code was first published by Scheil; subsequently by Harper and by Ungnad. The latter has also published several fragments of the code which have since come to light. It has been translated by Scheil, Müller, Johns, Harper, Winckler, Ungnad and others.

kind five hundred years before the time of Moses is a strong argument for the possibility of the promulgation of the Law at the time of the exodus. There has been a tendency on the part of some to disparage the Mosaic to the advantage of the Babylonian code, and to argue that the admittedly human origin of the latter must of necessity dispose of the argument in support of the supernatural origin of the former. This was of course to be expected. But it must be admitted that the discovery of this code has in many ways both directly and indirectly confirmed the historicity of the Pentateuch.

The discovery of the Code of Hammurapi had, as might have been expected, the effect of stimulating interest in legal and business documents of that period. Some work had already been done in that field, notably by Strassmaier, Meissner and Peiser, several hundred texts having been published and more or less carefully studied. During the past decade over 1,300 tablets have been published and the majority have been translated by Ungnad, and Kohler has made a study of the legal questions involved. Over 600 tablets dating from the Kassite period and about 1,500 from the Neo-Babylonian and Persian period have also been published. From the Assyrian period relatively few new texts have been published, although Ungnad has translated most of the texts published by Johns (1898-1901), and some others making nearly 900 in all, and Kohler has discussed the legal problems.

It is of interest to note that quite recently Koschaker, of the University of Prague, has written a valuable study of an important legal problem, the law of guarantee (*Bürgschaftsrecht*) as it was operative among the Babylonians and Assyrians. He studies it not merely in the early period but

The problems of the code and its relation to the Mosaic legislation have been studied by S. A. Cook, D. H. Müller, Grimme, Edwards, W. W. Davies, Kohler and Ungnad, and others. The name of this king was formerly read Hammurabi. It has been shown however that the sign read *bi* has also in Old-Babylonian the value *pi*. And since this king is generally identified with the Amraphel of Gen. xiv. (see p. 240) the new reading, which was first proposed by Ungnad, is to be preferred.

in the late as well, and in order to do this he, although a jurist and not an Assyriologist, devoted considerable time and effort to the study of the Assyrio-Babylonian that he might be able at least to study transcribed texts in the original language. Schorr, an Assyriologist who has devoted much time and study to this line of investigation, remarks in reviewing Koschaker's book that it is a noteworthy event in the history of Assyriology that a jurist has taken the trouble to study Assyrio-Babylonian in order to investigate its legal problems.

In addition to the tablets just mentioned, about 3,000 business documents or temple-records as they are frequently called, dating in the main from the third millenium B.C. and written in Sumerian and not in the Semitic Babylonian, have been published and quite a number have been translated.

The fact that these business documents are usually dated makes them of value, sometimes of great value, historically. They serve as an important check on the dynastic lists, date lists and chronicles and, where these are fragmentary or unreliable, they are of great assistance in determining the chronology. This is especially true of the early period, the third millenium, and also of the Kassite period, for which the "King-List" is fragmentary. The tablets of the Assyrian period, most of which were published by Johns, give us the names of most if not all of the eponyms for Assyrian chronology between 666 and 606. But for about the last forty years of this period it is impossible for us as yet to determine their order. The Eponym Canon enables us to establish the chronology between about 900 and 648 (Ugnad) with almost no breaks.³⁰

Letters form a not inconsiderable group among the tablets which have been excavated. The number is relatively small as compared with the far greater number of contract and other business documents which have come to light. But

³⁰ This custom of dating by eponyms in Assyria is very ancient. It is regularly used by Adad-Nirari I (cir. 1300 B.C.) on his larger inscriptions and we even find it on "Cappadocian Tablets," which (*cf.* note 20 preceding) may now be assigned to the period of the Second Dynasty of Ur (cir. 2300 B.C.) instead of to the fifteenth century B.C. (*cf. Sayce, Encycl. Brit.*, 11th edition, Vol. III, pp. 101 f.).

over 2,000 letters have been published thus far and they are receiving a good deal of attention. The study of letters practically began with the discovery of the El-Amarna letters in 1888. A few years later Harper undertook the publication of the letters contained in the Library of Assurbanapal—there are some 1,500 letters or fragments in this collection—a task which is now nearly completed. King published a little over ten years ago some eighty letters written by kings of the First Dynasty of Babylon. Many of these letters are of very considerable historical interest. Some of them throw important light upon the customs secular and religious of the people. A great deal has been written on the subject of the El-Amarna letters especially and a new edition of them has been prepared by Knudtzon.

It is practically within the last decade that private letters, *i.e.*, letters written by and generally to private individuals as distinguished from official letters written by or to the king, have been studied. Some 400 tablets of this character, chiefly of the period of the First Dynasty³¹ and of the Neo-Babylonian period have been published. They have been studied by Thompson, Ungnad, Landersdorfer, Martin, Ebeling and others.

These letters, despite the many difficulties which they present to the translator, are a very interesting study. Covering as they do a period of some 1,500 years and coming from different localities, they present similarities and differences which are quite marked. It is instructive to study the epistolary style, the differences in the forms of the greeting, etc. The private letters are intrinsically far less important than the official or royal letters. But in one respect they are of great value, namely for the sake of their witness to the degree of education and culture possessed by their writers.

³¹ Thureau-Dangin has recently published a tablet which is of peculiar interest. It is somewhat mutilated. But he seems to have good grounds for his view that it is a letter written by Luenna, chief priest of Ninmar, to Enetarzi, chief priest of Girsu, at Lagash (Tello). In it Luenna tells of his successful warfare with invading Elamites. This letter dates from about 2850 B.C. and is written in Sumerian.

In this respect the letters of the early period are especially valuable because they indicate that a fairly high degree of culture prevailed in Babylonia at the time of Abraham. Thus the contents of some of the letters which have been found are of such a trivial nature that the fact that such messages were committed to writing seems to indicate that letter writing was neither a rare accomplishment nor a difficult task for the people of that age. When for example Akhum writes to Lipit-Ishtar and Awêl-Bau: "Now then send me the ass about which Zaziz spoke to you", or Adayatum to Nanna-intukh: "Give a shekel of silver to the agent of Sin-asharidu", or Nanna-intukh to Shumma-Shamash: "Give 60 *Qa* [c. eight gallons] of date-wine to Marduk-nâsir son of Bêl-khâzir"—brief instructions which could easily be conveyed by word of mouth, especially since the letters were probably delivered by private messengers—it seems clear that letter-writing could not have been a rare accomplishment, confined to temple scribes, or such messages would hardly have been written down. This is confirmed by the nature of the script. In these letters the characters are often carelessly written or scribbled and the inference seems justified that they are written by and to men who were so well accustomed to their complicated script that they did not feel obliged to write every character with great care and precision in order to avoid misunderstanding. When we remember that this script contains some 300 characters, some phonetic, some ideographic and many of them quite complicated, it speaks a great deal for the culture of this age. It is also a noteworthy fact that, despite minor differences, letters of the early period are all written in much the same general style, showing that letter-writing was taught in the schools of 4,000 years ago.

In the conclusion to the Code of Hammurapi we read the exhortation to the oppressed to come and read the words of the Code: "Let the oppressed man who has a cause come before my image as king of righteousness and let him read³²

³² Ungnad favors the rendering "let him have read to him". But the

my inscription which is written and let him hearken to my precious words and let my inscription show him his case, let him see what is his right and let his heart be at ease." Judging from the letters and business documents of the period it seems certain that many of Hammurapi's subjects were able to avail themselves of this exhortation and that the inscribing of the code on a great block of diorite and setting it up where all could see it served a very practical purpose.

That was however not the only purpose of the setting up of the stele. This great stele, with its bas-relief representing the king receiving the code from the Sun-god, was also intended to be a memorial stone, a tribute to and reminder of the goodness of the Sun-god, the god of justice and righteousness, the giver of the Code. And this was probably the chief reason that Moses commanded Joshua to set up great stones on Mount Ebal and to plaster them and write on them the words of the Law of Jehovah. It was to be a memorial, an Ebenezer, an Ebenzeke. Whether we can from it draw any inference as to the amount of education possessed by the Children of Israel when they entered Canaan is difficult to say. We know of course that the priests were to have copies of the Law and to teach it to the people. It is consequently assumed that the priests could read and possibly a considerable number of the people could also.

As Professor Sayce has recently reminded us, an old argument against the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch was that writing was not known at the time of Moses and that, had the Law been revealed to him, he could not have written it down and codified it. This position has of course long been utterly untenable. But it has found its echo in the claim that the Israelites were merely nomads, strangers to the high culture of Babylon and Egypt. In the light of other is equally if not more probable in itself and it is certain that many could have read for themselves, although it must be regarded as no less certain that very many could not. Perhaps the expression is on this account intentionally ambiguous.

archaeology, it is certainly not too much to say that Abraham probably learned to read and write when a boy in Ur of the Chaldees and that Moses, who was versed in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, may during the long years spent at the court of Pharaoh have learned not merely to read and write Egyptian but even have mastered the Babylonian cuneiform as well, since the El-Amarna letters show that it was at that time the *lingua franca* of a very wide area.

The contract tablets, business documents and letters contain a great many proper names. During the past decade several scholars, notably Ranke, Tallquist, Huber, Clay, Dhorme and Poebel have collected and published the names occurring on some thousands of tablets of different periods, both Semitic and Sumerian.³³ This study has proved very valuable. The study of the theophoric names throws considerable light upon the religious life and thinking of the people, as has been shown by Tallquist's investigations. The similarity between these names and names contained in the Old Testament is sometimes very great. One fact which has been brought out very clearly is the frequency with which names were abbreviated, through the omission of one or more of the component parts. In such cases a termination often having the force of a diminutive is frequently added. This feature is probably more characteristic of names in the Bible than is as yet recognized. The study of these names is also proving valuable, as Clay's investigations have shown, from the ethnological standpoint. It is possible clearly to distinguish men of different nationalities by the names. And Clay has shown that the study of the proper names of the Kassite period throws considerable light upon the puzzling Hittite problem.

The contracts, many of the other business documents and some of the letters bear seal-impressions; and many signets of various kinds have been discovered. These signets form a very interesting and fruitful field for investigation, attrac-

³³ Dhorme, Huber and Poebel have been studying Sumerian proper names, Ranke names of the First Dynasty, Clay those of the Kassite period and Tallquist those of the Neo-Babylonian and Persian period.

tive alike to antiquarian, artist and historian. In 1910 appeared W. H. Ward's *Cylinder-Seals of Western Asia*, which is a very valuable contribution to this subject. It is a seal impression on one of the "Cappadocian Tablets" which has established their early date (see note 20). A casual reference in Gen. xxxviii proves that, as might be expected, the Patriarchs carried signets.

THE RELIGION

In the study of the religious texts, which possess for us an interest which is in some respects at least scarcely inferior to the historical texts, very marked progress has been made.³⁴ Most noteworthy is perhaps the study of the omen

³⁴ The study of the historical texts, with which Assyriology began, furnished of course some information with regard to the religion of these peoples. The study of the myths and legends practically began with George Smith's discovery of portions of the Babylonian Flood-legend (1872), followed by his *Chaldean Genesis* in 1876. Since then a number of myths and legends, of which the Gilgamesh-epic (the account of the Flood is contained in the eleventh tablet of this epic), the Creation Tablets and the Descent of Ishtar are the most generally known, have been extensively studied. Within the past decade Jensen has published a new edition of the more important of these texts. The study of the magical texts began with the appearing of the second volume of Rawlinson's *Cuneiform Inscriptions* (1866). Oppert and especially Lenormant (1873) opened up the study of the incantations and exorcisms practiced in the Babylonian demonology. This line of investigation has been continued by Tallquist, King, Fossey, Thompson, and others. In 1875 appeared Lenormant's *La Divination et la Science des Présages chez les Chaldéens*, in which work although he was to a very considerable extent dependent on the classics for information, he pointed out most of the departments of this field (to astrology he devoted little attention). The hymns and prayers to the gods early received attention and many of them were published. In 1885 Zimmern's *Bab. Busspsalmen* appeared, in 1893 Kundtson's *Assyrische Gebete an den Sonnengott*. In the course of the decade a good deal of work has been done in the study of the cults of special deities—Bollenrücher, *Nergal*; Perry, *Sin*; Combe, *Sin*; Gray, *Shamash*; Hrozy, *Ninrag*; Schollmeyer, *Ishtar*, Myhrmann, *Labartu*, Pinches, *Ishtar*. Langdon has been studying the old Sumerian hymns and temple ritual and contributions to this subject have been made by Radau, Zimmern, Myhrmann, Macmillan and others. Behrens has made a valuable study of seven of the letters which have been published by Harper, which relate to religion and cult. Works on the religion have been published by Rogers, Sayce, Dhorme, Pinches and Jastrow.

texts. Within a year the second volume of Jastrow's German edition of his *Religion of the Babylonians and Assyrians* (1898) has been completed. This volume is very largely devoted to the study of these omen texts and contains a great deal of new material. In fact the writer devotes nearly 800 pages, more than the compass of his entire first edition, to this one subject. He discusses at very considerable length the most important forms of augury and divination which were practiced at Nineveh and Babylon—examination of the liver (hepatoscopy), observation of the heavenly bodies and of natural phenomena, divination by means of oil and water (lacanomancy), augury based on the encountering of different animals and the observation of their actions, augury based on the birth of monstrosities, oracles, dreams, etc.³⁵

The omen literature attracted attention quite early in the history of Assyriology, as was natural in view of the references to it in the classical writers as well as in the Old Testament. And all of the branches of it, which Professor Jastrow investigates, have received more or less attention from previous writers. He is however one of the first to emphasize the great importance of this aspect of the religion and he has also been the pioneer in the study of the texts dealing with the examination of the liver.³⁶ In the study of astrology, the Jesuit Kugler has come to be regarded as an authority and Boissier, Virolleaud, Fossey, Hunger, King, Klauber, Handcock and others have made contributions to these lines of investigation. Professor Jastrow regards hepatoscopy and astrology as the two most important forms of divination practised by these peoples. The former he characterizes as the popular, the latter as the scientific system.

³⁵ Cf. also his *Aspects of Religious Belief and Practice in Babylonia and Assyria*, 1911.

³⁶ As early as 1875 Lenormant called attention to the importance of hepatoscopy and referred to two unedited text fragments dealing with this subject. But, as has been stated, it is only quite recently that this subject has been carefully studied.

Professor Jastrow has been accused of devoting too much attention to this one subject—the omen literature—in his new work and with thus giving his readers a false, or at least a one-sided, conception of this religious system and of the importance of this feature in it. That there is some truth in this objection must be admitted. For, as he himself admits, he is forced to reserve for a new volume the treatment of a number of subjects which should be discussed in a work bearing this title—subjects which occupied over a third of the space of the first edition—because he has devoted fully one-half of the space of these three volumes to this one topic.

His reply to this objection is however significant. He points out in the Preface to the second volume that these omen texts form a large part of the religious literature as we know it. They constitute, as he reminds us, the largest single group in the texts coming from the Library of Assurbanapal. He argues with justice that we must take the material as we find it and further justifies his procedure by the fact that this group of texts has been largely neglected in the past. Having himself devoted a great deal of time and pains to the study of texts dealing with the liver, it is only natural that he should discuss this “new subject” more fully than he might otherwise have done. His second reason is especially noteworthy. He contends that the preponderance of omen texts is not accidental, but that it is really due to the especial prominence of this feature in the religious beliefs and usages of the people. He tells us that “it was in these very omen-texts that the theory of the universe, which dominated the lives of the people in Assyria and Babylonia, from the very earliest to the latest period, expressed itself, that it was one of the chief objects—if not the main purpose—of the religion in its practical form to enable men to prepare themselves for that which was impending and to enable them to do their best to ward off every evil, when it was impossible to prevail on the gods to alter their purposes.”

This characterization of the religion of Babylon and Nineveh, given to us by one who is a recognized authority in this field, is very significant. That these nations used divination and augury was known to us, as has been remarked, through the Old Testament and the Classics even before the study of Assyriology began. But it is only recently that the great prominence of this feature in these religions—the special emphasis upon the “future problem”—has been made clear by this literature itself. And this fact is of unusual importance not merely for our study of this religion, but even more for a true appreciation of the relation in which it stands to other religions and especially to the religion of Israel.

In this age of comparative study and research, to which the words development and derivation are so familiar, a comparison between these religions is unavoidable, more especially since the interest which has been taken in Assyriology has come largely from the study of the Old Testament, and Bible lovers have been inclined to welcome every new point of contact between the Old Testament and the Monuments and have looked to the latter for confirmation of the truth of the former. And to many, of course, connection necessarily suggests derivation or dependence, and an emphasis on the correspondences between the religion and culture of these nations leads naturally to the inference that there was an interdependence—a derivation.

The attempt to prove the dependence of Israel upon Babylon in religious and other matters, which can be traced back for several decades,³⁷ was brought prominently before

³⁷ It received its first real impulse through the discovery of the Babylonian myths of the Flood and of Creation. In 1877 C. P. Tiele, in his inaugural address as professor of comparative religions at Leyden on: “*Die Assyriologie und ihre Ergebnisse für die vergl. Religionswissenschaft*,” asserted that the religious literature of the Babylonians and Assyrians was destined to play in the comparative theology of the Semites the same rôle as the Vedas in that of the Indo-Germans. In 1888 Dr. Edw. G. King in his *Akkadian Genesis* tried to trace the influence of early Babylonian religion on the language and thought of Genesis and advanced some quite extreme views. The discovery of the El-Amarna

the public eye through the so-called "Babel-Bible" lectures of Professor Friedrich Delitzsch of the University of Berlin. The first of these lectures was delivered in January, 1902, the second a year later and the third in 1905. The main thesis defended by Professor Delitzsch was to the effect that many features of the religion of the Old Testament which have been and are regarded as distinctly characteristic of that religion and as having their origin in supernatural revelation are derived directly or indirectly from Babylonian sources. In the second lecture, for example, he contrasted the Mosaic law with the recently discovered Code of Hammurapi and argued for the purely human origin of the former. The law of revenge he affirmed could not come from the thrice-holy God. In the third lecture he took occasion to inveigh against the narrow "particularism" of the Hebrew prophets who so bitterly opposed all foreign innovations and were so intensely exclusive in their spirit.

These lectures, which were delivered by one who was regarded as an authority in the field of Assyriology and who had done so much for its development, and which furthermore were delivered before the *Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft*, which was conducting excavations in Babylonia, Palestine and Egypt and had the warm support of the German emperor, naturally became the storm-centre of a very active controversy. Numerous articles, pamphlets and books written by theologians and Assyriologists have been published and the controversial literature is very extensive. Professor R. D. Wilson who delivered the "Opening Address" in Miller Chapel in the fall of the same year in which

letters gave strength to this movement because it showed how far-reaching was the influence exerted by Babylonian language and literature at the time of Moses. In 1895 Gunkel in his *Schöpfung und Chaos* argued that in the account of the Serpent in Genesis and of the Dragon in Revelation we have Babylonian mythical elements. In the next year Zimmern published a little book entitled: *Vater, Sohn und Fürsprecher* in which he sought to show that the Babylonian theology presented some noteworthy correspondences with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. In 1896 Eduard Stucken began his studies of astral myths.

the first "Babel-Bible" lecture was given by Professor Delitzsch chose for his subject: "Babylon and Israel", and showed by "a comparison of their leading ideas based on their vocabularies" that the alleged influence was opposed by weighty philological evidence.³⁸ Sayce, in *Monumental Facts and Higher Critical Fancies*, König, in *Bibel und Babel*, a little book, which has passed through a number of editions in Germany and has been translated into English, Hommel, in *Altisraelitische Denkmäler*, and a number of others have opposed the views advanced by Professor Delitzsch. A. T. Clay, in *Amurru, the Home of the North Semites* has argued that the influence was the other way around and that it was the West-Land that influenced Babylon. In justice to Professor Delitzsch it should perhaps be remarked that although his lectures have attracted more attention than the utterances of any other scholar, which might be expected in view of his high position and distinguished attainments, he has certainly not gone to greater extremes than some other almost equally prominent German Assyriologists, e.g., Zimmern, Jensen and Winckler, in the attempt to prove the dependence of Judaism upon Babylon. Winckler through his astral myth theories, Jensen in his attempt to find in Moses, Jesus and Paul, variants of the ancient Babylonian mythical hero Gilgamesh, and Zimmern in his more recent writings and already in his *Vater, Sohn und Fürsprecher* (1896) have gone further probably than Delitzsch. Jensen and Zimmern, especially the latter, have taken part in the recent controversy precipitated by Drews' *Christ-Myth*, and although Alfred Jeremias has attempted to combine a most unqualified recognition of mythical and legendary elements in the Old Testament with a firm belief in its historical trustworthiness, the Pan-Babylonists, of whom he and Winckler were the leaders, have had

³⁸ This address appeared in THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW (April, 1903). It was repeated in a somewhat different form, at the Boston Convention in December, 1904, under the title, *The Linguistic Evidence for the Relations between Babylon and Israel*, and was published in the *Bible Student and Teacher* (May, 1905).

recourse to far fetched and fanciful theories hardly less extreme than those of Jensen. When one reads a book like *Moses, Jesus, Paulus*, which may be regarded as an extreme type of much that has been written to prove Babylonian influence, one is tempted to ask one's self whether these scholars have not, like so many Jews of the time of Jeremiah and Ezekiel, fallen victim to the spell of Babylon. One might almost imagine that a third "Babylonian Captivity" is pending, a thought to which the distinguished Jesuit scholar Kugler has given expression in the title of his recent book, *Im Bannkreis Babels*, in which he seeks to show that, as far at least as astrology and astronomy are concerned, the influence of Babylon on Israel has been greatly exaggerated.

In view of these attempts to make the Old Testament more or less tributary to Babylon and Assyria in religion and culture, especially the former, the new light which has been thrown upon the character of the religion of the Babylonians and Assyrians is especially valuable since it brings out clearly, as against the derivation theories which have been so freely advanced, one at least of the very important points of divergence between these religious systems—namely, with respect to augury and divination.

As regards Babylon and Assyria it is clear not only that divination and augury in their varied forms were very prominent in their religious systems, but also that the two forms most frequently used were hepatoscopy and astrology. In Israel on the other hand, not only was the emphasis on the "future problem" far less marked, but the recognized means for the ascertaining of the divine will were different, namely oracle and dream or vision, two means which according to Jastrow were not at all prominent in the Assyrio-Babylonian cult. Furthermore these two choice means employed by the latter, hepatoscopy and astrology, seem to be intentionally interdicted in Israel. While on the other hand necromancy, to the practice of which the Israelites were especially inclined, does not seem to have figured at all in the systems of the Assyrians and Babylonians.

The liver, the examination of which was so important for augural purposes among the Assyrians and Babylonians, is only once referred to in this connection in the Old Testament, namely in Ezek. xxi. 21 where the king of Babylon is represented as standing at the head of the two ways and practising divination: "he looked into the liver" (רָאָה בְּכִבְדֹּר). But nowhere do we read of this form of divination being practised by the Hebrews. Instead "the instruction, which is frequently reiterated in the Old Testament, that in sacrificing, the caul above the liver, which played such an important rôle in hepatoscopy, should be burned, seems to be a protest against this form of augury" (Hehn).

Similarly as regards astrology we find nothing in the religion of the Law and the Prophets corresponding to the Assyrian and Babylonian usages. We know it is true that cults of the heavenly bodies flourished more or less in Israel (*cf.* 2 Kings, xxiii. 4 f.; Jer. viii. 2; Ezek. viii. 16; Amos v. 26; Acts vii. 43). But they were condemned by the Law (Exod. xx. 4-5; Deut. iv. 19, xvii. 3) and according to Hehn the conditions in Israel were not only unfavorable to the development of astrology, but "the religion of Israel was obliged to reject astrology on principle because it would have led directly to the worship of the stars as divine beings".

In his book *The Biblical and the Babylonian Idea of God*,³⁹ which we have just cited, Hehn has carefully investigated this all important problem of the nature of the conception of God as it is found in these two religions. He brings out very clearly, as may be gathered from the following brief summary, the great fundamental distinctions existing between them. The gods of the Assyrians are "personifications of the cosmical manifestations of the forces which are operative in the world of human beings, animals, and plants". Jehovah is transcendent and not connected with any natural phenomena. The relation between the pagan gods and their worshippers is a natural one.

³⁹ Hehn, *Die biblische und die babylonische Gottesidee*, 1913.

They are nature gods. The relation between Jehovah and His people is a covenant relation. The nature gods are very tolerant and admit other cults alongside of their own. The difference between deities is often only one of name. The Assyrio-Babylonians took Sumerian gods into their pantheon. The Egyptians took over Semitic deities. Ishtar of Nineveh pays a visit to the king of Mitanni. "Jehovah alone tolerates no other worship beside His own. He alone is intolerant and exclusive." Images too figure prominently in these cults. Jehovah forbids plastic representation of the deity. In the theology of the nature gods, the sex idea is prominent. We find gods and goddesses and complex relationships as among human beings. This idea enters too into the cult, and sensuous rites are found in this as in other ethnic religions of the Orient. This is absolutely foreign to and most emphatically condemned in the religion of Israel. Further, "Jehovah as national God is the ethical God whose first demand is for love and righteousness". "In the case of the nature gods the ethical factor is more accessory." The fact that the religion of the Old Testament centers around certain great figures, Moses, Samuel, Elijah, etc., finds no parallel in Babylon. And finally the uniqueness of the Old Testament religion shows itself in a peculiar inner contradiction which is to be observed in no other religion of the ancient Orient, namely, "the antagonism between the demands of the religion of Jehovah and the leanings of the people toward polytheism and nature worship". Were the religion of Jehovah of the same general character as that of the other neighboring peoples such a phenomenon would be inexplicable.

Barton says of this book: "In the face of Hehn's sober comparison no one can hereafter successfully contend that Yahweh as he appears in the Old Testament is a creation of Babylonian influence or that Hebrew Monotheism is borrowed either from Babylon or Amenophis IV." A judgment of this kind expressed by one who is himself a "natural evolutionist" of a pronounced type and who might conse-

quently be expected to be somewhat biased in favor of the "derivation theory"⁴⁰ is quite significant. And while it would be rash to assert that the "Babel-Bible" controversy is ended—it is far from that—it is a fact which can hardly be gainsaid, that the investigations of the past decade have tended to no inconsiderable degree to emphasize the differences and not the resemblances between the religion of Israel and the religion of Babylon and Assyria.⁴¹ And this is but to assert that the trend has been to confirm the witness of the Hebrew Prophets who lived at the time when the influence of Assyria and Babylon was at its height.

In fact if we would guard ourselves from the danger of forming a false estimate of Babylon and Nineveh we cannot do better than turn to the "Prophets", who just because of that particularistic attitude which Professor Delitzsch decries were peculiarly qualified to form a true estimate of these great nations which left a name at which the world grew pale long after their capitals were desolate wastes. The excavations have brought vividly before us the evidences of the might of these nations, their high civilization, the breadth of their influence. But they do not make it out to have been one whit greater than these Prophets of old describe it as having been. It was no puny

⁴⁰ Cf. his *Sketch of Semitic Origins*, in which he traces the beginnings of the religion of Israel not to Babylon but to the Kenites.

⁴¹ It is also worthy of mention that Farnell in *Greece and Babylon* reaches much the same conclusion regarding the influence of Babylon on ancient Greece. He believes that "where the influence of Babylon upon Greece can be reasonably posited, it reaches the western shores of the Aegean at a post-Homeric rather than a pre-Homeric epoch" (p. 249). Thus the use of incense and the examination of the liver are comparatively late. "... the theory that primitive Hellas was indebted to Babylonia for its divination-system is strongly repugnant to the facts." This "all-pervading atmosphere of magic which colors their [the Babylonians'] view of life and their theory of the visible and invisible world" he stigmatizes as "most un-Hellenic". The closing paragraph summarizes his conclusions as follows: "So far, then, as our knowledge goes at present, there is no reason for believing that nascent Hellenism, wherever else arose the streams that nourished its spiritual life, was fertilized by the deep springs of Babylonian religion or theology."

state that overthrew Samaria and no weakling who carried captive Judah. It was a high culture and an alluring religion which exerted such a subtle and baleful influence upon these peoples. And the Prophets do not disguise the fact. They proclaim it rather with great plainness of speech. They tell us how the kings of Assyria subjugated and plundered the nations as an egg hunter plunders the nests. The boastful words in Isa. x find their counterpart in the "royal inscriptions". They tell us too how the daughters of Zion aped the luxurious customs of the Assyrians, and that even in the very temple of Jehovah women baked cakes for Ishtar, the Queen of Heaven, and made a wailing for Tammuz. But they tell us that it was for this very sin of aping the foreigner and worshipping his gods that Assyria was made the "rod of His anger" and Babylon became to them a second Egypt. And they deny most emphatically that this "strange worship" had any place or part in Israel. They speak with scorn and contempt of the idol gods, who see not and hear not, who are made by men's hands and carried on men's shoulders. They scoff at the signs of the wise men and diviners, which are vain, and exalt Jehovah as the One who alone can predict and perform.

This warning of the Prophets to the men of their age is one to which the men of our own will do well to hearken. Assyriology has done much and we have reason to hope that it will yet do much more to confirm the Scriptures and to open up anew for us the history of long ago. But there is a danger that in the interest and fascination of these new discoveries, which seem almost to annihilate time and carry us back to the days when Assyria and Babylon were at the height of their power we lose a sense of true proportion and turn to them and not to the "Law" for light and leading. It is for this reason that the evidence which has been produced to show how essentially different was the religion of Israel from that of Babylon and Assyria is especially welcome. And we have reason to hope that future discoveries will make this all the more apparent, and that

we, who look back upon Assyria and Babylon through the mist of centuries will be able with ever increasing confidence to cite the witness of the monuments in support of the great affirmation of the Hebrew Prophet: The Word of our God shall stand forever.

Princeton.

OSWALD THOMPSON ALLIS.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

The First Principles of Evolution. By S. HERBERT, M.D. (Vienna), M.R.C.S. (Engl.), L.R.C.P. (Lond.), Author of "The First Principles of Heredity." Containing ninety illustrations and tables. London: Adam and Charles Black; New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. 8vo; pp. ix, 346. \$2.00.

"This book, like a previous one, 'The First Principles of Heredity,' is the outcome of a series of lectures given to a class of workingmen and others." It aims to "present the problem of Evolution comprehensively in all its aspects," but to do this in a "simple yet scientific manner." This aim Dr. Herbert has realized.

His work is comprehensive. It discusses "Inorganic Evolution," "Organic Evolution," and "Superorganic Evolution," under the last head considering "Mental," "Moral," and "Social Evolution," and under Social Evolution dealing with "The Family," "The State," "Religion," "Evolution and Progress." These subjects, moreover, are taken up under two aspects: first, the facts illustrative of the process of evolution are presented and, secondly, the various theories of this process are stated and criticized. The book concludes with two chapters, one on "The Formula of Evolution" and the other on "The Philosophy of Change."

Again, this work is simple, wonderfully simple in view of the inherent complexity and difficulty of the subject-matter. This simplicity results from the logical arrangement of topics and from the accuracy and directness of the author's style, and it is much aided by the numerous and admirable illustrations. The serviceableness of the volume is also greatly enhanced by the Bibliography, the "Glossary," and the "Index," with which it closes.

Once more, Dr. Herbert is to be congratulated on having given us a thoroughly scientific discussion. It is distinguished by fullness and exactness of information, by being in all respects up to date, and by absolute honesty and frankness.

Indeed, he is so bent on setting forth the truth, and only the truth as he sees it and believes it, that he often prejudices his own case. There is no denying that he holds a brief for Evolution, and yet the reading of this brief has raised in the mind of the reviewer the following among many questions:

1. Do not the number, and especially the contradictory character, of the various theories of the process of evolution militate against any one of them being the true theory and reduce them all to improbable,

if not to impossible hypotheses? Thus, to give but an example or two, the Neo-Lamarckians depend for evolution on environmental factors while the ultra-Darwinians maintain the all-sufficiency of natural selection. The former insist on the inheritance of acquired characteristics, while the latter as resolutely deny it. Hence, as Dr. Herbert remarks, "the difficulties of either of these extreme schools are very great indeed when taken singly, each side being able to make out an apparently strong case against the other"; and yet, as I may add, they are mutually exclusive, and so cannot be combined.

Again, take the auxiliary hypotheses that have been devised in aid of natural selection and the Darwinians, such as panmixia, germinal selection, intra-selection, coincident selection, and isolation. These hypotheses may not be exclusive of each other, speaking strictly; but are they not admitted to rest on only a small basis of fact? Are they not but so many guesses? Do they not by their very number as well as by their futility emphasize their purely conjectural character?

Once more, take the two modern schools of heterogenesis and of orthogenesis. The former "look upon discontinuous variations as the material of organic evolution," while the latter "assume a determinate progressive movement in the organic world as an intrinsic part of its organization."

Neither of these theories, however, may be regarded as supplementing the two older ones. They can not be combined with them. Heterogenesis emphasizes the discontinuity of variations, whereas the point of the older theories is that they emphasize the continuity of variations; and orthogenesis insists on "a determinate progressive movement in the organic world as an intrinsic part of its organization," whereas the older theories resort to accidental variations in the organism or in the environment. Nor can these two modern theories be themselves combined. Heterogenesis lays stress on single variations or sports: orthogenesis, on the contrary, falls back on an "inherent growth of the organism." The method of the one could not be more opposed than it is to that of the other.

Nor is the case different when we compare the two schools that hold to orthogenesis. These are as exclusive in their fundamental principles as mechanism and vitalism. And the same is strikingly true of the vitalists themselves. They divide into two camps, one holding to purpose, the other, as Bergson, denying it. Is not Dr. Herbert overmodest in his conclusion? "It has become evident that the problem is by no means so simple as the pioneer of evolution thought. And, we must add, the difficulties have by no means been overcome by their successors." Is it not nearer the truth, the reviewer would ask, that they have been greatly multiplied?

2. Does not our author's admission just quoted weaken his further conclusion? "One thing is sure, however, organic evolution or the transformation of living beings has been established as a scientific fact on a sufficient and independent basis, and is now the accepted creed of the age." Whether that it is "the accepted creed of the age"

is not too strong a statement, we need not pause to discuss; but the former assertion we must consider. "The only question" is not, as Dr. Herbert claims, "How has the progressive differentiation of the organic world come about?" "The other question that he regards as settled is still a question. We must still ask, Is the progressive differentiation of the organic world a universal fact? And this inquiry depends on the former. That is, the inquiry whether evolution be a universal process depends to a large degree on the admittedly unanswered inquiry as to the theory of this process. In a word, facts cannot be considered apart from their meaning. We cannot understand a fact until we discern its meaning. To affirm that it illustrates a certain process we must have a true theory of that process. The various organic forms might illustrate creation according to type as well as evolution one out of another. Or they might illustrate, as the reviewer believes that they do, the employment of both methods; but what they will illustrate will depend on our theory. Apart from a reasonable theory they may not rationally be conceived as illustrating anything; and, as we have seen, the theories of the process of evolution thus far proposed are rational only in the sense that they are successively destructive.

3. Is not our author correct in the closing sentences of his admirable book when he says "It is in the field of metaphysics rather than that of biology that the riddle of evolution will have to find its final solution"? Doubtless, our solution would not be his, but we are at one in holding that we must seek it beyond the pale of pure science.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series—Vol. XIII.

Containing the Papers read before the Society during the Thirty-fourth Session, 1912-1913. Published by Williams and Norgate, 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London, W. C. 1913. 8vo; pp. 375. Ten Shillings and Sixpence net.

This volume, as compact and well printed as ever, contains the following papers: I.—On the Notion of Cause. By Bertrand Russell; II.—The Nature of Willing. By G. Dawes Hicks; III.—Purpose and Evolution. By Arthur Lynch; IV.—A New Logic. By E. E. Constance Jones; V.—Intuitionist Thinking. By Frank Granger; VI.—What Bergson means by "Interpenetration." By Miss Karin Costelloe; VII.—The Analysis of Volition: Treated as a Study of Psychological Principles and Methods. By R. F. A. Hoernlé; VIII.—Does Consciousness Evolve? By L. P. Jacks; IX.—Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, with some of its Ulterior Bearings. By William W. Carlile; X.—The Notion of Truth in Bergson's Theory of Knowledge. By Miss L. S. Stebbing; XI.—Symposium—Can there be anything obscure or implicit in a Mental State? By Henry Barker, G. F. Stout, and R. F. A. Hoernlé; XII.—Memory and Consciousness. By Arthur Robinson; XIII.—The Philosophy of Probability. By A. Wolf.

These able papers are all so good that, as usual, the reviewer hesi-

tates to discriminate among them. He may say, however, that the discussion "On the Notion of Cause" and that on "The Notion of Truth in Bergson's Theory of Knowledge," he has read with peculiar interest, if not, in the case of the former at any rate, with entire agreement.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Personality. By F. B. JEVONS, Litt.D. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd. 1913. Crown 8vo; pp. ix, 167.

This book consists of four lectures given in the summer of 1912 at Oxford in the Vacation Term for Biblical Study. They undertake the task of vindicating the reality and of (in part) defining the nature of Personality. The method pursued is logical analysis of the several points of view which dispense with the idea of Personality with the result of an ever growing strength of demonstration that in the very effort to deny Personality Personality is assumed.

Mr. Edward Clodd supplies the text for the first lecture with his attempt to postulate a pre-animistic stage for human development, in which men did not yet personify the "powers" with which they felt themselves in contact: they had as yet no conception of "a person at all, in any sense of the word". Dr. Jevons has no difficulty in showing that the conception of impersonal powers presupposes that of person. He is willing to allow that not primitive man alone but the most advanced science—even that science called Psychology—can get along without the conception of personality, on one condition. That condition is that it will consent to be purely descriptive. As soon as we insist on "accounting for things" another situation is reached; and if science is "causal thinking," we may add (though Dr. Jevons would probably not press this) and "causal thinking" demands the postulation of adequate causes for the whole as well as the part, the discovery of Personality back of not only our activities but those of the world-all is unavoidable. In the second lecture there is very amusingly shown the inconsequence of William James' reasoning that Personality and Personal Identity are "inferences" and wrong inferences at that. The very alternative suppositions with which we start out,—"I am the same I that I was yesterday," and "I am not the same I that I was yesterday,"—already assume both the Personality and the Personal Identity, which it is their purpose to bring to the question. The I of to-day and the I of yesterday are summoned before the court of the I of both to-day and yesterday. We cannot even raise the question of Personality or Personal Identity without presupposing it and demonstrating it by the very raising of the question. From James' thought without a thinker we advance in the third lecture to Bergson's change with nothing to change. Here Dr. Jevons is at his best. Bergson's method is incisively shown to differ in nothing from that of his predecessors from Hume down: he merely in the course of his argument somehow drops out the subject. Resolving it into its parts he bids you look at the parts—with the implication that their existence as parts excludes the existence of the whole of which they are parts. "The truth is,"

remarks Dr. Jevons finally (in two senses), "that it is impossible to resolve the 'me' into something else which is not me. If the something else is not 'me,' it is not me—and I have not been resolved into it."

So far Dr. Jevons' argument seems to us as cogent as it is clever. The final lecture which is entitled "Personality and Individuality" and in which the social aspects of Personality are discussed appeals to us much less strongly. Perhaps the reason is that the aspect of the general subject here treated lends itself ill to Dr. Jevons' method of logical analysis and *reductio ad absurdum*. We have no impulse to recoil from the propositions maintained. "It is maintained," says Dr. Jevons in his preface, "that persons are not individuals, in the sense of closed systems, but are at once subjects cognizant of objects, and objects presented to other subjects; but the principle of unity which holds persons together, and the impulse towards unity with one's neighbor and one's God, is love." But the development of these propositions leaves us cold. We find ourselves fancying that we are being treated only to plays on words, wondering whether Dr. Jevons has not merely a crotchet to defend, feeling that, however true the propositions put forward may be, they have no organic support in the general line of reasoning. Possibly we simply do not easily think on the lines of Mr. Bosanquet's teaching.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

De Pragmatische Philosophie van William James, en haar Begrip van Waarheid. Door Dr. J. G. UBBINK. Arnheim: A. Tamminga. 1913. 8vo; pp. xiii, 377. Full analytical Table of Contents, and extensive annotated Bibliography.

Dr. Ubbink's Doctorate thesis, published in the autumn of 1912, bore the title of *The Pragmatism of William James*. It met with so much acceptance that it is now reissued in this goodly volume under the amended title of *The Pragmatic Philosophy of William James and its Notion of Truth*.

In Dr. Ubbink's view it is its notion of Truth which provides the hinge of William James' system, and he therefore makes James' Doctrine of Truth the center of his discussion. The book consists of an Introduction and eight chapters. These chapters bear the following titles: William James as Author; The Method and Results of James' Scientific Work; The Will to Believe; Pragmatism and its New Notion of Truth; Origin and Relations of the Pragmatistic Notion of Truth; The New Notion of Truth, its Origin and Principle Criticized; Pragmatism and Religion; the Metaphysics of Pragmatism. Three of the seven chapters, it will be seen, are devoted to James' notion of Truth; they in turn carefully ascertain his meaning, seek to discover the origin and relations of the conception, and offer criticisms upon it.

The two elements which enter into James' conception of Truth are pointed out as, (1) its subsumption under the broader category of the good ("truth is one species of good and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and coördinate with it") and (2) its reduction to a mere transitory phase in a process of action, which for

the time brings satisfaction ("the truth of an idea is not a stagnant present interest in it: truth *happens* to an idea"). "Accordingly," writes Dr. Ubbink, "when we keep all this well in view, we must speak of truth thus: 'the most true' (not, the true: it is not absolute but relative) 'we shall' (not, we may: not to-day but only in the future, not to-day before the action but only after the experiment, after the occurrence itself) 'call the idea, theory, or world-view which leads us' (not which corresponds or shall correspond with a reality), 'to the human action most satisfactory to the man' (and not, indifferently whether it is pleasant or unpleasant to the man)" (p. 177). Reluctantly therefore he agrees with the criticism of Hoekstra: "What is useful to man varies day by day, and if, as James says, the truth is what is useful, there is no longer any constant truth but only contingent truths. *The* truth does not exist; there is only a body of truths which serve for given occasions. Truth becomes, 'is in the making.' By Pragmatism, the sharp antithesis between truth and falsehood is in principle abolished and the essential distinction between them is reduced to a matter of degree. It teaches, indeed, that truth is what is good. In this definition the deepest root of Pragmatism is laid bare, and at the same time its *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* is brought to light." Dr. Ubbink, having quoted this judgment of Hoekstra's approvingly, adds: "And yet! Nowhere does James give the impression of having wished to deny the truth. Never does he give evidence of proceeding from such sceptical and cynical aims. And therefore in my judgment the fault must be sought more deeply." He finds it in a general exaggerated evolutionism and the transference of the notion of the eternal becoming to spheres in which it has no fitness. The critical chapter is very sharply written and issues in the conclusion that the whole idea of truth on which James' entire system turns not only is completely untenable but is crassly self-contradictory.

The characteristics of Dr. Ubbink's treatise which most strike the reader are its thoroughness and the richness of the literature which it surveys. Not only has all that James wrote been carefully explored, but pretty nearly everything of importance which has been written about him has been noted and considered. The book serves the purpose therefore not only of an estimate of James' teachings themselves, but also of a report upon the wide-spread discussion which they have aroused. This side of its usefulness is enhanced by the very full Bibliography, with brief characterizations, which is added.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

A Handbook of Christian Apologetics. By ALFRED ERNEST GARVIE, M.A. (OXON.), D.D. (GLAS.), Principal of New College, University of London, Author of "The Ritschlian Theology," "Studies in The Inner Life of Jesus," "The Christian Certainty amid the Modern

Perplexity," "Studies of Paul and His Gospel," etc. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. 8vo; pp. xii, 241.

This is the last volume to be issued of the series known as the "International Theological Library." This fact defines its aim and indicates its method; for that library was meant to be "a series of textbooks for students of Theology, and yet a systematic exposition of the several departments of theological science for all intelligent persons." It also sets and assures a high standard of excellence; for however one may differ from the positions taken by some of the writers of this series, all must admit that they form a distinguished company of theological scholars.

Dr. Garvie's argument for Christianity is simple and clear. He ignores entirely the old classification of the evidences into external, internal, collateral, etc.—as it seems to us with some loss of comprehensiveness and cumulative effect—and he seeks continuity by discussing in succession the great doctrines of the Christian religion. Thus after an introductory chapter on "The Purpose" and the "Problems of Apologetics," he considers in turn: "Religion and Revelation," "Inspiration and Miracle," "The Lord Jesus Christ," "The Christian Salvation," "The Christian View of God," "The Christian View of Man," "The Christian Ideal," and "The Christian Hope." A "selected Bibliography" follows, and the book closes with an "Index."

"In accordance with the author's idea of the task of Apologetics as commendation rather than defense, less attention is given to meeting objections than to presenting the attractions of the Christian Gospel." This is done in a winning way. The writer's style could not be more in harmony with his purpose. It is the best illustration of his own words: "The manner of Christian Apologetics should be appropriate to the matter and the method. A gospel of grace should be commended and defended graciously." We confess that sometimes it seems to us to be done—we do not say too fairly,—but just a little too graciously. When the issues at stake are the most tremendous conceivable, it is sometimes well that they should be presented more sharply than would be done in a parlor meeting. This, however, must not mislead any. The tone of the book is as serious throughout as it is gracious. Nor is its method, on the whole, concessive. It gives up much that the reviewer himself would earnestly contend for; but this is not because the author would meet his opponents more than half way, it is because the Christianity which he holds seems to the reviewer to be, even in its utmost extent, comparatively attenuated. As the expositor of Ritschl, while not agreeing with him at all or, perhaps, at most points, he would appear to have been so influenced by him as to have lost his grasp on much that many regard as belonging to the Christian faith.

It would be impossible within the limits of this notice even to indicate the various respects in which the reviewer fears that this is the case. He may refer, and briefly, only to the following:

1. Dr. Garvie's theory of inspiration is distinctly that known as the Gracious theory. "We must conceive the apostolic inspiration as the common Christian inspiration raised to a higher power in the measure of the clearer vision of closer communion with, and fuller consecration to Christ as Savior and Lord" (p. 65). That is, the difference between the Apostles and ourselves with regard to inspiration is one of degree merely and not of kind. "Paul's writings have a significance and value for us such as no writings outside of the New Testament have, because he was so fully and thoroughly Christ's" (p. 66). This was not, however, the view which he took of himself. He claimed divine authority for his teaching, not because of his piety, but because he spoke "not in words which man's wisdom taught but which the Spirit taught" (1 Cor. ii. 13). His claim, too, and that of the other Apostles, was confirmed by God himself "in signs and wonders, and divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost." And then this view breaks down on Dr. Garvie's own principles—it is unworkable. The Apostles declared those anathema who did not receive their doctrines: we, however, would think ourselves anathema, were we to make any such claim for ourselves. But where are we to draw the line? Our inspiration is the same in kind with the Apostles'. To what degree, then, must it attain to render him anathema who does not appreciate it?

2. Equally unsatisfactory and even more inconsistent is our author's position as to miracles. He argues acutely and conclusively against Harnack and J. M. Thompson when they would explain away the miracles of our Lord, and he makes Mill and Hume in their opposition to miracles destroy one another: but he himself rejects every one of the Old Testament miracles; and while he frankly admits the impossibility of desupernaturalizing all of the New Testament ones, he regards them as "constituents" of Christ's mission rather than as "credentials" of it, more as the reflected glory of his redemptive work than as the signs and seals of supernatural revelation, rather as suggesting problems than as attesting the glory of the Son of God. That is, he accepts Christ as his Lord and Master and then declines as credentials the credentials to which he appeals (Luke vii. 22).

3. Equally defective is our author's theory of the will. With such writers as Julius Müller, James Seth, and Samuel Harris, he holds to the "self-determination of the will." While making much of the necessity and the power of motives, he maintains that the secret of the moral life is not in the character in which the self appears to express itself, but in an unexpressed residuum of the self. Hence, "personal development is creative evolution." As Müller says, "we form our own character out of self." There is no objection to the theory of the indifference of the will which does not apply almost equally to this. In essence, indeed, it involves the Kantian distinction between the transcendental ego and the empirical ego.

4. The doctrine of the fall is rejected as mythical and as unessential.

"It is impossible to maintain as literal history," we are told, "the narratives in Genesis 1-11. We now know that these stories are borrowed from Babylonian mythology, although stripped of polytheism, and clothed with monotheism in the telling. Even if we could take them literally, does the cause—the eating of an apple—seem adequate to the effect—the sinfulness of the human race" (p. 175)? As though it were the mere eating of the apple, and not the disobedience, to say no more, involved in the eating of *that* apple, that was the cause. Paul, it is true, believed this and other stories, but he could well have been mistaken. Nor is our author phased by the fact that if the fall is denied, the universality of sin is left unexplained. He is content to leave it unexplained, and we must give him credit for criticising acutely and rejecting the evolutionary and other theories of the origin of sin that have been proposed in explanation of its universality.

5. Our author's point of view, as might be expected from his Ritschlian sympathies, not to say tendencies, is christocentric rather than theocentric. With him Christ is the great fact. He seems to forget our Lord's own words, "Ye believe in God, believe also in me" (John xiv. 1). This causes him to present his argument in what seems to us an illogical order. Thus he discusses the "Lord Jesus Christ" and the "Christian Salvation" before he vindicates the "Christian View of God;" and we cannot but think that his argument suffers from his doing so, and more especially as, unlike Ritschl, he appreciates the need of a metaphysic of Christ's person and finds it in that which the Fourth Gospel offers. To receive Christ as the Son of God, must we not start with God the Father?

6. It is, however, in his eschatology that Dr. Garvie departs most from the "faith which was once for all delivered unto the saints." Thus, for belief in the personal and physical second advent of our Lord he substitutes "the experience of Christ's presence here and now, the expectation of clearer vision, closer communion, and greater resemblance in heaven, and the conviction that the Sovereignty of Christ's Saviorhood will yet be fully owned on earth." The conception of the General Judgment he so transforms as virtually to reject it, and he affirms distinctly a second probation for all who have not deliberately rejected Christ. The doctrine of the eternal punishment of the impenitent is set aside and for it is substituted the fancy that the finally impenitent, if such there be, will, not by any act of divine omnipotence annihilating them, but by the inevitable decay of their personality, drop out of existence.

But enough. It must be evident that the Christianity which this "Handbook" would vindicate is the Christianity of this age; it is not the Christianity of the ages. And yet the reviewer would be most unwilling to make the impression that he has found nothing good. He has found much that is excellent. The chapter on the "Christian Salvation" is in the main true and illuminating. The objective reference of Christ's death and the vicariousness of his sacrifice are

strongly insisted on. At times one almost fancies that he is reading the blood theology of the Fathers. So, too, the chapter on the "Christian Ideal" is a just, a noble, and a timely presentation. We do not know of a more pertinent and satisfactory vindication of Christian ethics. Perhaps, we would better say, We do not know of one that is so good. Finally, Dr. Garvie's argument for the realization both of the universal and of the individual Christian hope is conclusive; it is triumphant; it is the tonic that we all need in an age of doubt; we thank him heartily for it, and all who are "not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ" must do the same.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Constructive Natural Theology. By NEWMAN SMYTH. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. 8vo; pp. viii, 123.

This small but attractive volume contains four lectures delivered upon the Taylor Foundation of the Yale School of Religion. They are entitled "Scientific Materials for Theology," "The Method and Problems," "Christ as Final Fact of Nature" and "Scientific Spirituality." They are written in the striking and often brilliant style, with the wealth of literary allusion, with the breadth of knowledge, and also with the evident distaste for dogmatic theology, characteristic of their distinguished author. They have for their aim to show the importance and to lay down the method of "a theology of nature constructed in accordance with the known mechanical principles of evolution" to take the place of "the older natural theology which, strongly built as it was from the scientific materials of its times, has been abandoned as an antiquated and no longer tenable fortification." To speak more correctly, these lectures would point out that "two features characterize generally, with some honorable exceptions, the teaching of natural theology in our Protestant theological seminaries: namely, the method is negative, an attempted destruction of scientific objections; and also the books referred to are not distinguished by familiarity with scientific researches up to date": and they would hold up as an example for all the "New College, Edinburgh, where instruction abreast of the times is furnished in science, and where examination in Professor Simpson's course of general biology is required for a degree in divinity."

With the general aim of this discussion the reviewer finds himself in hearty accord. While he is not ready to admit that the principle of "the older natural theology" has been set aside, and still less that the principle of evolution should take its place, he sees clearly the importance of a new natural theology which shall utilize the new wealth of scientific material to prove the existence and to illustrate the ways of God. It does not seem to him, however, that this calls for the introduction of courses in science, even in biological science, into the curricula of our theological seminaries. Such in-

struction is provided in our colleges; and our seminaries, almost without exception, require their students to be college graduates. Then, too, the theological curriculum has become too crowded to allow any addition to it. Still further, as compared with natural theology, revealed theology must hold the place of first importance. It is God's last and special message to men: natural theology illustrates it, but it interprets natural theology. Finally, no matter how developed, not even when based on the most up-to-date science, has natural theology anything to say of what the sinner needs most to know; namely, redemption.

This is true of natural science in general and from the nature of the case, but it would seem to be specially true of natural science as our author understands it. Indeed, we do not see how, reading it as he does, he can discern in it the possibilities that he finds. Our interest in natural theology is strong because we agree with Paul that "the invisible things of God since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity" (Rom. i.20). We confess that our interest would be greatly lessened were we, with our author, obliged to reduce the meaning of nature as follows: "The presence of some 'unknown factor' in nature is everywhere to be felt; that factor seems to indicate some energy of mind in forming matter, an energizing that is superhuman, but not necessarily supernatural. By whatever means wrought out, nature seems to have been first thought out" (p. 67). If this be all that the latest science can tell us of God, the only ground on which it could claim admission to the theological curriculum would be that the latter were empty.

Indeed, we would question its right to admission even then; for its testimony is most uncertain precisely as to what is most essential in theology as well as in religion. It is of "the superhuman, but not necessarily supernatural" that it speaks. Now the supernatural is the characteristic idea, the fundamental fact, of both theology and religion. It is, however, from Dr. Smyth's christology that we would dissent most earnestly. He regards Christ as "the final fact of nature"; but if this be the teaching of natural theology, then the latter must be the contradiction of revealed theology. How can he belong to the world when, as John tells us, "all things were made by him" (St. John i.3)? How could the evolution even of the whole creation develop him who declared himself to be one with the Father (John x. 30)? At least, how could this be, unless, as in pantheism, God and the universe are identified? How can natural heredity, even if accompanied by an "influx of spiritual power which is beyond our apprehension, but not beyond the capacity of nature to receive," (p. 84) account for him that "descended out of heaven, even the Son of man, which is in heaven" (St. John iii. 13)? Nor in holding thus would we for a moment admit that our Lord did not enter into "the full inheritance of our human nature" (p. 84), and so can not be a "high

priest touched with the feeling of all our infirmities." What we would most emphatically deny is, not that he did not at and through his incarnation take our humanity, but that he who was in the beginning with God and who himself from all eternity existed as God (John i. 1-18) could ever have been developed out of that humanity which he himself in time created.

It may be remarked in closing that our author's view of "the virgin birth" is in complete accord with his general attitude. He regards the narrative of the virgin birth as "very likely one of the earlier after-thoughts of some of the disciples concerning their risen Lord" (p. 82), and he thinks that it furnishes an "exceptionable difficulty" precisely because it emphasizes our Savior's supernaturalness. Could there be a clearer proof that we have not misstated Dr. Smyth's position?

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Legal and Historical Proof of the Resurrection of the Dead with an Examination of the Evidence in the New Testament. By JOHN F. WHITWORTH, Author of "Taxation of Corporations," "Statutory Law of Corporations," "Creation of Corporations," "Corporate Opinions," etc. Harrisburg, Pa.: Publishing House of the United Evangelical Church. 1912. 8vo; pp. 70.

The title of this book exactly describes its contents. It argues for the trustworthiness of the New Testament, and so for the truth of the testimony to the resurrection of the dead, on the same ground on which Greenleaf takes in his standard work on Evidence; on the basis of the historical witnesses, even from the first and among her foes, to the facts of Christianity, and from the circumstances and especially from the character of the writers.

If men of the world would always judge in religion as they do in the ordinary affairs of life, there is no doubt that their verdict would accord with our author's presentation of the case; and, therefore, we earnestly hope that it will be so widely circulated as to call for other editions. Should this be so, however, the whole work should be carefully revised. There are several slips. Among them we may mention the following: Justin Martyrs on p. 37; the statement regarding Matthew on p. 39, that "he wrote about the year 38"; the assertion on p. 46 that "the world is indebted to Luke alone for the preservation of the Lord's Prayer"; the statement on p. 67, that "Dr. Lyman Abbott declares that no 'event in the world's history is better attested than is the resurrection of Jesus'" (what we question is not the truth of the declaration, but its source); and the use, p. 19, of the phrase "the resurrection of the dead" as "synonymous" with the expression "the immortality of the soul."

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Everyman's Religion. By GEORGE HODGES. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. Pp. 297. 50 cents net.

This book may be described as both an argument and appeal for the Christian Religion in language that is intelligible to the average man or woman. It gives the impression of having proceeded from a vigorous intellect that has thought its way honestly through the problems presented by the contact between faith and reason, and it indicates a heart that has tested the teachings of Christianity in experience and found them good. Familiar themes are handled with a marked freshness of language; indeed, there is a rather remarkable absence of triteness throughout the book. Nearly every page is interesting and stimulating. Apparently the author is so true a scholar that he is free from the affectation of scholarship—there is no pedantry about him whatever. An illustration may be afforded by a typical paragraph from the chapter on "The Means of Grace": "Another means of grace is a decided initiative. This is only a condensed statement of the plain psychological fact that if we really desire to keep a good resolution, we must begin strong. . . . We must make the matter public. Thus we bring the environment of expectation to bear definitely upon our case." We infer from this that Dr. Hodges has been reading Professor James, though the thought is truly his own; and he modestly refrains from cumbering the page with such a phrase as "as Professor James says." There is such a thing as an over-use of allusion which is like a man carrying the most of his wealth in the form of diamonds on his person; and from this fault Dr. Hodges is free.

If we were to try to characterize this book in two words we should be inclined to use the terms *sanity* and *wholesomeness*. While all the fifteen chapters are stimulating and spiritually helpful we particularly commend the chapters on "The Means of Grace," and "The Life Everlasting."

Cranford, N. J.

GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

The Christian Tradition and its Verification. By T. R. GLOVER, Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; University Lecturer in Ancient History. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. Crown 8vo; pp. xiv, 229. (Being the Eighth Course of Angus Lectures, 1912.)

The Nature and Purpose of a Christian Society. By T. R. GLOVER, Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; University Lecturer in Ancient History. Third Edition. London: Headley Brothers. 1912. Crown 8vo; pp. 85. (Being the Fifth of the Swarthmore Lectures, 1912.)

Under the title of *Life and Letters in the Fourth Century*, Mr. Glover published some dozen or more years ago (1901) fifteen studies of typical figures and movements in the literature of that century in which heathenism was dying and the Church was advancing to take its place as the governing force of the Roman world. It is a delightful

volume full of insight and marked by great delicacy of touch and it gave us great pleasure to say as much, in reviewing the book in *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review* (Oct. 1902; vol. xiii, pp. 662-4). When, a few years later (1907), he was called upon to deliver the Dale Lectures in Mansfield College, Oxford, Mr. Glover was well advised to adopt for them the same method of treatment which he had so successfully used in his earlier volume. The subject he chose was *The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire*, and the resulting volume (1909) contains ten graphic studies of the various forms of religion which jostled each other in the opening centuries of the Christian era, presented, as he says, "not in the abstract, but as they show themselves in character and personality." This too is a delightful volume, vivid and illuminating. There are essays on the Roman Religion, the Stoics and Plutarch; on Celsus and Clement of Alexandria and Tertullian; on the Conflict of Christian and Jew and the struggle between "Gods and Atoms." In the midst of them there stand essays also on "Jesus of Nazareth" and "The Followers of Jesus." These are not the best essays in the book. Mr. Glover is essentially a humanist; his interest lies in literature and the expression of personality in literature; his charm consists in his lightness of touch, the daintiness of his handling of his material, a certain fastidious humor which is poured over all. These are not the qualities which fit one best to deal with Jesus of Nazareth or those first missionaries of the cross who, "in deaths oft" broke a way through the ingrained prejudices of the old world's life and thought for the entrance of Christianity. Nor are Harnack and von Dobschütz and Weinle, Wernle and Pfeleiderer, Wellhausen and Bousset, nor even Professor Burkitt, and certainly not Mr. Conybeare, the best guides to the understanding of the beginnings of Christianity or the person of its founder.

Not that Mr. Glover fails in appreciation of the human personality of Jesus, or of the new spirit which animated His followers. He only fails to appreciate that there was anything more than a human personality in Jesus or that His followers were animated by any other spirit than may be summed up in the immense impression made upon them by Jesus' human personality. In his attempt to portray this human personality he says many fine and beautiful things about Jesus; many of the traits which really characterized Him he catches and knows how to throw vividly forward. He understands His uniqueness and the uniqueness of the religion He founded, and has such things as this to say about it. "As its opponents were quick to point out—and they still find a curious pleasure in rediscovering it—there was little new in Christian teaching. Men had been monotheists before, they had worshiped, they had loved their neighbors, they had displayed the virtues of Christians—what was there peculiar in Christianity? Plato, says Celsus, had taught long ago everything of the least value in the Christian scheme of things. The Talmud, according to the modern Jew, contains a parallel to everything that Jesus said—('and

how much else!' adds Wellhausen). What was new in the new religion, in the 'third race' of men? The Christians had their answer ready. In clear speech and in aphasia they indicated their founder. He was new" (p. 116). But of the real uniqueness of Jesus Christ and of the religion which He founded—of the redemption of the world in His blood ("the blood of God" Paul calls it), of the regeneration of the world by His Spirit ("the Spirit of Jesus" is with Mr. Glover, but His influence, His character "repeating itself in the lives of men and women" p. 139), Mr. Glover has no sense. And therefore his chapters on "Jesus of Nazareth" and "the Followers of Jesus" flat dreadfully among the more sympathetic studies which otherwise fill the volume. Jesus Christ is too high for him: he cannot attain to Him. Accordingly there creeps over one as he reads these chapters something of the feeling of unreality and insufficiency, though happily in indefinitely less degree, that assaults the soul as we read the pages of, say, Renan. As an expounder of the colour and movement of life in the ages of transition from heathenism to Christianity, Mr. Glover moves with firm step and shows unending skill: when he passes to expound Jesus Christ and His Gospel he has got beyond his *métier*.

It seemed to be needful to say some such things as these about a volume which we are not now reviewing, because we may thus be enabled to make clear, in the fewest possible words, the exact nature and character of the volumes which we are reviewing. In them Mr. Glover turns aside from the portrayal of the ideas and personalities of the later classical period to undertake the exposition and defence of fundamental Christianity and of its function in the world. It will scarcely be necessary for us to say that these volumes are therefore of indefinitely less value than the former ones. Of course, in these too Mr. Glover writes interestingly: probably he could not write uninterestingly if he tried. He writes here, it is true, with what seems almost exaggerated simplicity of diction. It would appear that he is determined to be thoroughly understood by "the general." But all the old brightness is here. Indeed many of the old bright sayings are here, for Mr. Glover has permitted himself in perhaps an unusual measure to treat his former (Dale) lectures as a mine from which to derive gems for the ornamentation of the plainer pages of his later (Angus and Swarthmore) lectures. The reader of the former volume, at all events, continually meets in the pages of the later ones fine turns of speech which are already familiar to him; mingled, no doubt, with others which are here new, derived from other fields of learned and loving research. Here, too, Mr. Glover, as is natural, writes largely *en historien*. This is his point of view. He has swept the wide horizon with widely open eye and stands forward to tell his less fortunate brethren, as simply as may be, how Christianity appears to him and what seems to him to be its function in the world. We are bound to say also that the "reduced" view of the Person of Christ and of the essence of His work as an atoning sacrifice, which was thrown clearly, if even then

prudently, up to observation in the more scientific Dale Lectures retires into the background in the more popular Angus and Swarthmore Lectures; or perhaps we may even say recedes out of sight. It is doubtful if the cursory reader of these Lectures, while he might feel that not always all was said that might well be said, would detect any tendency to transpose the great music of Christ and His Gospel into a lower key. The whole treatment is instinct with reverence for Christ, and that not merely as the historical source of the whole movement which we call Christianity but as its moving factor still; everywhere there is evident the most complete dependence on the Holy Spirit; and the fervor of Christian love glows on every page.

Behind the deep devotion to the person of Jesus which is everywhere manifest, we do not easily see that, after all, this Jesus is to Mr. Glover no more than a good man, who was not a "mediator between God and man, making atonement" in His blood (*Conflict*, p. 156); whose death on the cross was only "a pledge of His truth," "making possible our reconciliation with God" (p. 139); and whose entire function it has been to reveal to us with new poignancy the great fact that God is our Father (p. 142). Who could imagine that beneath the constant references to the Holy Spirit as the power of a new life in Christians, there lies nothing but a reference to the "influence of Jesus" "repeating itself in the lives of men and women" (p. 139), which though Paul may call it "the holy spirit" (note the lower-case initials) we may speak of perhaps as "the Christian instinct" (p. 150)? And certainly when we read the appeals to the Great Commission we are hardly prepared to understand that it is extremely doubtful (*Conflict* p. 114) whether this Commission is allowed by Mr. Glover, we will not say merely to be an utterance of our Lord's, but even to be a genuine portion of Matthew's Gospel. We read at the end of his Swarthmore Lectures these moving words: "We have found the nature and purpose of a Christian Society, and we can sum it up in familiar words: 'Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature'; and, if we obey, we in our turn shall be able to speak of 'the Lord working with us and confirming the word with the signs following'" (p. 85). It is not likely that Mr. Glover attaches any authority to either text which he here cites: it is not likely that he believes either to be a genuine part of the Gospel in which it is now found. His bringing them together in this solemn passage, may help us to form an estimate of how much significance we may attach to his citation of the Great Commission as if it were of importance to Christians; and also of his method of dealing with his audiences. Clearly in these Lectures Mr. Glover has not wished to wound the sensibilities of his hearers by any suggestion of critical hesitations, or of doctrinal doubts. He has wished to speak to them on the basis of whatever of Christian belief,—and more, of whatever of Christian sentiment,—remained common to him and them. No doubt his justification of this course would be that Christianity after all is a life not a dogma: and no doubt this justification is valid—to a certain extent.

Thus, at all events, the Lectures gain immensely in usefulness as addressed to Christian audiences: they may be read with profit by all. But they lose equally in significance,—unless we are to read them as signs of the decay of Christianity as a doctrine and of its persistence merely as a traditional sentiment, seeking still to justify itself as such by its fruits. We wonder if Mr. Glover does not feel as he delivers such Lectures much as he portrays Plutarch as feeling as he argued for the old religion which he looked out upon with saddened eyes in its decay—that “delightful man of letters,” as Mr. Glover describes him, “so full of charm, so warm with the love of all that is beautiful, so closely knit to the tender emotions of ancestral piety,—and,” Mr. Glover adds, comparing him with Seneca, “so unspeakably inferior in essential truthfulness.”

It was highly appropriate that the distinguished son of Dr. Richard Glover should be called upon to deliver a course of the Angus Lectures; and the general tone of the lectures which he has delivered on that Baptist foundation is a testimony to the Christian training which he received in the Baptist manse at Bristol in which he was bred. The subject chosen—*The Christian Tradition and its Verification*—gives large opportunity for the manifestation of a Christian heart, and the opportunity is taken. The verification of the Christian tradition is sought in experience; and the effort of the lecturer is to give to his hearers some sense of the immense mass of experience the Church of Jesus Christ has accumulated of Him; with the hope that by its contemplation they will be led on to experiment and by experiment to the discovery of “what life in Truth is.” The lectures are six in number and are entitled in their order: The Challenge to Verification, the Use of Tradition, the Significance of the Christian Church, the Experience of the Early Church, Jesus in the Christian Centuries, and The Criticism of Jesus Christ. The practical note is everywhere dominant, but it is no unintellectual Christianity that Mr. Glover recommends. As he elsewhere expresses it (*Conflict*, p. 125): “It is only the sentimentalism of the Church that supposes the flabby-minded to be at home in the kingdom of God: Jesus did not.” What Mr. Glover aims at is the consecration of all human powers to the service of Christ: “action,” he says, “is impossible without some working theory, and this very fact drives earnest men into speculation” (p. 37). He suggests, indeed, in a somewhat Sphinx-like saying, that “Jesus Christ is not a teacher to be quoted” (p. 31); but what he seems to mean is that His words are not to be repeated merely but lived. If he gives too secondary a place in the Christian life to the life of the mind (which is emphasized in the declaration that we must love the Lord our God, as with our whole “heart” and “soul,” so also therefore of course with our whole “mind”—“the whole *understanding*, all the powers of thought and will,” as Meyer explains it), he yet insists on the life of the mind. And he places Christ at the center. “The plain fact is that, in the long run, despair is at the heart of every religion without Christ; and if man or woman is to get through the world at

all, it must be by the hardening or deadening of the more sensitive parts of human nature. Marcus Aurelius' *Diary* is a sort of breviary of despair" (p. 68). "One thing has always stood out clearly sooner or later. Whenever the Church at large, or any church in particular, has committed itself to any scheme of thought that has lessened the significance of Jesus Christ, it has declined. Error always tells, and the error of over-estimating Jesus Christ ought to have told by now, but the experience of the church so far suggests that it has no real reason to dread any danger from overestimating Him, but rather that the danger has always come from obscuring or abating His significance. It is, I think, worth while to reflect upon what this involves. The faith has been tested in every compromise that Christian's have attempted, and if it is still held, it is with some warrant" (p. 86). Good apologetics, that! Can we have read Mr. Glover wrong, when we have read him as "obscuring and abating the significance of Christ," both in His Person and in His work? We could wish he had known "Jesus Christ and Him as crucified" better, and Wilhelm Herrmann less well!

The Swarthmore Lecture runs somewhat on the lines of the third of the Angus series. Its leading topic is the significance of the Christian Church, and its key note is perhaps struck in some such words as these. "We do not enough value the fact that the story of the Christian religion is the story of personality influenced by personality—rebirth constantly the product of the influence of the reborn" (p. 27). There may be an echo of Wilhelm Herrmann in this and we are glad therefore to read on the next page: "The blessing comes from a higher source, but the broken bread is given by human hands"—followed by some illuminating remarks. We do not wonder that surprise has been felt that this particular topic was chosen for a lecture addressed to Friends. Mr. Glover defends his choice of topic in an interesting preface, the upshot of it being (if we understand him) that Friends especially need instruction on the Church. This is probably true; at all events it is instruction on the Church that Mr. Glover gives them—and he does it very well. Beginning with the inheritance we have in the Christian Church, he ends with the duty of the Church to the world, while between the two he expounds the relation of the individual to the Church. In the center of all, here too he sets Jesus Christ. "From the very beginning and ever onwards right in the center of all their thoughts, the Christian communities have had Jesus Christ, the Son of God, in whom God was, reconciling the world unto Himself. He has been the leaven within the Church, disruptive, propulsive, re-creating and stirring, the permanent life, the guarantee and promise of a future that shall progressively transcend the past—

No dead fact stranded on the shore

Of the oblivious years,

but the living Christ; always recognized, and owned and loved by the Church. The great function of the Church has been to witness to Him, and to bring the world face to face with Him" (p. 43). We

ask again, can we have misread Mr. Glover when we read him as holding to a "reduced" Christ? For the rest, we call attention to two small points. One is the comma in the first sentence we have quoted after the phrase "in whom God was." This gives a particular interpretation to 2 Cor. v. 19—an interpretation which, indeed, is wrong, but which seems notable on Mr. Glover's lips. The other concerns the allusion to the Parable of the Leaven, in which an interpretation of that Parable which Mr. Glover repeats in more than one of his series of Lectures, is adverted to. This interpretation conceives that parable as teaching not so much, as it has been customary to expound it, the hidden, pervasive growth of the Kingdom in the world, as the seething, fermentation of life which takes place in the Church of Christ,—in the individual man and in the community. The leaven, says Mr. Glover, *works*; and in its working bubble after bubble *breaks*; the breaking of the bubbles is not an indication that the end has come, but that there is *life* at work behind them. The interpretation again is wrong; but again it is not without its significance on Mr. Glover's lips.

We must not close without pointing to a passage in each of the Lecture-courses which has pleased us vastly. In the Swarthmore Lecture we point to the section on "Grace" (pp. 33-37).—"the greatest of all the Catholic doctrines," Renan said" (p. 33). In the Angus lectures we point to the passage on the phrase "From the foundation of the World" (pp. 135-140),—in which is enshrined "the great fact of God's love as antecedent to all things,—of Christ as the embodiment of purposeful love—of the universe itself in all its range as a Cosmos indeed, inspired and achieved by love, and subservient in its last detail to love" (p. 139).

Princeton.

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EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

Textkritische Materialien zur Hexateuchfrage. Von JOHANNES DAHSE, Pfarrer in Freirachdorf (Westerwald). I. Die Gottesnamen der Genesis. Jacob und Israel. P in Genesis 12-50. Verlag von Alfred Töpelmann (vormals J. Ricker) Giessen. 1912. 8vo; S.viii, 181. Mark 480.

Pastor Dahse has already published studies bearing on the matter contained in this volume. *Textkritische Bedenken gegen den Ausgangspunkt der heutigen Pentateuchkritik* appeared in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, 1903, S.305-319; *Textkritische Studien* in the *Zeitschrift für alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1908, S.1-21 and 161-173; *Naht ein Umschwung in der Pentateuchkritik*, in the *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, September 1912, reprinted by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge in an English translation with the title, *Is a Revolution in Pentateuchal Criticism at Hand?*; and an article

entitled *New Methods of Inquiry concerning the Pentateuch* in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for October, 1912.

In the present work, arguing from the names Jacob and Israel the author concludes that these two names are valueless as indications of different literary sources. Regarding "P in Genesis 12-50," he holds that the book of Genesis, in the form in which it now lies before us, is an elaboration of an older narrative. This earlier work was supplemented in order to adapt it for use in public worship. These additions are found in most of the so-called P sections, but are not confined wholly to P. They originally stood on the margin or at least were separated from the rest of the text; and they may reasonably be ascribed to Ezra.

The portion of this book, however, which is devoted to "the divine names in Genesis" forms by far the larger part of the work, 121 pages out of 174; and it is particularly interesting because of the novel theory that is propounded, and because of the bearing of this theory on critical questions relating to the text and to the literary analysis of the book of Genesis. The subject is intricate in its nature, and the difficulty of following the discussion is increased by the author's habit of scattering his arguments for a particular reading in various parts of the book instead of setting forth the facts and reasons in one place once for all. An exposition of the theory, therefore, rather than a minute criticism of it, is about all that will be attempted at the present time.

Pastor Dahse points out, among other things, that 1. The translation of the word Jehovah, occurring in the Hebrew text, by '*o theos*, God, in the Septuagint, was not due to any awe for the Name felt by the Greek translators, seeing that they often reproduced by *kurios*, Lord, the word Jehovah, for which the Hebrews at that time read '*adonay*, Lord. Accordingly it is quite probable that they followed the Hebrew text which they had before them, and with fair accuracy transmitted the divine names which stood in that text (comp. S.93; see also S.51, argument 3). 2. The LXX, when it diverges from the Masoretic Text in respect to the divine names, frequently has the support of other ancient versions, attesting the existence of an ancient Hebrew text that diverged from the MT and witnessing to the fidelity of the LXX to this ancient Hebrew text in the matter of the names (comp. S.51, argument 2). 3. The divergence between the present Hebrew text and the LXX in respect to these names is quite as likely to have originated in a revision of the divine names in the Hebrew text by the Jews themselves as to be due to the methods employed by the Greek translators; for the Jews did not hesitate to change the divine names, but at will substituted a different title of God for the one which appeared in the original documents of their Scriptures, as may be seen from duplicate psalms, parallel passages in the books of the Kings and the Chronicles, quotation in the Talmud, and the translation in the Targums (comp. S.51, argument 1).

The arguments advanced by Pastor Dahse may be strengthened by observing the fidelity of the LXX in representing accurately the divine names in test cases, where the name was discriminatingly used by the Hebrew writer. For example, 1. When Elohim is the only proper term to employ (as in Gen. 1, where God appears as the Creator of the universe, and not as the God of grace or the God of Abraham; and in Gen. 3:1-5,¹ in the conversation between the serpent and Eve; and in Gen. 39:9;¹ 40:8; 41:16-32, where Joseph speaks to Potiphar's wife, to the Egyptian prisoners, and to Pharaoh; and in Gen. 9:26f,¹ where the word Jehovah in verse 26 and God in verse 27 mark a distinction and are used intentionally), and especially 2. In reproducing current expressions in which uniform Hebrew usage required the designation Jehovah and where the term God would be inadmissible: such as "to call upon the name of Jehovah," Gen. 4:26; 12:8; 13:4; 21:33; 26:25; and *n'um 'adonay*, "declaration of Jehovah," Gen. 22:16 (with Num. 14:28 the only occurrences in the Pentateuch). These names, as they appear in these passages in the MT, were unquestionably used in the primitive Hebrew text. In every case the LXX reproduces them accurately. Evidently the Greek translators are conscientiously following their Hebrew original in these typical instances. There is no carelessness here.

The *sedarim*, it will be recalled, are paragraphs, 153 in number, into which the Pentateuch was divided. They were designed for weekly lessons in the public worship; and, by being read consecutively on successive Sabbaths, the entire book of the Law was gone through once every three years.² The *parashiyoth* are longer sections of the Law, and number 54. Used as weekly lessons, they make it possible for the Law to be read through in the course of a single year. A table of the *sedarim* and *parashiyoth* in the book of Genesis is given herewith for convenience of reference. The divine names most commonly used in Genesis are God and Jehovah, Elohim and Jhvh; and in the table the letter E or J indicates which of these two divine names occurs first and which last in the *seder*.³ A straight line shows that the two names do not interchange; a row of dots indicates that they do interchange; the perpendicular declares that one name, used regularly up to a certain point, yields there to the other.⁴

¹ In a J environment.

² The cycle of three years prevailed in Palestine, till the exiles from Spain brought their customs into the Holy Land (Jewish Encyclopaedia).

³ For various reasons, however, other divine titles are occasionally employed, either alone or appended to Jehovah or Elohim: for example, at the beginning or end of a *seder* 2:4^b; 21:33; 33:20; 43:14; 46:3; 48:3.

Neither divine name is found in chap. 14, unless in verse 22; and no divine name is used in chaps. 34, 36, 37 or 47, nor in the thirty or more consecutive verses 29:1-30; 40:9-41:15; 42:29-43:13; 46:4-34. A divine name occurs only once in chap. 23, and there it is idiomatic, and without significance (v. 6, a prince of God = mighty prince); and only twice in chap. 10, both times in verse 9; and in three verses of chap. 49, namely verses 18, 24, 25.

⁴ Regarding the nearness of the two names to the beginning and end of the *seder*, it may be stated that in each of the first thirty-two *sedarim* the divine

Pastor Dahse propounds the general theory that "the use of the divine names [Elohim and Jehovah] is influenced in the Massoretic text (and in a different manner in the Hebrew text back of the LXX) by the practice of the synagogue in the public reading [of the Torah]" (S.32). In the MT the parasha is the present unit, within which the influence has been felt; in the Hebrew text back of the LXX the seder was the unit (S.94); and each underwent independent revision (S.39).

I. And, first, the theory of Pastor Dahse regarding the sedarim. The custom of reading by sedarim in public worship led, according to this theory, to a modification of the divine names in some of these paragraphs. The effect is seen, and the system which was followed is revealed, in the Hebrew text which was used by the LXX (S.107). If one divine name was used throughout the paragraph, it might remain unchanged; and of course it did remain unchanged, if no other divine name was equally appropriate. For example, in seder i Elohim is used throughout, since the creation of the universe is the topic. But "in those ancient sedarim in which a change of the divine names occurs," i.e., in which both Elohim and Jehovah are used, Jehovah customarily stands at the beginning or end of the paragraph" (S.97; cp.3). The different cases under this rule seem to be: 1. Where one of these divine names was used continuously in the first part of the seder; and the other in the latter part. No change was required, for the word Jehovah already stood either at the beginning or the end of the paragraph. 2. If Elohim were used throughout in the original narrative, Elohim might be changed to Jehovah on its first or last occurrence, or in both places, if the title Jehovah was suitable to the divine activity described in the verse. 3. If the two divine names were used frequently in the seder, Jehovah was desiderated as first or last.

What are the facts, when the text is examined? In two sedarim neither divine name occurs (xxxiii and xli). In the first seder and the last eight sedarim (i and xxxvi-xliii), except in chap. 49:18, Elohim only is used and for a special reason; and therefore, in the eyes of those who understood, was not susceptible of revision. Sedarim vi., xxii., xxxi. and xxxii. likewise of the two names contain Elohim only (with El twice in seder xxxi., Gen. 35:1^b and 3); seder vi. but twice, and that in a single verse, and seder xxii. but once. Twenty-eight sedarim remain. Of these ix., xx., xxi., and xxiv. have Jehovah only; viii. has Jehovah only, except once where Elohim is necessary (9:27), and xxxv. has Jehovah only, except twice where Elohim is necessary (39:9 and 40:8). There are left twenty-two sedarim (or twenty-three if seder xliii is included because of the occurrence of the name of Jehovah in chap. 49:18), in each of which the two

name E or J appears in one of the first three verses, generally in the first verse, except in sedarim viii., x., xi., xvi., xxii., xxiv., xxx., and xxxi.; and frequently so near the end of the seder that it is found in one of the last three verses, as in x., xxiv., and xxxi.

Seder		Genesis	Hebrew text used by the Greek translators	Present Hebrew text transmitted by the Massoretes
Para- sha 1	{	i chap. 1:1 —2:4 ^a	E—E	E—E
		ii 2:4 ^b —3:21	E . . . J	J E—J E (E _{3:1-5}) ⁵
		iii 3:22 —4:26	E . . . J	J E J (E _{4:25}) ⁵
		iv 5:1 —6:8	E . . . J	E J
Par. 2	{	v 6:9 —7:24	E . . . J not same as	E . . . J
		vi 8:1-14	E—E same as	E—E (twice)
		vii 8:15—9:17	J— . . E (J 8:15-21)	E —E (J 8:20, 21)
		viii 9:18—11:32	J—J same as	J—J (E 9:27) ⁵
Par. 3	{	ix 12:1—9	J—J same as	J—J (6 times)
		x 12:10—13:18	E—J (J 13:4, 18)	J—J (7 times)
		xi 14:	neither divine name, unless in verse 22	
		xii 15:	J . . . E or J	J—J (7 times)
		xiii 16:	J (E in v. 5)	J—J (8 times)
		xiv 17:	J —E J once, same as	J —E (E 9 ^a)
Par. 4	{	xv 18:	E . . . J (E vs. 1, 14)	J—J (10 times)
		xvi 19:	J . . . J (E v. 29 a. b.; J v. 29 c)	J— E (E v. 29 a. b.)
		xvii 20:	E— J E 6 times, same as	E— J (J once)
		xviii 21:	J . . . J	J E J (E _{11 tm's})
		xix 22:	E—J	E—J ⁵
		23:	In v. 6 E is used, but without significance to the theory	
Par. 5	{	xx 24:1—41	J—J	J—J
		xxi 24:42—67	J—J	J—J
		xxii 25:1—18	E but once, same as E	
Par. 6	{	xxiii 25:19—26:34	J—J (E 25:21 b)	J—J (11 times)
		xxiv 27:1—27	J—J same as	J—J (thrice)
		xxv 27:28—28:9	E—E [or J, Sam'n]	E—E (twice)
Par. 7	{	xxvi 28:10—29:30	See comments on this seder	
		xxvii 29:31—30:21	J E	J E (J 4, E 6)
		xxviii 30:22—31:2	E— J (J once)	E J (E 3, J 3)
		xxix 31:3 —32:3	J —E (J once)	J—E (J 31:3, 49)
Par. 8	{	xxx 32:4 —33:17	? E	J— —E (5 times)
		xxxi 33:18—35:8	E—E (only in ch. 35)	E—E
		xxxii 35:9 —36:43	E—E (7 times, 35:9-15)	E—E (5 times)
Par. 9	{	xxxiii 37:	No divine name	
		xxxiv 38:	J—E	J—J (thrice)
		xxxv 39 and 40:	J—E same as	J—E (J 8, E 2) ⁵
Par. 10	{	xxxvi 41:1—37	E—E	E—E
		xxxvii 41:38—42:17	E—E	E—E
		xxxviii 42:18—43:13	E—E	E—E
		xxxix 43:14—44:17	E—E	E—E
Par. 11	{	xl 44:18—46:27	E—E	E—E
		xli 46:28—47:31 or 27	No divine name	
Par. 12	{	xlii 48:	E—E	E—E
		xliii 49 and 50	J —E same as	J —E (J 49:18)

⁵ The continuity in the employment of the same divine title is here unbroken, except where the use of a different divine name was unavoidable.

divine names are used, and by which the theory must be tested. It is the Hebrew text reflected in the LXX, not the Massoretic text, that is now under review. What are the facts? Seder ii. closes and perhaps opens with Jehovah; seder iii. closes with Jehovah in 4:26, where, however, the title Jehovah could not be avoided (for Elohim at the beginning, 2:4^b and 3:22[23] see Dahse, S.35, "Zeugniß de Origenes," with S.58 and 98); sedarim iv. and v. also close with Jehovah; seder vii. opens with Jehovah four times, in the first verse taking the place of Elohim found in MT; seder x has Elohim (see Dahse, S.40, 102), except in 13:4; where no title save Jehovah could be used, and in 13:18, the last verse of the seder, the final word of the paragraph being Jehovah. Seder xi. contains Jehovah once, Elohim not at all; and even this occurrence of Jehovah is rejected by Dahse as an ancient interpolation (S.39, citing Eerdmans). The passage records the interview between Abraham and Melchizedek, who worshiped in common the most high God (*'el 'elyon*). The addition of the word Jehovah to this title in verse 22 is proper enough, but is quite unnecessary. If not original, its presence in the text may be due to the practice of the reader in the synagogue of distinctly identifying the most high God with Jehovah. Seder xii. begins and perhaps ends with Jehovah; seder xiii. begins and ends with Jehovah; seder xiv. begins with Jehovah (which Professor Skinner ascribes to redactional change or scribal error), and has Elohim and once El Shaddai elsewhere; seder xv. opens with Elohim and closes with Jehovah; seder xvi. has Jehovah seven times, followed by Elohim twice in one verse (19:29), Elohim being original in this verse (Dahse, S.106 f, 111; cp. Skinner, p. 310) and explicable. In addition the LXX shows Jehovah in verse 29^e. Seder xvii. uses Elohim, and with discrimination as far at least as verse 16, since the narrative concerns a foreigner. The final verse of the seder (20:28) contains Jehovah. Here, however, the Samaritan and certain texts of the LXX represent Elohim; perhaps due to the influence of the preceding names. Professor Skinner remarks of this verse that it is "universally recognized as a gloss." Seder xviii. opens with Jehovah, and closes with Jehovah, the Everlasting God (El). On 21:2 and 6, see Dahse, S.102. The opening Jehovah is readily accounted for as it concerns the birth of the heir; whereas 21:8-32 correctly have Elohim, because Hagar has been cast off by Abraham. Seder xix. closes with Jehovah (22:16). The name occurs in the phrase "a declaration of Jehovah"; and is original, since in that phrase Elohim would be contrary to usage. In this chapter, according to the Syriac, Elohim was used everywhere except in verses 14 and 16. This seder (but not Parasha 4) includes chapter 23, in which neither divine name occurs, except in verse 6 where Elohim is part of an idiom (prince of God = mighty prince) and without significance in relation to Pastor Dahse's theory. Seder xxiii. opens and closes with Jehovah, having this name everywhere except in 25:21^b. Seder xxv. has Elohim twice; but in place of the second Elohim the Samaritan has Jehovah (28:4). Seder

xxvi. perhaps uses the title Jehovah at the first opportunity.⁶ Seder xxvii. begins with Jehovah (29:31). The presence of this name in verses 32 and 35, and perhaps 33, is proper, according to a principle which characterizes Genesis, Jehovah being the name used in connection with the birth of the legal or actual heir. Thenceforth Elohim. Seder xxviii. closes with Jehovah (30:30), Elohim is used previously, and has the support of the Syriac which with the LXX reads Elohim in verses 24 and 27. Seder xxix. begins with Jehovah. Thenceforward Elohim is used, and properly; though in 31:7, 9 and 16^a Samaritan, and in 16^b Syriac, have Jehovah. Seder xxx. may be regarded as beginning with Jehovah in 32:9 [Heb. 10], although compound epithets containing Elohim preceded it in this verse. It is attested by the MT LXX uncertain. Dahse regards it as "interpolated later" (S.13). Seder xxxiv. begins with Jehovah in 38:7^a, Elohim in 7^b and 10. The divergence from the MT existed in Origen's day (Dahse S.103). In seder xxxv. Jehovah is used, except in speech to a foreigner (39:9; 40:8). In seder xliii. the title Jehovah appears in 49:18, the first occurrence of the divine name in the seder; but it is in a quoted poem and need not be regarded as significant in relation to Dahse's theory.

In several of these sedarim the title Jehovah, where it occurs at the opening or close, is necessarily employed, and therefore proves nothing as to the correctness of the theory. Its presence, however, satisfied that desire of the directors of the synagogue worship which the theory presupposes. The facts are that the name Jehovah is found at the beginning or close of practically every seder, where this word with its connotations could be appropriately used. Whether the facts are sufficient in number and character to justify and sustain the theory concerning the divine names in the sedarim is a delicate question. Intention may especially be assumed whenever textual criticism can prove that Jhvh takes the place of an original Elohim at the beginning or end of a seder (cp. 2:4 and 3:22, Dahse, S.35 and 98, Z 13 ff; 8:15⁷). In regard to sedarim xii., xiii., xiv., in parasha 3; and xv. and xviii. in parasha 4; and xxiii. in parasha 6; and xxvii. in parasha 7; and xxxiv. in parasha 9, eight sedarim in all, several possibilities demand consideration. 1. The initial Jehovah in 15:1; 16:2; 17:1; 18:1; 21:1; 25:21^a; 29:31-35; 38:7^a may be the characteristic of one of the sources from which material was drawn for constructing the narrative contained in the Pentateuch, this particular source being one in which God was regularly mentioned by the title Jehovah. Thus, in general, the divisive critics, who denote this source by the letter J. 2. The initial Jehovah in these passages

⁶ The paragraph, Gen. 28:10-22, is difficult from the standpoint of textual criticism. If Jhvh is due to dittography in verse 21 (the clause then reading: "and will be God to me"), the name Jehovah is attested in verses 13 and 16 only. There was reason for using Elohim in the phrases "angels of God" and "house of God." The designation "angels of God" occurs but twice in the Old Testament, in Gen. 28:12 and 32:2[Eng. 1], beginning and ending the parasha (as Dahse remarks, S.95); never "angels of Jehovah," although "his angels" are mentioned (e.g. Ps. 91:11; 103:20).

may be due to the intention of the writer to begin each account of the birth of the presumptive heir to the Abrahamic blessing with the title of the God of Israel, the author, maker of the promise, and its guarantee (see subsequent remarks). 3. The initial Jehovah may be due to the desire for this name at the beginning or close of a seder. The fact that the LXX, without variation in the transmission, attests Elohim in 18:1, the first divine name in seder xv., makes for the theory that the use of initial Jehovah in the Hebrew of these narratives is due to a change introduced into the original text either in order that each of these particular narratives may begin with the name Jehovah or else in order to the symmetry within the parasha (see below).

II. The theory regarding the parashiyyoth. The Hebrew text of Genesis, known as the Massoretic text, is more recent in respect to the divine names Elohim and Jehovah than is the Hebrew text underlying the Septuagint (S.97). The divine names which are found in the MT represent the rule followed in the synagogue at public service when it had become customary to read the Pentateuch according to the annual cycle of fifty-four large divisions called parashiyyoth (S.32). When the law of Moses was divided into fifty-four sections in order that by reading them consecutively on successive Sabbaths the whole Torah might be covered in one year, and when as a result the sedarim became merged in these larger divisions, the divine names God and Jehovah were sometimes found to intermingle in a manner distracting to the worshipping audience. When such was the case, a slight revision of these names was undertaken, so Dahse holds, in order to secure a comfortable symmetry in the parasha (cp. S.107). The revision was more extensive than had been required when it was desired merely to obtain the name Jehovah at the beginning or end of a seder. To secure the desired uniformity in the parashiyyoth various methods were employed: the word God was changed to Jehovah, when it stood between Jehovah-passages (S.94), and the name Jehovah might be changed to God, when it came between verses in which the word God was used (S.99 Z 12 f; cp. S.38); or the one name might be added to the other (S.98, Z. 13 ff). The object aimed at, whatever the method of revision, evidently was to allow one name to be used continuously for a stretch, avoiding the distraction of repeated change from one to the other, and linking consecutive topics together. Of course, though Dahse does not seem to mention it specifically, revision was not in every case necessary, since symmetry sometimes existed already; and in several cases where symmetry did not exist revision was impossible or undesirable, because no other divine name was so suitable as the one originally employed in the narrative; for example, God and not Jehovah was the proper title to use in referring to the Creator of the universe, in the conversation between Eve and the serpent, and where foreigners are speaking of the deity without special reference to the God of the Hebrews. The avoidance of revision in these cases, and the resulting lack of symmetry, made the distinction of thought more noticeable.

Of Parasha 1 a comparison of the MT with the earliest readings of the Greek indicate a revision. Thus, read as a parasha, a symmetry altogether lacking in the text attested by the LXX has been secured in the MT: God, 1: 1-2:4^a, where God is the only appropriate divine name to use; then Jehovah God, 2:4^b-3:25, except thrice, where Eve and the serpent are talking together; then Jehovah alone, 4:1-4:16; then God, 4:25-5:24, except once, 4:26, where the retention of the word Jehovah was unavoidable; finally Jehovah, 5:29-6:8, with the exception of 6:2 and 4 where the title Jehovah was inadmissible. This revision (and critics of the text generally admit a revision) ignored the boundaries of the sedarim. In Parasha 3 also the MT shows a symmetry in the use of the two divine names that is lacking in the earlier constituent sedarim. The word God no longer stands between passages in which the divine name is Jehovah. The designation Jehovah is used consecutively about thirty times, followed by Elohim nine times. In Parasha 5 likewise the name God does not occur between Jehovah passages; the sequence being Elohim once, then Jehovah twelve times, then Elohim once. The Greek and Hebrew agree, no adjustment was made. In Parasha 6 Elohim is not found between Jehovah passages; Jehovah being used fourteen times consecutively, then Elohim twice. This unbroken sequence, exhibited by the MT, is not shown by the Greek texts. In Parasha 8, Elohim does not appear between Jehovah passages. Barring compound titles, the parasha opens with Jehovah in 32:10[9], thenceforth Elohim only. In this respect there is no divergence between the Hebrew of the LXX and the Hebrew of the Massoretes. In Parasha 9 Elohim occurs once between Jehovah passages, (39:9), where, however, the title of Elohim is unavoidable. The last divine name in the parasha is Elohim (40:8), where also its use was unavoidable. This symmetry is lacking in the Greek. Parashiy-yoth 10 and 11 have Elohim only. In this the MT and LXX agree. Parasha 12 has Jehovah but once, and that in a poem with other divine titles; Elohim continuously. In only four of the nine parashiy-yoth just noticed, namely in 1, 3, 6 and 9, is there divergence between the MT and the Hebrew text represented by the LXX, but in these four the symmetry of the MT in comparison with the Hebrew of the LXX is striking. In all nine, moreover, the MT uses the two divine names in the symmetrical manner which Dahse has observed and seeks to explain by his theory.

Parasha 2 has Elohist character (S.38), due to revision. It is difficult to prove, by the critical apparatus at present available, whether in several instances the divine names which appear in the MT in sedarim v.-vii., Gen. 6:9—9:17, are original or have undergone a change.⁷ In the MT Elohim occurs five times in succession, then

⁷ On the assumption that the names have been subjected to an Elohist revision (S.38), it is necessary to account for the presence of Jehovah in 7:1, 5, and 16. Concerning 8:15 the general concurrence of the Greek texts for Jehovah against Elohim of the MT may be interpreted either as the change of an original Elohim to Jehovah at the beginning of a new seder; or the change of an original Jehovah to Elohim in carrying out an Elohist revision (as Dahse holds).

Jehovah twice (7:1 and 5), Elohim twice, Jehovah once (7:16), Elohim thrice, Jehovah thrice (8:20 and 21), Elohim six times, Jehovah and Elohim (9:26 and 27, each being unavoidable), finally Jehovah seven times. The MT, just as it stands is more uniform than the LXX; and a yet greater symmetry exists if with the Samaritan (not Petermann's), and the Syriac (S.63 and 99) Elohim be read in 7:1, which probably involves 7:5 also. Dahse accounts for the retention of the name Jehovah in 8:20 as due to the feeling that this designation was alone suitable, and in the following verse the name Jehovah remained because of the intimate connection (S.99). If Elohim is original in 7:1 and 5, then from Gen. 6:9 to 9:17 Elohim occurs eighteen times, interrupted by the name Jehovah once, at the end of a seder (7:16), and again in 8:20, 21, where the designation Jehovah was important; from Gen. 9:26-11:9 the word Jehovah is found eight times, broken by one unavoidable Elohim (9:27). Parasha 4 is likewise more symmetrical in the MT than in the LXX. In sedarim xv.-xviii. the name Jehovah occurs seventeen times in the MT (not so in the LXX), and is followed by Elohim eight times (as in the LXX also), Elohim being the proper term to use; then Jehovah occurs thrice (at the end of seder xvii. and the beginning of seder xviii., Gen. 20:18; 21:1), Elohim eleven times (differing from LXX), being the proper term to use in 21:9-32; and finally Jehovah once (21:33), closing the seder. That half of seder xix. which belongs to this parasha, namely Gen. 22, is not uniform in the use of the divine name, Elohim being used in verses 1 to 10 and Jehovah in verses 11 to 18. This change from Elohim to Jehovah at the crisis of the narrative has been regarded as original, and significant (even by Knobel). But if Elohim be read with the Syriac in verses 11 and 15, then Elohim only is used in the seder, except in verses 14 and 16. In the latter verse Jehovah is unavoidable, being in the phrase "declaration of Jehovah,"⁸ and in this phrase Elohim was never used. Regarding verse 14, Professor Kent (cp. Dillmann also), without the authority of the ancient versions, claims that the word Jehovah has been substituted for the original Elohim by a Judean editor. Thus the entire section may be made to contain Elohim only, except in verse 16, at the end of the series, where the phrase requires Jehovah. Dahse, however, retains Jehovah in verses 11 to 18, yet considers its use in verses 11, 14 and 15 to be "motivated," and therefore not inconsistent with pronouncing seder xix. "Elohistic, only the conclusion Jahwistic, 22:16" (S.94 and 95). The remaining half of seder xix., namely chap. 23, belongs to Parasha 5. Regarding Parasha 7, in seder xxvi. the divine names intermingle; and in most instances where Elohim is used, that particular name was unavoidable. In sedarim xxvii.-xxix. Jehovah occurs four times at the beginning of seder xxvii.; then Elohim nine times; Jehovah four times (LXX and Syriac but twice), including the end of seder xxviii.

⁸ When the divine Being is the subject, the divine name is always Jehovah, either alone or enlarged.

and the beginning of seder xxix.; Elohim twelve times, interrupted by Jehovah once (31:49, where LXX has Elohim).

Thus it appears that even in these three parashiyoth, 2, 4 and 7, notwithstanding that the final determination of the original names in certain cases still eludes textual criticism, yet a tendency towards symmetry is observable in the MT, which is lacking in the Hebrew text of the LXX. And with this phenomenon Pastor Dahse's theory agrees.

It is possible to take a broader view than is taken by Dahse and to consider certain phenomena which bear upon the determination of the original Hebrew text and perhaps of its later stages. Whatever the sources, oral or written, were, from which the narrative in the book of Genesis was obtained, it would seem that the author or his editor followed several rules in his use of the divine titles. 1. Unless it was the intention of the speaker to refer specifically to the God of the patriarchs (cp. 1 Kin. 17:10-14; 2 Kin. 5:10-19; 18:19-35), a foreigner and a Hebrew in conversation used the generic word God or other high and holy name which embodied the common conception which each party had of God; as 'el 'elyon, God most High, possessor of heaven and earth (14:19-22), 'elohim, God (20:9-13 E; 39:9J; also 43:23, 29, and 44; 16J, where Joseph appears as an Egyptian); cp. Kuenen, *Hexateuch*, p. 56. 2. In every narrative in Genesis, which concerns the birth of the presumptive heir to the Abrahamic blessing (Gen. 12:1-3), the Massoretic text has Jehovah for the introductory divine name in the paragraph and also for the divine name in the few instances where one occurs in the reason assigned for the heir's name, whatever name or names may be used for the deity later in the narrative: thus, the promise of an heir (15:1); attempt to secure an heir (16:2); and the reason for the name (16:11; LXX, exhibiting the composition of the name, Ishmael, uses God); renewed promise of an heir (17:1); promise of a son by Sarah within a year (18:1, and verse 13 where the specific promise is given; but 17:15 God, Old Latin, Lord); birth of Isaac (21:1); birth of Esau and Jacob (25:21^a); birth of Reuben, and of Judah who ultimately became the heir (29:31 with 32 and 35); failure and refusal of Judah's sons to beget the legal heir, and birth of the ultimate heir in the house of Judah (38:7^a, with 29). The Septuagint with one exception (18:1) attests the word Jehovah at the beginning of these paragraphs, as the first divine name in the seder, however much the Septuagint may differ from the Massoretic text in respect to the divine name elsewhere in the paragraph. Dahse's theory, it will be noted, accords with these facts regarding the initial divine name, and also accounts for the difference between the Massoretic text and the Septuagint in 18:1. And the general agreement of the two texts in regard to the divine name used, where a particular rule seems to have been followed by the author or early editor of the narratives, is an additional attestation of the fidelity of the Greek translators to their Hebrew text, and affords valuable testimony to the readings of the early Hebrew text.

3. According to the Massoretic text the patriarchs never approach the deity under the generic designation of God, but always use a formal title, drawing nigh to God in a specific character, expressed in a unique title, as Jehovah, or El or the word Elohim qualified by an adjective or a limiting genitive or a relative clause. Thus they build the altar to Jehovah (8:20; 12:7, 8; 13:18), or to El, the God of Israel (33:20), or to El who answered me (35:3); offer sacrifice to Jehovah (4:3) or to the God of his father (46:1); and they call upon the name of Jehovah (4:26; 12:8; 13:4; 21:33; 26:25). Where they are represented as themselves speaking they address their prayer or invocation of a blessing, not to God in the generic sense (as they might when making supplication in behalf of a foreigner, 20:17), but to Jehovah (32:9; Ex. 5:21; cp. the indirect prayer of Rachel, Gen. 30:24, where however the Greek and Syriac with propriety have the word God, which may be original), Lord Jehovah (15:2, where the early Septuagint attests only Lord, Dahse, S.13), Lord (Gen. 18:30; Ex. 4:10; 5:22), Jehovah, God of my master (Gen. 24:12, 42), God of my father (32:9; cp. 48:15), God Almighty (28:3; 43:14), and El (Num. 12:13), the only exception in the Massoretic text being in two successive verses of a poem-prayer or blessing, where the word God is used in sequence to Jehovah (Gen. 27:27, 28); and they give thanks for answered prayer to Jehovah (24:27, 48), they take oath by Jehovah, the God of heaven and earth (24:3), they bestow the blessing of the birthright before Jehovah (27:7), and when speaking to other men specifically of the God of Abraham, they say Jehovah (chap. 24 throughout; 27:20; 30:30, end of the seder; cp. verse 27 where, however, the Greek has God, which is equally good). Such is the Massoretic text; and Dahse's theory meets with no obstacle in any of these passages, but coincides. Moreover, the uniformity of the agreement between the Massoretic text and the versions in reading a formal title of God in practically all such instances, together with the evident propriety of such a title in the circumstances, is once more a strong argument for the ancient use, if not for the original use, of the formal name in these passages. Even the Greek translation of Gen. 28:3 and 43:14, notwithstanding Dahse's argument to the contrary, attests the words God Almighty, the phrase used being a form employed by the Greek translators for rendering this title elsewhere.

4. On the other hand, in the familiar intercourse of the family, when speaking to each other or with their kinsfolk, Abraham and his descendants do not use the divine name Jehovah. They say God (mostly Elohim, occasionally El); for example, 30:2-8; 31:4-16; and even 33:5, 10, 11 J. The exceptions in the Massoretic text where the word Jehovah is used in the customary, easy conversation of the household are few and doubtful. They scarcely number ten or eleven, and only five or fewer occur in ordinary conversation, 16:2, 5; 30:27, 30; 31:49 (the others being 16:11; 29:32, 33, 35; 30:24; and to include the period before Abraham, 4:1). In six instances there is textual authority in the versions for reading God (4:1; 16:5; and 31:49, Septuagint; and

30:24 and 27, Septuagint and Syriac; and 16:11, Septuagint, probably an attempt to correct a supposed error). In two cases, 16:2 and 30:30, the name Jehovah begins or ends the seder, but is equally well accounted for otherwise. In 16:2 and 11, and 29:32 and 35, the title Jehovah found in the Massoretic text is used by the author or editor of the narrative because the birth of the heir is related. In 30:27 and 30, in a conversation between Laban and Jacob, the use of the name Jehovah in reference to the God of Jacob is quite intelligible and proper, but perhaps is not original; while in verse 24 the Massoretic reading Jehovah, although explicable as the original text, is not unlikely a late play upon the first syllable in Joseph (for these three verses, see the foregoing remarks). The names given to children likewise indicate that God, not Jehovah, was the divine name ordinarily used in the familiar talk of the household. The word Jehovah was not used, so far as the records go, in the proper names of this period, except perhaps in Jochebed. El is common, as Ishmael (16:11, J; 16:15, P) and Israel (32:28, J; 35:10, P; 42:5, E context; 48:2, 8, 11) and others (46:10, 14, 17, 24; Ex. 6:22-24, P). This phenomenon regarding the word God as the divine name used in the ordinary conversation of the home sustains the originality of the Greek reading in a number of instances; and it supports Dahse's double contention that the Massoretic text represents alterations made in the "mixed" sedarim in order to secure the occurrence of the name Jehovah either at the beginning or end of the seder, and made in the parashiyoth with a view to securing symmetry in the use of the name.

Dahse's conclusions regarding the original text will not in every case be accepted as warranted; moreover he does not hold that either the Greek translation or its Hebrew prototype is faultless. But all that may be left aside. The facts are that many sound reasons exist for believing that the Septuagint represents careful transcription of the divine names which occurred in the copy of the Hebrew text used by the Greek translators. Where there is divergence from the Massoretic text, the latter's preference for the divine name Jehovah may be due in a few instances to the natural desire to use that name in connection with certain narratives. When the preference of the Massoretic text is not evident, Dahse's twofold theory is apt to offer an ingenious reason.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

The Source of the Christian Tradition. A Critical History of Ancient Judaism. By EDOUARD DUJARDIN. Revised edition, translated by Joseph McCabe. (Issued for the Rationalist Press Association, Limited.) Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. Pp. xvi, 307.

Two decades ago Maurice Vernes published a series of Old Testament studies, in which he advocated the postexilic origin of substantially all the Biblical literature, including the prophets. There are others who since that time have ranged themselves—at least with respect to this or that prophetic book—on the side of Vernes. Now

M. Dujardin comes forward with the claim that, apart from "legends and customs belonging to earlier times", of which "the compilers of the Mosaic writings made use", the entire Old Testament dates from after the exile, according to the following scheme: Pentateuch—Kings, during the 4th and at beginning of the 3d century, Chronicles, Ezra and Nehemiah still later; the prophets, latter part of the 4th and in the course of the 3d century; Psalms, Daniel and "other works", during the 2nd and 1st centuries.

It is evident that such a scheme upsets the prevalent criticism of to-day, which builds on an 8th century Amos and Hosea, by removing its very foundations. Thus "extremes meet", here as so often elsewhere. The conservative critic and this ultra-radical are at one in opposing the order: first prophets, second law. So this Dujardin, after appealing to Vernes' writings, seeks comfort and support next in the conservative Halévy, because forsooth Halévy's *Recherches bibliques* may be cited as demonstrating "that the prophetic books are later than the Mosaic writings." The author expressly adds, "With the new theory of dates we return to the traditional formula: the Prophets after the Law."

This fact and this alone constitutes the significance of a book that is a wild orgy of skepticism. To its author history is imagination, prophecy is forgery, law is a pious fraud. "Pseudonymity is the invariable condition of Hebrew literature" (p. 186). Nothing is true, nothing sacred. Yet on every page there are familiar tones. The difference, one feels, between the methods of this writer and those of Professor Moore, Smith or Kent is but a difference of degree. And it seems to us that critics of that type should read a book like this with a certain uneasy feeling that its author differs from them mainly in his greater consistency. For it is a fact too patent to need proof, that for them the criteria for determining whether a writing belongs before or after the exile lie within the scheme of religious evolution first elaborated by Graf. Many lines of argument are often adduced to support the conclusion reached, but the discerning reader marks that this conclusion was already a foregone conclusion. Yet the application of the same lines of argument, minus such a foregone conclusion, will often lead to just such results as Dujardin here reaches. *Exempli gratia*, Chapin and Day on Amos and Hosea.

Against this thorough-going skepticism what is one to plead? We are driven back upon faith. But, faith in what? Let us not answer, tradition. For that word will inevitably frighten our liberal school. But let us say, faith in *the men who produced the Biblical literature*,—in a word, faith in the Bible's own account of its origin, so far as it gives an account. This is internal evidence, not external. But it is a justifiable act to distinguish between the men who wrote the Old Testament and the men who collected the canon and transmitted it to us. Of the latter we know little or nothing. But of the former we have a personal revelation in their works. We know them, as we know few characters back of our own day. And is it not a reasonable faith

that proclaims, I trust the assertions of the man who wrote this book, including his assertions or implications that settle its date and authorship? There is no essential difference between the man who puts Deuteronomy in the 7th century, and the man who puts it in the 4th. Both alike have cast off faith in its author—one of the glorious religious characters of all time—and both alike are adrift upon the sea of conjecture, to find a precarious harbor where they may. Let this book under review be a warning to the critic whom we are accustomed to call “radical,” but whom it makes to appear as “a cake not turned.”

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

The Building Up of the Old Testament. By the Rev. R. B. GIRDLESTONE, M.A. London: Robert Scott. 1912. Pp. xx, 314. (Library of Historic Theology, edited by the Rev. Wm. C. Piercy, M.A.)

The nature of this book cannot be better stated than in the words of its preface: “This is intended to be a reverent and rational restatement of the position of the Old Testament, dealing with its form, its substance, and the relationship of its various parts, examining how far the later Books presuppose the earlier so that the whole is fitly framed together by words, idioms, texts and ideas, exhibiting traces of purpose throughout. The book consists of two Parts. The first considers the phenomena of the Old Testament as a whole; the second analyzes each book, its language and contents, in order to find out its position and design. . . . In a book of this compass it is impossible to go into all details, but while a broad view is taken of the Old Testament as a whole, the writer has not consciously ignored or evaded any material objections to the position to which he has been led after fifty years of study and thought.”

In carrying out this plan Canon Girdlestone has embodied his views on a great variety of questions, both theological and philosophical, archaeological, chronological, geographical, literary. The weakness of the book is its discursiveness. There is plenty of bread, but it is buttered too thin. Yet to put into the hands of a layman, perplexed about Biblical criticism as such without quite knowing what it is—for that describes the mental state of many in our churches—and lacking any coherent principles of Biblical interpretation, such a book as this, with its sound fundamentals, is perhaps the best sort of a guide to be found.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life in Israel, in Judaism, and in Christianity or Hebrew, Jewish and Christian Eschatology from Pre-prophetic Times till the Close of the New Testament Canon. Being the First Jowett Lectures delivered in 1898-99. By R. H. CHARLES, D.D., D.Litt. Speaker's Lecturer in Biblical Studies, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford, Fellow of the British Academy. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. London: Adam and Charles Black, pp. x, 484. 1913.

Immortality. The Drew Lecture, Delivered October 11, 1912. By R. H. CHARLES, D.Litt., D.D. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1912. pp. 38.

The first edition of Dr. Charles' *Eschatology* appeared in 1899. Fourteen years lie between that date and the publication of this second edition. The "Revised and Enlarged" on the title-page of the latter does not mean that any considerable new material has been added, or that the main positions of the first edition have been to any important extent modified. The one extensive addition occurs in the treatment of the nature of Apocalyptic, more particularly its relation to Prophecy and the causes of its pseudonymity. Here the writer offers a new theory. But the other changes do not affect the main character of the work as representing a definite view in regard to the development of biblical eschatology. So far as the Old Testament is concerned this view is that of the Graf-Wellhausen school. It might be summed up in the following positions: a purely paganistic ethically-indifferent individual eschatology (Sheol) prior to the introduction of Jahvism; the development of an ethical collective eschatology through the influence of the higher prophetism from the eighth century onward, and this first of all in the adverse sense of an announcement of judgment upon Israel, and only later in the favorable form of Messianic prediction (the promissory passages in Amos and Hosea being rejected); the moral transformation of the original paganistic views of the state after death through the individualizing of the ethical nationalism of the great prophets; the successive and only partially successful attempts at effecting a synthesis between the national and individual hopes through the doctrine of the resurrection, the synthesis being perfectly attained in Christianity only; the broadening out of this particularistic into a universalistic and cosmical eschatology under the influence of the ethical principle. Within the limits indicated by these positions the author is moderate in his views. He assumes a stronger admixture of the ethical element in the Mosaic conception of Jahve than perhaps most of the critics of the school would allow, although on his own showing the ethical ingredient postulated remained practically dormant until the prophets resuscitated it. On the other hand it might be classified as a somewhat radical position when the author sides with Stade and Schwally a.o. in ascribing ancestor-worship to the pre-Mosaic Hebrews and construing from this point of view their primitive heathen eschatology. In the second edition this is still adhered to, although in the meanwhile, in result of what has been written on the subject, the theory has lost considerable of its erstwhile prestige. We think the author too curtly dismisses the objections raised by Frey and Grüneisen, especially by the latter. He is, of course, within his rights when choosing to abide by his original judgment, but the theory has certainly become sufficiently shaken to require of every scholar, who still thinks himself able to uphold it, a careful restatement of the arguments and a refutation of the counter-arguments adduced. Instead of this, the author simply repeats the reasoning of Stade and Schwally

in its original form. Especially Grüneisen's interpretation of the mourning-customs as defensive measures adopted to ward off the dangerous influence of the souls of the departed, is in many respects much more plausible than the interpretation of these same customs as acts of worship. And even if it should be urged that in this sphere of pagan superstition the line between defensive treatment of the spirits, or care and provision for the spirits, and of a positive religious cult of them, is hard to draw, it still would have to be remembered that the phenomena of the mourning-customs at any rate would not point to *ancestor-worship* in the specific sense, but could at best only be used to prove the worship of the departed in general, so that many of the far-reaching corollaries of the theory in regard to the tribal and family-organization of Israel appear unwarranted. As the matter stands the non-expert reader will be apt to form from Dr. Charles' statements a very inadequate conception of the merits of the controversy. Even Eerdmans, whom none will suspect of conservative leanings, declares in a recent issue of the *Theologisch Tydschrift* (1913, II, p. 124) that the whole theory of the primitive religious cult of the departed turns out to have been "*een groote misgreep*" i.e. a huge mistake. The point at issue does not concern pre-jahvistic paganism exclusively, but also affects the view taken of the Old Testament teaching itself in regard to the state after death. Charles assumes that Jahvism, in order to combat ancestor-worship, conceived a theory of the nature of the soul, which implied the destruction of all life in Sheol. The trichotomy of Gen. ii. 7 makes the existence of the soul depend on the presence of the spirit, which at death withdraws to its source in God. Nothing therefore remains to descend into Sheol. According to the author the denial of immortality in Eccl. xii. 7 is the logical outcome of the anthropology of this creation-account. But, he assures us, the destruction by Jahvism of all life in Sheol was necessary with a view to the truly ethical doctrine of the future life. We do not believe that the intent of Gen. ii. 7 is to deny the continuation of the individual life after death. And we cannot help feeling that the ethicizing of the future state, by means of the (temporary) denial of the survival of man, would be a procedure beneath the dignity of revelation. Nor do we believe that there is, as the author seems to assume, a historical connection between what he calls "the later view" in regard to Sheol as a place of silence, inertia, forgetfulness (in distinction from the older ascription to it of a relatively high degree of life, movement and remembrance) and the anthropology of Gen. ii. 7. This passage, if it did imply the cessation of man in toto, could only have led to the abolishment of Sheol. How it could have operated towards depressing the degree of activity in Sheol we fail to see. The whole distinction, moreover, between an alleged later and an alleged older view, is without sufficient basis. Dr. Charles favors it evidently, because it falls in with the theory of primitive ancestor-worship. The whole thing amounts to a difference of emphasis in the various popular conceptions reflected in the Old Testament as concerning the degree of life

and activity ascribed to the dead, and with a difference of religious principles it has nothing to do. As a matter of fact, even on the alleged older view of Sheol the dead are so wholly deprived of energy and influence as to exclude every idea of their worship by the living. Grüneisen has convincingly shown the incongruousness between the general Old Testament view of Sheol and the theory of ancestor-worship, although he falls into the same mistake as Charles, viz. of finding in Gen. ii. 7 the view that the soul does not survive death. Only according to him this is not the later doctrine, it is the general and original teaching of the Old Testament. And the popular belief about Sheol and the shades were inconsistent with it.

Another point in regard to which the enlargement claimed for the new edition might have been expected to show itself concerns the antiquity of the promissory (Messianic) eschatology and of the cosmical framework of the eschatological expectations in general. These appear in accordance with the modern theory as after-developments. But Gunkel, Gressmann and others have presented some very weighty arguments in support of the opposite view, and if their conclusions are correct, the whole scheme of development above outlined and almost conventionally followed by the Wellhausen-School will need considerable revision. Here again no fault could be found with the writer, if after due presentation of the evidence he chose to adhere to his original conviction. But Dr. Charles does not raise the question at issue anywhere. Throughout the discussion only casual references to Gunkel occur, e.g. pp. 182, 198. On p. 189 we read about the "cosmological myths" in Gen. i.-iii., and of other elements of a similar nature preserved in the prophets. From the next page we learn that "in later Judaism these cosmological myths were transformed into eschatological expectations." And a little later this is qualified by the statement that "this transformation of 'primitive myth into eschatological expectation was already known to the prophets at all events in poetical form." That under these vague and easy statements a far-reaching problem, involving the whole development-hypothesis with which the writer is identified, hides itself, no uninformed reader would be led to surmise. Practically the author treats the controversy as non-existent. After what Gressmann has written, one is surprised to find on p. 99 the following statement: "In Zephaniah the judgment appears for the first time to be universal. Its universal scope is the necessary corollary to the Monotheistic faith of the prophet." We believe that the number of Old Testament scholars ready to subscribe to this statement at the present day is considerable less than it was in 1899, when the first edition appeared. There is an increasing recognition of the fact that much of the wider eschatology is older than the eighth century, and therefore cannot be explained as the product of the ethical monotheism of the prophets of that period. Either the monotheism of which that eschatology is claimed to be the correlate must be older likewise, or no real connection between it and ethical monotheism exists. In the latter case the universalistic, cosmical set-

ting of the earlier eschatology will have to be explained from Babylonian influence. Dr. Charles, who is prevented by his general position, from adopting the former view, should have at least made clear on what grounds he rejects the other side of the alternative.

By far the most valuable, and we may add the most reliable, part of the work is that which deals with the apocryphal and apocalyptic literature. Here the writer is an acknowledged authority, and we can only be thankful to him for the illuminating way in which he has presented to us the essential points and the great lines of development in the confusing mass of phenomena. In view of his long preoccupation with the subject, it can hardly create surprise that the author magnifies the value of this literature for the student of biblical eschatology. His praise of it, not merely of its eschatological teaching, but also of the ethical content of some of its documents, and that in pointed contrast to the Old Testament, is so generous, that we do not see how it leaves room for any canonical distinction between this literature and the recognized Hebrew Scriptures. In this connection the author attaches no blame whatever to the pseudonymity of most of these writings. He offers for it the well-known excuse that in those days the modern conception of literary property was entirely unknown. We fail to see how this covers the point. The case is not one of appropriating the work of others as a literary product, but of usurping the authority of others as a moral asset. And the new hypothesis which the author brings forward to explain this feature of the apocalyptic writings is found to accentuate most painfully the moral aspect of the matter, and insofar to discount the force of the conventional excuse. According to Dr. Charles the pseudonymity arose from the absolute control which legalism with its doctrine of the completeness and finality of the law as a rule of faith and practice had gained over the congregation. This state of affairs made it necessary, if any new truth was to be presented, to introduce it under the auspices of primeval religious personages, so that its acceptance might not seem to be in contravention to the monopoly of the law. This amounts to saying, that the writers gained for their views a hearing under the guise of pseudonymity which they knew could not be accorded to it had they stood back of them with their own persons. In doing this they committed a fraud, not to be sure upon Enoch or Moses, but upon the representatives of legalism, whose control they dared not openly to dispute. And it is difficult to understand how the latter could be so naïve as to be taken in by this palpable disguise of the pseudepigraphical writers. Whether the author's new explanation of the phenomenon, be successful or not, at any rate it ought to have led him to tone down somewhat his high estimate of the literature in question.

The discussion of the New Testament Eschatology covers much less space than that of the intercanonical period. Considerable of it skims lightly on the surface. In regard to the teaching of our Lord, which the writer does not take special pains to separate from that of the

synoptical gospels, his standpoint is opposed to that of the extreme eschatological school. He recognizes the presence in Jesus' teaching of the idea of a present, spiritual kingdom. The evidence however adduced in support of this view will need some sifting. *E.g.* when the opening message of our Lord's ministry to the effect that the kingdom is *at hand* is appealed to, the author overlooks, that the extreme eschatologists use the very form of this message as an argument on their side, on the ground that a kingdom *at hand* is not a *present* kingdom. Dr. Charles also seems to think that our Lord began with the idea of the present kingdom pure and simple, and added to this the eschatological expectation as an afterthought, when his experience had shown Him that the optimistic forecast of a gradual, uninterrupted development of the present kingdom could not be realized. This is a construction based exclusively on the fact, that what the writer considers the earliest sayings of Jesus contain no explicit reference to the eschatological aspect of the kingdom. But, even if the question of criticism were discounted, it would remain an argument from mere silence. The author does not deny that our Lord expected a new heaven and a new earth as the scene of the perfect kingdom. The question is pertinent how He could have possibly conceived otherwise than by way of catastrophe of the creation of this final environment for the kingdom. On this point the writers are not lacking, who make the development of Jesus' mind move in precisely the opposite direction, viz. from the eschatological to the present kingdom. And it does not appear that they have any greater difficulty than the advocates of Charles' view in arranging the chronology of the sayings to suit their theory.

The author agrees with the extreme eschatological school in one point. He ascribes to Jesus in his later teaching the view, that the consummation of the kingdom would take place within the lifetime of that generation. The possibility of interpreting the sayings pertaining to this head of a spiritual advent to the church is not considered, although in other connections the actual occurrence of such a way of speaking in the Fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse is admitted. While conceding that Jesus here held a mistaken view, Dr. Charles strives to minimize the importance of the mistake. It was a mere question of time which did not touch the essence of the matter. But here once more it might have been worth while to take some account of the contention of the hypereschatologists to the opposite effect. On their view not merely the fallibility of our Lord on a chronological question, but the character of His ethics is involved, not to speak of the bearing which the subject has acquired on the question of our Lord's mental balance.

In other respects the author's tendency is to use the ethical or sub-ethical character of the eschatological sayings of Jesus as a test of their genuineness. We notice in this connection that he eliminates from the great eschatological discourse the so-called "Small Apocalypse," considering it with—Weiffenbach and others a purely-Jewish

document. The grounds on which this is done are those usually adduced. In our opinion they are wholly insufficient to bear out the view in question, when once the unwarranted idea is abandoned, that Jesus could have no eschatological interest that was not motivated ethically and spiritually in the most direct manner. If interest in eschatology is not in itself a culpable thing, why not allow for it in Jesus, who was a true man in this respect also. It is hardly self-consistent when the author argues on the one hand that the signs of the end enumerated in the small Apocalypse cannot come from Jesus, because He declares that no one knows the time of the end, and that it comes by surprise,—a declaration to be taken in the most absolute sense, and yet on the other hand appears to find no conflict between this declaration of absolute ignorance and the positive declaration that the parousia will come within the time of the then living generation.

The discussion of the Pauline eschatology is largely subordinated to the development-theory which Charles holds in common with Teichmann, Pfeleiderer and other recent writers. Four periods are distinguished, the first represented by 1 and 2 Thessalonians, the second by 1 Corinthians, the third by 2 Corinthians and Romans, the fourth by Philippians, Colossians and Ephesians. We do not believe that on the author's own premises, the necessity of separating 1 Thessalonians from 1 Corinthians, i.e. the first period from the second, can be demonstrated, for Dr. Charles does not believe that 1 Thess. teaches a resurrection of the unchanged body, as other advocates of the development-theory assume. Nor can it be maintained that the eschatology is in 1 Thess. un-pneumatic, for, if on the one hand the body is to be changed, and if on the other hand the dead are νεκροὶ ἐν Χριστῷ, there is no other conception that will account for these two features, than the Pauline conception of the union between believers and Christ in the Spirit. As to 2 Thess. the only thing to mark this off from the later Epistles would be the doctrine of the Antichrist. The difference as regards 1 Corinthians would amount merely to this that here Paul is silent on the subject, for certainly nothing is said here that excludes it. The case is somewhat different with Romans for, here, as Charles urges, the optimistic perspective of Chap. xi clashes with the pessimistic outlook of the Antichrist-expectation of 2 Thess. ii. But the writer overlooks that according to the latter chapter itself the Antichrist-movement spreads itself and gains force on the basis of an extended apostasy, which apostasy, to judge of it in the light of other New Testament statements, takes place within the church. Accordingly there is no contradiction here either.

The warrant to posit a third distinct period depends entirely on the exegesis of 2 Cor. v., 1-10. Of course there is an interpretation which finds here the prospect of the endowment with the resurrection-body at the moment of death. But many prominent exegetes interpret the passage quite differently, and there are some most serious objections to the exegesis espoused by Charles. Foremost among these stands the fact that on the basis of it that which Paul professes to shrink

from, and which he hopes to escape by survival till the parousia, would have to be the momentary dissolution of the body. Now as a matter of fact the Apostle tells us in so many words that it is not this *momentary experience*, not the *articulus mortis*, but the *state of nakedness* from which he recoils. Dr. Charles does not enter into the question exegetically at all. He simply quotes the pericope, as if its meaning were so plain as to obtrude itself on the mere reading of it. The reader will do well to compare on this whole question the recent monograph of Deissner entitled *Auferstehungshoffnung und Pneumagedanke bei Paulus*, noticed in the October-number for 1913 of this REVIEW.

The main peculiarity of the fourth period consists in this that Paul makes the evil angel-spirits the subject of redemption. The same view is, as a possible alternative, suggested by the writer, in connection with the two well-known Petrine passages. And throughout the author lays great stress on what he calls the "moralizing of Sheol" as the only legitimate issue of the trend of biblical eschatology. He does not hesitate to intimate that the possibility of repentance in Sheol must either lead to conversion or to final annihilation. Every other conception of Sheol, or Gehenna, in other words the doctrine of eternal punishment he stigmatizes as unethical. Where it occurs in the New Testament it is a Judaistic survival. We do not believe that the biblical development previous to the New Testament can be shown to tend towards the doctrine of a future probation. To be sure Sheol is moralized, in comparison with the primitive pagan conception of it as a place indifferent to ethical distinctions, but in this sense Gehenna as the scene of eternal punishment is most intensely ethical. On the other hand if "ethical" be made to mean a state which admits of repentance, then there is nothing to show that such a moralizing was contemplated by any biblical writer, and Dr. Charles' advocacy of it is plainly not of a historical but of a theological nature, it being in line with his semi-pelagian predilections. If it were not for these he would scarcely have handled the Petrine passages and the statements in Colossians after such an easy and summary fashion. It is positively painful to read on how slender grounds the author finds even in Jesus' teaching the intimations of repentance in the future state. Every student of the subject knows that here also a great deal has been said on the other side and that not merely by believers of the doctrine of eternal retribution. The view that even after the final judgment there is no absolute finality runs directly contrary to and means the destruction of eschatology at its core.

We are glad to notice, that, apart from the well-known passage in the Apocalypse, Dr. Charles finds no Chiliasm in the New Testament not in Acts iii., nor in 1 Thess. iv., nor even in 1 Cor. xv. He rightly points out that the whole trend of the New Testament, especially of the teaching of our Lord and of Paul, points away from such a doctrine and leaves no room for it.

Our chief criticism of the treatment of the New Testament would be that it fails to raise and answer the fundamental question to what

extent the development of soteriological teaching in general proceeded on the basis of eschatology, and therefore partook of the character of an anticipation in the present of what was originally expected in the eschatological period. In bringing this question once more to the front the hyper-eschatologists, Schweitzer foremost among them, have rendered a real service. But our author does not touch upon this problem. For Schweitzer in particular he seems to have little respect, to judge from the following statement in the preface to the second edition: "Since Schweitzer's eschatological studies show no knowledge of original documents and hardly any of first hand works on the documents, and since further they make no fresh contribution to the subject, no notice is taken of him in this edition." One feels tempted to suggest that Schweitzer's case would not be the first one in which remarkable intuition into the meaning of historical developments had been evinced on the basis of a merely second hand acquaintance with the sources. We doubt not Schweitzer could learn a great deal from Charles, but that does not prove that Charles can learn nothing from Schweitzer.

The Drew Lecture for 1912 summarizes in a very lucid way the views elaborated in the large volume grouping them around the idea of immortality. Its perusal will be found helpful both before and after the study of the larger work.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

Primitive Christianity and Its Non-Jewish Sources. By CARL CLEMEN, Ph.D., D.D., Professor in the University of Bonn. Translated by ROBERT G. NISBET, M.A., Lecturer in Latin in the University of Glasgow. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 30 George Street. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912.

Professor Clemen is the Baedeker in the field of modern theological controversy. In the October number for 1912 we noticed his *Der geschichtliche Jesus*, a brochure furnishing an excellent introduction to the contemporary debate about the historicity of Jesus. The present work renders a similar and equally valuable service with regard to the wider and somewhat older issues raised by the *religionsgeschichtliche* interpretation of Christianity and the New Testament. In its German form the book appeared in 1909 under the title *Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments*. The English translation now offered to the public has been revised by the author himself, and the reader is assured in the preface that in every respect it truthfully represents his meaning. It has besides this, as Dr. Clemen generously concedes, the unusual merit of reading better than the original. This judgment is verified by the comparison we have made of the two. The cases where the German may be consulted to advantage in clearing up obscurities of the English are few in number compared with the cases where the opposite procedure will be found helpful.

After an introduction in which the history of the religious-historical interpretation is traced from Celsus down to Drews and Jensen, and

in which the methodological principles for instituting the inquiry are carefully laid down, the author deals successively with the two rubrics of the leading ideas of Christianity in general and the individual types of teaching (Jesus—Paul—the Johannine writings) in particular. The former rubric is subdivided into three sections treating of the ideas inherited from Judaism, the New Ideas of Christianity and the Institutions of Primitive Christianity. What precedes the discussion of these three subdivisions is a chapter of considerable length entitled Christian thought in some of its more general aspects. This title is a misnomer, for the chapter is entirely devoted to the consideration of concrete resemblances in thought or expression between the New Testament and the cotemporaneous Hellenistic literature. Owing to the barrenness of results this part of the book is apt to have a wearying effect upon the reader. The author arrives in nearly every instance at the negative verdict of "not proven." In the subsequent discussion things become more interesting. While the author keeps to the end strictly within the rôle of a referee, who weighs and judges, but offers no new suggestions of his own, and while within this rôle his attitude remains one of great caution and impatience with the extravaganzas of the more notorious representatives of the school, there nevertheless appear many points where he concedes the probability of foreign influence. Under the head of the leading ideas inherited from Judaism, the writer rejects the derivation of the Monotheism of the Old Testament from Babylonia, and likewise that of Parsistic influence. The seven angels, and eyes, and stars of Ezekiel and Zechariah and the Apocalypse are derived from the seven planets, but it is emphasized that the writer of the Apocalypse has no perception any more of this original meaning. Dr. Clemen also admits that the names of the Archangels are not explainable from this theory. The twenty-four elders and the four living creatures of the Apocalypse are likewise originally stars. The author's sober sense reasserts itself in his refusal to associate the twelve Apostles with the signs of the zodiac. Neither has the "Lamb" anything to do with the constellation Aries. A sort of half-way position is taken in regard to the *στοιχεῖα*: the stars meant by this term are conceived as animated bodies, but they are not as such brought into connection with the angels and no fatalistic astrological influence is attributed to them. Satan is explainable not from Babylonia but (at least in part) from Mazdeism. Even the Spirit of God is represented as possibly in its origin a Parsistic conception. Equally interesting is the discussion of the foreign provenience of Christianity's eschatological inheritance from Judaism. Here Clemen goes with the Graf-Wellhausen school. He rejects Gunkel's and Gressmann's views about an ancient, pre-prophetic cosmological and universalistic eschatology in Israel and particularly the assumption that this eschatology was the popular belief of the early period, adopted and afterwards revived by the prophets. None the less at a later stage Rahab and the dragon, and the beasts of the Apocalypse were derived from the Chaos-monster. The explanation

of the repetition of this mythological conflict in the future, and in general the development of the whole idea of eschatology in the minds of the Babylonian astrologers from the precession of the equinoxes is not endorsed. For this a possible derivation of the idea of eschatological recurrence from Mazdeism is substituted. Gog is not a mythological conception (against Gressmann). The identification of Satan with the Dragon is due to Parsism. The belief that nature-phenomena are precursors of the end is not traceable to any foreign source. Neither can the personal precursors of the Messiah be so explained. The Messianic idea is not of foreign origin. The argument against Gressmann on this point is staked on the un-Messianic interpretation of Isa. vii. and on the treatment of Mic. v., 2 as a late interpolation based on the misunderstanding of Isa. vii. as a Messianic prophecy. The prophets know nothing of a mother of the Messiah. The ancient myth of a Redeemer-king born of a virgin exists only in the imagination of Jeremias. Isa. ix. and xi. are not based on the idea of a return of the golden age. The Messiah is no more than the King of the last days, and he is looked forward to on no other principle than that there will be a restoration of the earlier power of Israel. Once more Gressman's interpretation of Isa. liii. is rejected on the grounds chiefly that the servant is not an individual, and that the sacrificial, expiatory character of his death is lacking in the myths of Adonis, and Attis and in the account of the righteous servant from the text of Assurbanipal's library. Gunkel's assertion that there even existed in Jewish belief a myth which ascribed death and resurrection to the Messiah is declared unfounded.

The author's preference, shared by him with Bousset, for Mazdeism as the chief foreign source of New Testament eschatological ideas clearly reveals itself in his discussion of the Son-of-Man problem. The idea is traced back to that of the Persian "heavenly man." Although Paul in 1 Cor. xv., 45 ff. polemizes against the idea so far as the priority in sequence of the heavenly man with regard to the earthly man is concerned, he is nevertheless said to have appropriated the substance of the idea in his doctrine of Christ as "the man from heaven." Clemen also explains from this source the *μορφή θεοῦ* of Phil. ii., for of this Persian "heavenly man" it is said that he was in the form of God. In the same context the *μορφή δούλου* is interpreted on the basis of the Poimandres, where the primal man is represented as becoming *ἐναρμόνιος δούλος* i.e. enslaved to the Heimarmene. The author is, however, careful to emphasize that all this does not carry an idea of pagan provenience into the core of the official consciousness of Jesus, because the function of judging the world was not originally inherent in the idea of the heavenly man, but was extraneously added to it in Judaism, and by Jesus Himself.

The expectation of a life after death both in its immortality and in its resurrection form is held to have had no antecedents in Babylonia. While in part indigenous to the development of Old Testament religion in the direction of spiritualizing and individualism, it also underwent a perceptible influence from Parsisin.

The observation may be made on the basis of the foregoing that Dr. Clemen's reserve towards accepting the religious-historical explanations has something to do with his theological position as an adherent of the "liberal" views. He follows the "liberal" tradition of exegesis within the Old Testament, which may not unjustly be characterized as minimizing the supernatural and preferring wherever possible to rationalize the mental processes of the writers. Over against this the *religionsgeschichtler* have a positive liking for realism of interpretation and for emphasizing the magical irrational aspects of religious conceptions. It is plain that the former attitude more easily lends itself to the explanation of acts on the principle of indigenous rational development, whereas the latter more naturally exploits the disconnectedness of the irrational in favor of its hypothesis of foreign derivation. If Dr. Clemen's exegesis had been more realistic, the instances in which he admits that ideas are borrowed would have doubtless been more numerous. In the matter of interpretation e.g. of the Messianic texts we cannot help feeling that Gunkel and Gressman are more nearly right. If from the mysterious and disconnected character of such material we on our part do not draw the inference that it is derived from Babylon or Persia, this is simply due to the fact that we reckon with a solid supernaturalism. But on the standpoint of Clemen, who does not do this, a movement away from the "liberal" exegetical tradition would inevitably lead to acceptance of the religious-historical conclusions on a much larger scale.

The same observation might be made with regard to the author's treatment of the specifically Christian ideas and institutions. Here his attitude is even more reserved and negative than where the Jewish inheritance is concerned. This is the natural result of the reflection that the primitive Christian church was much less open to direct influence from pagan sources than Judaism had been in its longer history. The canon accordingly results, that to prove influence it will be necessary in such cases to point out its working in the Jewish antecedents of Christianity, and with regard to the specifically Christian ideas this cannot be done. The author makes frequent and sound use of this canon. Nevertheless here also, we believe that from his unsupernaturalistic standpoint a less "liberally" colored exegesis would have rendered him more receptive to the views of the other party. As it is he makes concession only at isolated points, and that largely in formal respects. His criticism of the Gilgamesh theory is searching and conclusive. He has no use for the derivation of the passion and resurrection story from an Adonis or Attis or any other myth. The Sacaea cannot have given rise to the account of Jesus' maltreatment. The explanation of a large part of Paulinism from the mystery-religions finds no favor in his eyes. At the utmost the form of expression and in no wise the substance has been influenced from this source. A somewhat peculiar position is taken with regard to the virgin-birth. The theories or origination of the idea from Isa. vii., of Babylonian, North-Arabian, Persian, Indian and Greek origin are

alike rejected. On the other hand Clemen does not believe that the idea is founded on fact. In his discussion of the Lucan narrative he employs the usual arguments to show that it was not originally inherent in the tradition, but subsequently added to it. How then does he account for its rise? He suggests that it may have sprung from a view previously current in Jewish circles that the patriarchs were supernaturally begotten of God without a human father through a virgin-birth. And this idea, he thinks, could easily have been developed out of the older notion, vouched for by Paul, that Isaac was born after the Spirit, i.e. that there was a supernatural factor involved in his procreation. The sole support for this theory is the allegorizing statement of Philo to the effect, that, where the patriarchs represent virtues in the Old Testament narrative, they are not introduced as "knowing" women. In spite of Conybeare and Badham, there is nothing in Philo's statement to indicate, that his allegorizing fancy has at this point a solid basis of Jewish realistic belief. But the theory is interesting because it brings the virgin-birth into connection with the idea, that in our opinion, is actually embodied in it as a fact, viz. the necessity of the direct supernatural origin of the human nature of the Saviour, so far as this was possible within the terms of His office. If Dr. Clemen will translate his theory out of the sphere of ideas into the sphere of history, we are prepared to accept it.

The general conclusion at which the author arrives at the end in his retrospect at the discussion, needs a word of comment. It sounds comparatively reassuring to hear him declare that "if we leave external matters definitely on one side, the New Testament *ideas* that are *perhaps* derived from non-Jewish sources—for we may emphasize once more the hypothetical nature of most of our results—lie mainly on the fringe of Christianity, and do not touch its vital essence." But it should not be forgotten that the reassuring import of such a statement with its comforting distinction between "fringe" and "essence" is wholly dependent on the theological standpoint from which it is made and received. Dr. Clemen is a "liberal" theologian, and he distributes the contents of the New Testament as to essence and form in accordance with his liberal interpretation of what Christianity means. The historic faith of the church has always counted among the essence not a few things which "liberalism" declares purely formal. Insofar as certain of these things are declared by Dr. Clemen of pagan origin, it is small comfort for us to know, that to his "liberal" point of view they appear of a formal nature. The reassurance that we need regards, not the liberal but the orthodox interpretation of what constitutes the essence of Christianity. Conservatives have no occasion to infer from Dr. Clemen's book that the danger from the religious-historical interpretation of the New Testament is purely imaginary.

Of errata in the English text, partly occurring also in the original German, we note the following, p. 52 Mt. viii., 22 ff. for 23 ff.; p. 57 Lk. iv., 28 for 23; p. 69 in the quotation from Epictetus τοῦτον for τοῦτο; חֲכָמֵי הַשָּׁמַיִם on p. 129 should have no Dagest in the ש.

The translation is uniformly accurate. Only on p. 86 the rendering

"this representation" would have better given the sense of the original than "all such reasoning." On p. 97, line 14 the "zugleich" of the original is neglected in the translation. On p. 368, last paragraph, "of course" should be "to be sure."


Princeton.

GERHARDUS VOS.

Worte Jesu und Gemeindeüberlieferung. Eine Untersuchung zur Quellengeschichte der Synopse. Von WALTHER HAUPT. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1913. Pp. iv, 263. M. 7.50, geb. M. 8.50.

This is the third Heft in the series of *Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament* edited by Windisch, and, like the first by Spitta—*Die synoptische Grundschrift in ihrer Überlieferung durch das Lukasevangelium*, 1912—is a discussion of the Synoptic Problem. Taking Luke as the basis of his investigation Spitta sought to determine the character and content of the fundamental documentary source (Grundschrift) of the Synoptic Gospels. The result of his literary analysis is given in translation (pp. xiii-xlviii); the process by which this result is reached is set forth in a detailed study (pp. 1-450); the conclusions are then summarized (pp. 450-500) and compared with the results of a similar analysis of the Fourth Gospel (*Das Johannes-Evangelium als Quelle der Geschichte Jesu*, 1910). The Grundschrift (Gr) is found to be preserved entire—with the exception of a few short passages—in the Gospel of Luke. It began with the appearance of John and continued through the passion (death and resurrection). With it two other documentary sources are combined in the Third Gospel, the infancy narrative (i-ii) and a book of the discourses of Jesus (ix. 57-xviii. 14)—also certain independent sections and additions which are not derived from Mk-Mt but from an earlier form of Mk (Mk¹) which in turn is derived from an earlier source (Gr^m) different from the Gr embodied in Lk (Gr¹), the two forms of the Gr representing different Greek translations of an Aramaic original.¹ Haupt too attaches importance to Lk in determining the content of the Grundschrift (G),


¹ This yields the following scheme (p. 499):



Gr is dated in the beginning of the forties (p. 478).

but the results of his investigation, while agreeing with Spitta's in certain details, differ in maintaining the dependence of Lk on Mk and in fixing the content of G, from which the narrative of the resurrection is excluded.² His discussion serves more directly than Spitta's the development of the Two-Document Hypothesis. Presupposing the soundness of this general theory, Haupt seeks first of all a more accurate determination of the limits and order of Q by an examination of its relation to Mk. The matter common to Mk and Q shows that Mk is dependent on Q; the matter in Q common to Mt-Lk but not to Mk shows that Q existed in different forms. The narrative material in Mk goes back to a source G (*Grundschrift*) and this was known also to Mt-Lk—accounting for their agreement against Mk in passages common to the three. Ultimately the Synoptic tradition goes back to two narrative sources, one concerned with the incidents of the last two days of Jesus' life in Jerusalem, the other with events of His Galilean activity. These were united by the prophecy of His passion and thus constituted the first "life" of Jesus, the *Stammberecht*, from which the later sources of the Synoptic Gospels are derived. The later sources are primarily three,—G common to Mk-Mt-Lk, S peculiar to Mk, and L peculiar to Lk. The *Stammberecht* was without discourse material. This appears first in Q¹, which was prepared as a supplement to G and consisted of three discourses,—instructions to the disciples for their mission, teaching occasioned by dispute concerning precedence, and the parable of the sower. The last two discourses may have formed part of G, but the first indicates the character, point of view and dominant interest of Q¹. This was narrowly Jewish Christian, particularistic, informed by the eschatological expectations of the community in Jerusalem. It was added to G about the year 50. Shortly afterward it was enlarged by the addition of discourse material consisting chiefly of the disputes of Jesus with the Scribes and Pharisees. The point of view of this redaction, Q², is broader—Hellenistic—and its character is determined by its interest in the Law. With these additions (Q¹, Q²) G was known to Mk. But Mk used another source, S, which like G was derived from the *Stammberecht* but without addition of discourse material, lacked the apologetic Messianic

² Haupt's view of the relation of the Synoptic Gospels to the Grund-schrift is indicated in the scheme.



Mt and Lk used Mk but had recourse from it to G

tendency of G, was vivid in description, not narrowly Jewish Christian, was not related to Peter (vs Papias), and was written about the year 60. In Mk these sources, G-Q¹-Q² and S, were united about ten years later. G and S run parallel through the Gospel, the narrative following first one and then the other; but the discourse material is scattered. The combination of these sources and the method of their use solves the problem of the structure of the Gospel and makes it possible to explain the omission of Mk. vi. 44-viii. 27 by Lk on the theory of its derivation from S. After the composition of Mk, Q was revised and enlarged under the influence of a catechetical motive, a universalistic point of view with an advanced Christology and contributions of a high ethico-religious value (Q⁸). G also prior to its use by Mt-Lk received additions,—a genealogy of Joseph, differing in the different exemplars used by Mt-Lk; the supernatural birth, Lk's deviations being due to the use of another source (L); and certain additions known to Mt but not to Lk. The special source of Lk, L, is later and more extensive than G or S; it was written about the year 80, is idealizing, fond of miracles, universalistic but originating in Jewish Christian circles. It has points of contact with the Fourth Gospel and a local origin possibly in Asia Minor. Q also received certain glosses differing in the forms used by Mt and Lk; but beside these the Q used by Mt had undergone a Jewish Christian (Nazarene) redaction. The Gospel of Lk was written at the end of the first century (c. 100) and Mt somewhat later, each adding to the sources,—in the case of Lk an ascetic interest, in the case of Mt reflective ad-
duction of O.T. prophecies, a typological manner of thought, an interest in Peter and the Church, the universalism of the end of the Gospel, and a possible allusion to the author himself in an apt description of his work in xiii. 51 f.

This analysis of the literary relation of the Synoptic Gospels is intricate. The phenomena admittedly do not permit a nice separation of the sources nor a precise indication of the strata which enter into the literary structure of these Gospels. The influence of the interests of the Christian community, doctrinal (eschatological, Christological), apologetic (Messianic), catechetical (ethico-religious and universal), is too readily set in contrast with and without adequate proof taken to be new and different from the interest of Jesus, so that doubt arises whether authenticity attaches to more than a few of the words attributed to Him even in the earliest sources. Haupt evidently feels the historical problem but thinks it does not matter whose words they were since their truth and life-giving power resides not in their source but in themselves and in their effect. The issue however still remains. The portrait of Jesus in the Gospels was painted by Christian hands, and as far back as we can trace its preliminary sketches, these too are of Christian workmanship. Do they faithfully portray their subject, or has the portrait been more influential than its original inspiration? And if they do not, then it is a serious question just what limit may

be set to Haupt's theory of idealization,⁸ and whether that view is altogether without reason which extends it to the person of Jesus Himself.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions. By H. A. A. KENNEDY, D.D., D.Sc., Professor of New Testament Language, Literature and Theology, New College, Edinburgh. Hodder and Stoughton: London, New York, Toronto. 1913. Pp. xviii, 311 6s net.

In the critical study of the New Testament attention has for some time been directed toward the environment in which Christianity had its origin and expansion. In the transfer of this religious movement from its Palestinian birthplace to the Graeco-Roman world, the Apostle Paul was an important factor. His Epistles embody his conception of the nature of the movement; and if the new environment seriously influenced the movement they will naturally have preserved traces of it. No feature of this environment has of late received more careful study than its religious ideas and ritual. In this sphere it appears that from 300 B.C. to 300 A.D. Oriental influences were a potent factor in the syncretism of which the Mystery-Religions were an important expression. It is not strange that the history-of-religions method should seek in the phenomena of these cults the historical explanation not merely of the environment in which Paul did his work but of constituent elements in his interpretation of Christianity. This effort is being pressed with vigor—to judge from Bousset's *Kurios Christos*—and sufficient progress has been made to indicate its essential features and the data upon which its conclusions are based. Under these conditions a survey of the field by Dr. Kennedy is both timely and instructive. His discussion is well ordered, beginning with the religious elements in the Hellenistic world of Paul's time and tracing their antecedents in Stoicism, the Orphic movement and the Oriental cults. A chapter on "Jewish affinities with the Mystery-Religions" prepares the way for criticism of the tendency to neglect the Old Testament background of Paul's thought. Five chapters are devoted to the discussion of "the character and influence of the Mystery-Religions (Eleusis, Cybele-Attis, Isis-Serapis, Hermetic literature)," "St. Paul's relation to the terminology of the Mystery-Religions (especially *μυστήριον, τέλειος, πνευματικός, ψυχικός, νοῦς, γνῶσις, ἀγνωσία, ἀποκάλυψις, μεταμορφοῦσθαι, εἰκῶν, δόξα, φωτίζειν*)," "St. Paul and the central conceptions of the Mystery-Religions (*θεωθῆναι, ἐνθουσιασμός, ἔκστασις, σωτηρία, ἀναγεννᾶσθαι*)", "Baptismal rites,"

⁸ P. 212. "The facts are so overgrown with creations of fancy that it is impossible to distinguish the one from the other. The narratives thus fashioned possess however such a refreshing simplicity, express the truth of Christianity in so charming a form that there is nothing to be compared to certain of these altogether unreal, yet inwardly true narratives in respect of their continued influence. This appears especially in the birth and resurrection (the Emmaus disciples) narratives of the [Third] Gospel."

and "Sacramental meals." The concluding chapter summarizes the results of the discussion and criticises Schweitzer's eschatological derivation of Paul's mysticism. Dr. Kennedy's treatment of his subject is sane and sensible. The reader will be impressed by the meagreness of the facts upon which large theories have been constructed; and he can scarcely fail to feel the force of Dr. Kennedy's presentation of the ethico-religious elements which enter into Paul's conception of the sacraments and which make impossible the attribution to him of a magical theory of their nature and efficiency, *ex opere operato*. Dr. Kennedy's point of view and the general result of his investigation are indicated in the following statement (pp. 280 ff): "The relation of the Mystery-Religions to Paul's environment requires no discussion. Ample evidence has been adduced to show that throughout the sphere of his missionary operations he would be in touch with many who had been initiated into Pagan Mysteries, and had finally entered the Christian Church. We cannot picture him engrossed in the cure of souls without recognizing that he must have gained a deep insight into the earlier spiritual aspirations of his converts, and the manner in which they had sought to satisfy them. Even apart from eager inquirers, a missionary so zealous and daring would often find himself confronted by men and women who still clung to their mystic ritual and all the hopes it had kindled. It was inevitable, therefore, that he should become familiar, at least from the outside, with religious ideas current in these influential cults. Sometimes, as *e.g.* in the case of *γνώσις* and *δόξα*, these ideas found remarkably close parallels in the thought of the Old Testament. Thus he would be impressed by their capacity for holding a genuinely spiritual content, and would use them in circumstances in which their earlier history would tend to make them more effective. Certain important terms like *τελειος*, *πνευματικός σωτηρία*, and others, were in the air. They meant one thing, no doubt, for a Christian, and quite another for a Pagan. Yet their fundamental significance for both had elements of affinity, sufficient to link together the respective usages. The essentially religious meaning, for example, of *πνεῦμα* and *νοῦς* in documents of Hellenistic Mystery Religion provided a common standing-ground for Paul and many of his readers. What holds of separate terms may occasionally be affirmed regarding groups of ideas. Thus the combination of *συμμορφιζόμενος* with *γινώσκειν* in Philippians iii. 10 seems to indicate a background for the Apostle's conception akin to the Mystery-doctrine of transformation by the vision of God. But it has also become clear that we dare not make far-reaching inferences from terminology as to the assimilation by Paul of Mystery-ideas. For we were able to show that the central conceptions of the Mystery-Religions belong to a different atmosphere from that in which the Apostle habitually moves. There is no principle determining their relations, which in any sense corresponds to the Cross of Christ in the realm of Paul's thought and experience."

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Jesus. Von W. HEITMÜLLER, D. and Professor der Theologie in Marburg. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 1913. 8vo; pp. viii, 184.

This volume contains a reprint of the Article "Jesus Christ" in the third volume (1912) of the encyclopaedia published under the name of *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*; together with an Address on "Jesus of Nazareth and the Way to God" delivered on March 11, 1913 at the seventeenth meeting (at Aarau) of the Conference of Swiss Christian Students.

The occasion of the publication of the volume is not without its interest. The Theological Faculty of the University of Marburg has for sometime has been in controversey with the Prussian *Kultusministerium* over the appointments made from time to time to its professorships. One fruit of this controversy was a pamphlet—his opponents call it a *Brandschrift*—by Jülicher bearing the title of *Die Entmündigung einer preussischen theologischen Facultät*. Notice was taken of this pamphlet in the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, and in the course of some remarks upon it the Freiherr von Schenck of Schweinsburg, who happened to be not only a deputy of the Chamber but also President of the *Konsistorialbezirk Kassel*, within the bounds of which the University of Marburg is situated, took occasion to comment also, with some sharpness, on Heitmüller's article on "Jesus Christ" (April 5, 1913). This is what he said:

"I am constrained to show you by means of a scientific work to what such a critical tendency can lead. I will be quite brief and, with the permission of the President, will read from the scientific work, *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, only the following sentences from the Article Jesus Christ, II, Particular Questions in the Life of Jesus. 'For the Jewish conception there lies immediately comprehensible in the idea of "the Son," that God stands to Jesus in a special relation of trust and love; as "the Son" Jesus knows Himself as before all other men the object of the special love of God. As we must understand from the context, He knows Himself as the Son precisely because He knows God in a unique fashion and God has made Him the vehicle of Revelation. Vehicle of a unique revelation, the Son absolutely—we are almost appalled (*erschrecken*) by the loftiness of this consciousness. It is certainly in no way a divine consciousness, but yet a vocational consciousness which almost oversteps the bounds of humanity and evacuates all the human experience which is otherwise manifested,—with reference to which we might ask indeed whether it can be made consistent with soundness and clarity of mind.' (Hear, hear! and for shame! from the Right.) 'Here is the point at which the figure of Jesus becomes mysterious, almost unearthly to us. But'—Now comes the But, for were the author to stop at this point and not proceed to this But, I am convinced that he, like any professor who propounds such teaching, must be liable to have a process entered against him for blasphemy (deputy Heckenroth, very true!) or at least for overstepping his professorial privileges. The text being read proceeds: 'But we have scarcely the right to distrust the essential contents of our passage, Mat. xi. 25 to 27, and that the less that the whole manner of conceiving the significance of Jesus (Revealer) which meets us here corresponds very little with the modes of thought of the primitive community.' Gentlemen, I am constrained to place my finger upon this point, because I say to myself, Here is an absolutely essential point, which must re-

ceive attention, for here there comes to an end what is otherwise spoken of as a theological tendency; here there meets us a point of view which is absolutely different from what we otherwise speak of as the Christian point of view (very true! from the Right). We are not dealing here with two tendencies, but with two world-views (very true! from the Right), with two completely diverse religions. They cannot be forced under the shibboleths of 'positive' and 'liberal' or dealt with from the standpoint of party politics. . . . Gentlemen, no indulgence can be shown to such things,—even under the mantle of freedom of teaching (*Lehrfreiheit*). I am convinced, if we enter upon such a pathway, that we must ultimately reach the point where it must be said, What is here offered to the people has nothing in common with Christianity except the name, but intrinsically nothing more. The monistic conception of life is making way among ever wider circles of our people, not merely among the professors at the universities, among the educated and learned,—no, it is already penetrating into very wide circles of all ranks, and the more deeply our population descends on the downward sloping road of the monistic conception of life, the more firmly and steadily must the *Kultusminister*, as the first counsellor of the throne, take his stand upon the high Christian world-view, and give expression to this his point of view in his decrees and acts." . . .

To the man in the street these must seem very sensible and straightforward remarks. But they naturally gave great offense at Marburg. The venerable Herrmann at once protested against them in behalf of his colleagues, in an open letter addressed to von Schenk and published in *Die Christliche Welt* for May 1, 1913 (No. 18), and Heitmüller has felt compelled by them to lay the article attacked before the wider audience before which he was incriminated, as his sufficient defence. In republishing thus this Article Heitmüller adds to it the Swiss Address as offering "a practical-religious supplement" to it. The Article is a scientific statement of what we historically know of Jesus. The Address deals with "the complex of the much discussed questions which concern the significance of the historical Jesus for faith." The two together may supply us, their author thinks, with some suggestion at least of his whole attitude, scientific and religious, towards Jesus.

The line which Heitmüller takes in reply to von Schenk is apparently a simple denial that he can justly be charged with ascribing to Jesus an unsound mind. He therefore contents himself at this point with a simple reference to a passage in his article in which he expressly declares that the attempt to represent Jesus as of unsound mind has not succeeded. This passage (p. 89) runs as follows: "As assured data of the tradition, we have the vocational consciousness transcending the limits of the prophetic and the fact that Jesus laid claim to the Messianic dignity in some sense or other. That these two facts raise difficult psychological questions, scarcely needs to be emphasized. And when of late the mental soundness of Jesus has been questioned, and He has been presented as a pathological subject, this attempt has at least a possible point of attachment here. It has not succeeded and it can never succeed. The poet of the parables, the framer of the proverbs, was as sound as ever man was. And in

this sound consciousness we find that content! Much can be brought forward to mitigate the puzzle; we are in no position to solve it." It is right to recall, however, that von Schenk does not represent Heitmüller as declaring Jesus to have been of unsound mind. He represents him as saving himself from that by a 'But.' The gist of his representation appears to be that Heitmüller deals frivolously with the charge that Jesus was of unsound mind and seems indeed to treat it as a preferable hypothesis to the ascription of a divine self-consciousness to Him: that he even appears to suggest that had Jesus' mysterious self-consciousness been but a little more exalted than he allows it to have been, we should have had to admit that He was of unsound mind. And this representation we can scarcely deny to be fairly justified.

The self-consciousness of Jesus is manifestly the crux of Heitmüller's presentation of Him. He declares it roundly to be merely human. "That the self-consciousness of Jesus," he says, (p. 68) "was through and through a human one, will be regarded as self-evident by every one who without hindrance from ecclesiastical dogma, makes use of the sources and of the historical criticism which is indispensable with reference to them." But in the palmary passage, which von Schenk cites (p. 71), it is only by dealing most drastically with Mat. xi. 27 (which is there under discussion) and violently reconstructing its text after the unfortunate example of Harnack, that he can reduce the lofty selfconsciousness there ascribed to Jesus to something which he can pronounce human; and he seems indeed only barely able to pronounce even what he makes it soundly human. A little later he speaks of "this self-consciousness which far transcends all human experience and seems to lift its subject out of the series of men" (p. 118); and again at the end of the article (p. 148) of "that extraordinary vocational consciousness transcending all human analogies, which, if we regard it as sound, can be represented only as an intimation that in this man in peculiar measure a creative, or as the pious man puts it, a divine life has entered into history." The constant recurrence of the suggestion that this self-consciousness may be thought to be unsound—or is thought by some to be unsound—may serve the purpose of conveying to the reader a keen sense of its exaltation. It also, however, leaves the impression on the reader's mind that in Heitmüller's view Jesus' self-consciousness just falls short of being unsound; and that, even after he has reduced it far below its actual representation in such an unassailable passage as Mt. xi. 27. The conviction unavoidably forms itself, accordingly that Heitmüller, after all said, finds himself with a Jesus on his hands whose self-consciousness is so little "through and through human" that he does not quite know what to do with it, and is compelled to allow that those who pronounce it a deranged self-consciousness have some show of justification, even after he has reduced it from the actual representation of it in, say, Mt. xi. 27. And, if this reduction be not allowed—as it cannot be allowed—what then? We cannot see that

Heitmüller safely escapes from the antithesis, *aut Deus aut non sanus*; and since he will not have the *Deus* at any cost, that he has any just ground of complaint against von Schenk's charges. He does seem upon the verge of assigning to Jesus a diseased self-consciousness (and that is all that von Schenk charges) and he appears to save himself from this result only by dealing with extreme violence with his texts.

The vigor of Heitmüller's Socinianism in his conception of Jesus' person has already become evident. He will not hear of Jesus being anything else than a man and a man of His times. How he obtains this purely human Jesus from records which present a very different Jesus lies in that mystery of "Liberal criticism" with which we are so familiar now-a-days: Heitmüller's critical methods differ in nothing from those current in the "Liberal" circles of which he is an ornament, and require the less to be adverted to here in detail that we have recently had occasion to explain them pretty fully in this REVIEW (April, 1913, XI. ii, pp. 218 ff). By means of this "criticism" very drastically applied, he manages to extract from records which present to us a Divine Jesus, a purely human figure; from records which present to us a supernatural Son of God surrounded by an aureole of miracle, a simply natural man who wrought no miracle. Not at Nazareth only, but throughout His career, He could do no mighty work, though He laid His hand on a few sick folk and healed them. Jesus had an impressive personality and may be credited with "faith-cures" (p. 67); it was from this beginning that tradition, certainly very rapidly, transmuted Him into "the Aesculapius of His people" (p. 60). But the historian can allow to Him no real "miracle" (p. 61). When "the historian" is done with the records, indeed, we find ourselves with very much less real knowledge of Jesus in our hands than we could wish. Heitmüller desires to separate himself, it is true, from that overstrained skepticism with reference to the knowledge of Jesus which he recognizes has been of late far too common even among theologians (p. 153). But he recoils from the other extreme also, which would have it that we know Jesus "as if He were one of our contemporaries" (p. 154). The way in which he would express himself is this (p. 41): "What we can attain by this procedure is certainly far less than we could wish. It of course does not suffice for writing a Life of Jesus; but neither is it enough even to sketch a portrait of His character or of His activity. There are individual traits of the portrait of Jesus which we distinguish, some of them clearly, some of them only in obscure outlines; there is often lacking the unifying bond and if we are prudent and desire to proceed with surety we will do well to make very little use of complementary and psychologizing inferences. On the other hand what we can grasp historically is not little and it includes what is most important. Whether the Christian can found his faith on it is a question which it is not the historian's business to answer and the Christian should not raise it."

It must be admitted that Heitmüller is not very exigent with ref-

erence to the historical foundations of a Christian's faith. That is a matter which is more fully discussed in the Lecture at Aarau; but there are some odd hints regarding it even in the encyclopaedia Article which it may repay us to take note of in passing. When discussing the story of the Virgin Birth, he determines it to be an invention of Gentile Christians on the model of the heathen myths of divinely-begotten men, possibly in misapprehension of the proclamation of Jesus as the "Son of God" (pp. 45-46). Yet he can tell us (p. 43), that "the question as to the right of the faith which comes to expression in it, is not strictly speaking at all subject to the judgment of the historian." The historian it seems can only "determine whether this faith showed itself early or late, and in whom it is found in the primitive Christian community." The plain man is apt to think that when it has been shown by the historian that the belief that Jesus was born of a virgin stands on a par with the similar belief as to Plato, it is already determined that it has no right to exist. At an earlier point the distinction here suggested is drawn broadly out (p. 12). "The pious man, even the simplest and most unlearned, on sinking himself believingly in these faith-laden accounts, finds the Jesus who kindles faith and whom faith needs. But the historian who does not ask what Jesus means for faith, but would fain ascertain and present what can be known of Jesus' life, acts, and nature by means of the generally recognized instruments and methods of scientific research, is able only through infinitely toilsome and complicated investigation to establish the treasure which is hidden in these writings on really sure reports. The chief question for him, before he uses them, is that which concerns the historical value of these sources." Is not this "the chief question" for the man who seeks spiritual life in them too? We observe that even Heitmüller says that the pious man finds what he seeks in the Gospels only when he sinks himself in them *believingly* (*bei gläubiger Versenkung*). Can he ponder *believingly* upon accounts whose historical truth he suspects or denies? To recommend the pious man to kindle his faith by narratives which he knows or suspects to be fables is a frivolity which must avenge itself in the degradation of faith into empty sentimentality.

The state of the case is not really altered by Heitmüller's view that though the evangelical narratives are not historically trustworthy we come into contact in them with Jesus' "creative personality." How can we come into contact with Jesus' "creative personality" in accounts of words which He did not speak and deeds which He did not do? Meanwhile, we are led by this remark to observe Heitmüller's point of sight. According to him though we obtain from the evangelical narratives very little knowledge about Jesus, we do obtain from them a very vital knowledge of Jesus. Not that they enable us to form a clear conception of His whole personality. We may regret this; but we may congratulate ourselves that what is most important lies within our reach—a sufficient insight into His religious character, at least in its fundamental traits. "No doubt insight into its de-

velopment is here too almost wholly denied to us, and thus we lack an important key to its full understanding. But we discover nevertheless its outlines and the chief elements of it" (p. 107). There are (apart from Jesus' acts) two sources for our knowledge of it: His words, and the religious life of the primitive Christian community, quickened by Him, from which we can argue back to the personality which inspired it (p. 108). Through these means we come into touch with the really creative thing in Jesus, which was just Himself. "The secret of His efficacy from His death on rests in His personality, which received its peculiar stamp from that extraordinary vocational consciousness, leaving all human analogies behind, which, if we regard it as sound, can be taken only as an indication that in this man a life, in peculiar measure creative—the pious man says, divine—has entered into history. Filled with life in and with God, sustained by this enigmatical consciousness, Jesus' personality has become—that is its significance—a 'power of God' from which ever new streams and surges of religious power have proceeded and proceed, the inexhaustible source of religious life, out of which Christianity still to-day draws" (p. 148).

In these few words there is compressed a brief exposition of Heitmüller's whole conception of the function of Jesus, of Heitmüller's entire "Christianity." Elsewhere he merely expands it, as, for example, thus (p. 105-6):

"The pious zeal of the dominant ecclesiastical party and the prudent calculation of the magistracy had won in the unequal conflict with the bold Galilean prophet. In the gibbet at Golgotha they had prepared an abrupt ending of the history of the Messiah Jesus. Yet at and with Golgotha this history really began: the history of Jesus in His community, which has not reached its end even to-day. And this history leaves no doubt of the answer which is to be given to the historian's question, Where the original and creative element, the effective force of the manifestation of Jesus is to be sought, in what its world-historical significance is grounded. Not in His sacrificial death on the Cross, as dogma has determined. Nor yet, as Modern opinion wishes, in His teaching or preaching, which is called by predilection, 'the Gospel.' It needs only a glance into the beginnings of the Christian community to perceive the truth. The disciples had in their enthusiasm hoped that Jesus should redeem the people Israel. Their hope was shattered by Golgotha. Like sheep who have lost their shepherd they were scattered, without guides, without hope. But in a little while we find them again in Jerusalem, at first behind closed doors, then, however, in the streets. At first they whispered it in the ear,—then, however, they proclaimed it from the housetops,—that Jesus is nevertheless the Messiah. Rapidly the little band of simple Galilean men and women became a company which was feared and persecuted and yet thus only increased. What turned these fishermen and peasants into missionaries, these fainthearted and stupidly fleeing disciples into heroes, the little community into the mustard-seed whose branches should soon shade the whole earth? What was the mark of this community? The knowledge of the preaching of Jesus? The no-doubt valuable new information on religion and ethics which it contains? Certainly not. But *the personality of Jesus*. To Him the hopes and the thought of this band attached themselves, from

Him it looked for everything in life and death; that He would come was its hopes, its prayer that He would come soon. Jesus, *He Himself*, was the power which wrought here, not some kind of knowledge or other, which He had discovered and proclaimed; not some kind of transaction or other which He had wrought. Jesus Himself is the 'Gospel.' His personality was what was new and creative, that entered into history, animated the community, and has worked itself out in humanity."

This is eloquently said, but certainly not truly. On the face of it, it was the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, not His "personality," which reanimated His overwhelmed followers. Heitmüller, by the way, has strangely little to say of Jesus' resurrection: apparently he does not consider it even worth refuting, as he refutes, say, the Virgin Birth. But he had nevertheless, immediately before the passage which has been quoted, said this: "After a short time, we see His Galilean adherents back in Jerusalem; they proclaimed that Jesus was nevertheless the Messiah, that He was risen from the dead. This however belongs no longer to the history of the 'historical Jesus,' but to that of the primitive Christian community" (p. 104). On the face of it it was not "the personality" of Jesus that conquered the world, but the glad-tidings that God was reconciling the world with Himself in Christ—a text which Heitmüller misquotes (p. 169). Paul, for example, preached not Christ *simpliciter* but Christ "as crucified." Nor was Paul the first to preach this. There is no "double Gospel" in the records of the New Testament; and it was Jesus Himself who declared that He had come to give His life a ransom for many,—a text which Heitmüller vainly strives to rob of its true content and bearing (p. 117). It is not by the influence of His "creative personality" but by His blood of the covenant which is shed for many that Jesus has redeemed the world.

These ideas of course recur in the Aarau Address, the precise purpose of which is to show that—and how—Jesus may still be the—or a—way to God. This Address begins, like a sermon, with a text; and this text is taken from the words of Philip, "Lord, show us the Father, and it sufficeth us." In Heitmüller's view (for he makes as strangely little of Sin here as of the Resurrection in the encyclopaedia Article) the one thing needful is that we should "see the Father," that is, in his sense, realize God as Father. What Jesus does is merely "to show us the Father," that is by the impression made on us by His religious personality lead us to be, like Him, religious-minded. He is not the only one who can show us the Father: there are other ways of finding God and many there be who go to Him by them. We should not lose our faith, then, even were He to vanish out of history: should He prove a mere myth, we could still find our way to the Father. But Jesus is a Way to God; and we, in our surroundings, can not only best find our way to God by Him but the loss of Him as the inspirer of our faith would be a great loss indeed.

In developing these ideas Heitmüller begins by pointing out that the starting-point in all seeking after God must be found in our hearts.

But only the starting point. We cannot attain complete, victorious certitude of God, clearness as to that which He means for us, in isolation. "Generality, paleness, indeterminateness, characterize the religious experiences which we make in ourselves, in independence. They are without blood and sap, without triumphant, compelling power, without concrete content. Content and convincing, emancipating power are received by them, they become revelation of God, *only* and *first* when they fall in with a powerful experience of God outside of us, only by contact with the stream of religious life which surrounds and flows about us" (p. 158). Now, the religious life which thus surrounds *us* is in its peculiar form Christian,—goes back to Christ as its source. "Not in all cases—that we wish to recognize—but certainly for the most part, when men meet us with living faith in God, we hear that they owe to Jesus ultimately the best that is in them" (p. 161). Thus Jesus meets us in the way and serves as the rallying point for the religious-minded. "His figure is the symbol and vehicle of all religious goods and knowledge" (p. 162). And as time has gone on the richness of this symbolism has become ever greater. Into it has been interwoven all that the later generations of the Christian community have experienced, and thus, "the traits of His figure have been deepened, the outlines of its form here and there have been altered"—there have been contributions made to it by a Paul or a Luther or a Schleiermacher—and "thus Jesus, or what men have taken and still take for Him, the source and symbol and type of the Christian community's experience of God, as a whole," becomes indirectly and mediately, through His community, the way to God for us (p. 162). This, however, is not all: throughout Christian history, Christian faith has been powerful, rich and clear in proportion as Jesus has been clearly laid hold of, and thus He has been also directly and immediately the way to God for many (p. 163). "This is certain,—we wish to say it once more: that it is in any case not necessary that for men of the present-day Jesus should be directly the guide to God, that the religious life of the individual should relate itself immediately and constantly to Jesus, be determined by Him, correct itself with reference to Him. There are other media of revelation, other ways to God. God lets Himself be found, experience of God can grow and gain power, through the community,—and indeed also through the religious life outside the community" (p. 163). But all through the Christian ages, nevertheless, "Jesus, the historical form of Jesus of Nazareth, has been the immediate way to God *for many*," and He can still be such for us. It is a mistake to think of Jesus as wholly a figure of the past. "Jesus belongs in any event also to the *present*—in His effects. In manifold reflections and radiations He reaches in His effects up to our day. And we have to deal with *that* Jesus, who in His effects can be a *part of our reality*, not with the various fragments and externalities which are no doubt important for the historian, and belong to His person, not with His several conceptions and ideas, with His view of the world and of nature and the like, but

with His entirety, His personality, His essence, with that which has worked and works" (pp. 164-165).

If we ask where we are to find this really historical Jesus, "not the symbol and vehicle of the Christian religion, but the historical form of Jesus, of course that which is operative in history,"—we must certainly say, not in the presentation of exact research. "The historian who works with the instruments and methods of exact research, and for good or evil must confine himself to them, can certainly even with the richest sources, grasp and set forth only details, particular traits, of an historical figure, not its personality. Here however we can have to do only with the indefinable, mysterious somewhat which we call personality—it is the source of the effects which proceed from a man. The personality is not, however, grasped by the instruments of exact history alone," (we beg the reader not to omit to mark that "alone"); "it is true even of the men with whom we live that we recognize and grasp their personality, their real nature, not through exact observation of details; they can be perceived only by the inner eye, intuitively understood,—*experienced*" (pp. 165-6). There is perpetrated in this representation a complete reversal of the facts of life: if anything in life is certain, it is certain that it is precisely by the intense observation of details, often no doubt done unconsciously, and by their vital synthesis that we arrive at that vivid sense of personality which moves us in others. But working on this false analogy Heitmüller proceeds. Thus also we grasp the personality of Jesus by coming into contact with Him as He has lived in history; best of all in the narratives of Scripture (though Scripture, we have been told, does not depict Him as He really was!), when read—almost a lost art nowadays—simply and at large. Thus we meet with a character to which religion is first and God is all. Gazing upon this personality, we do not acquire indeed a faith *in* the history of Jesus, but we acquire faith by *means* of the history of Jesus (p. 175). No doubt, we do not see Jesus as He was, but only as He has been interpreted to us,—by a Luther, by a Schleiermacher. "But what Paul, Augustine, Francis of Assisi, Luther, and Schleiermacher experienced by means of Jesus, and on which we also nourish ourselves, was nevertheless also an effect of the historical Jesus." "And what if now" Heitmüller proceeds to ask, "it were proven that Jesus was only the reflection and the cult-figure of a community? It has not been proven,—but even if proven, then, what comes to the individual from the history of Jesus in the Gospels—which in that case would be a history of the oldest Christian community—by means of reception of it and living into it, bears in itself its own inner necessity and truth. No doubt, among other things we must in that case refrain from relating ourselves to Jesus and by this we would lose much. Above all for the times of inward uncertainty and weakness in our life with God, we should not be able to find support in this—that this manner of experiencing God has been actually a reality in its purity and compelling power in a man. It would be

a great loss, but certainly not destructive of faith itself" (p. 176): After this clear declaration that Jesus may indeed be useful but cannot be necessary to faith ("Christian faith," mind you!) Heitmüller has little more to add except this positive declaration with which his lecture closes: "Jesus' significance is a purely one sided and limited one, and on that very account a very great and abiding one: it rests on the absolute forcibleness of His consciousness of God, which precisely for this reason makes Him the revelation of God for others, and in the apprehension of God as holiness and love. Thus He is a source of power; from which there ever proceed new waves and surges of that faith in God, the exposition and further development of which remains the task left to the exigencies and gifts of the different generations—to the Spirit who takes of the things of Jesus (Jno. xvi. 12 ff.). Our generation too has had its particular task. But we too, like all generations, may with Philip turn to Jesus with the confident request: 'Lord, show us the Father, and it sufficeth us' (pp. 177-8).

We have transcribed the argument of this lecture with perhaps unnecessary fulness, because it seems to be put forward by Heitmüller as his defence against the charge that what he teaches is "Christianity" only in name, and has nothing but the name in common with anything that has hitherto been known by that name. Clearly it offers no sufficing defence against that charge. Under the name of "Christianity" indeed, it is clear that Heitmüller teaches a religion which stands in so external a relation to Christ, that it can get along very well without Him, and appeals to Him only to enable it to do a little more easily perhaps, perhaps a little more thoroughly, what it would be quite able to do even though He never existed. Jesus is an encouragement, an incitement, an inspiration to religious endeavour: nothing more. Obviously this has nothing but the name in common with the Christianity which sees in Jesus Christ not merely a revelation of God as Father, but the reconciliation of God to sinful man. Here as von Schenck truly says are not two varieties of "Christianity," but two different religions and the only question is, which of these two religions is Christianity. We know which is the Christianity of Jesus, of Paul, of all the New Testament writers, who all alike present Christ as offering in His blood a ransom for the sins of the world. This is not the "Christianity" of Heitmüller. We cannot profess to be of both parties here. They stand in crass contrariety to one another and we must choose between them; and choosing between them, we must frankly declare of which of these two religions we are.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

Alexandre Vinet. Histoire de sa vie et de ses ouvrages. Par E. RAMBERT. Quatrième édition, illustrée et augmenté d'une préface et de notes par Ph. BRIDEL. Lausanne: Georges Bridel & C^{ie} Éditeurs. 1912. 8vo; pp. xvi, 640.

The first and second editions of this standard biography of Vinet by Rambert appeared in 1875, the third, containing only a few minor changes, in 1876. Since that time a considerable number of volumes and magazine articles concerning Vinet's life and the wide and varied influence of his works have been published, among the most notable being Pressensé's *Vinet d'après sa correspondance inédite avec Luttheroth* (Paris, 1891), containing many valuable letters to which Rambert had not had access.

The present edition leaves the last revision by the original author unaltered, but offers in the form of additional footnotes and several appendices a wealth of valuable biographical details concerning the leading contemporaries of Vinet referred to in the body of the work, together with a number of important corrections to be made in the former texts.

In its new form this biography may justly be regarded as an adequate treatment of its distinguished subject. The copious use of Vinet's own diary gives us a vivid picture not only of his domestic life, so blessed yet so full of trials, but also of his intellectual struggles, his professional labors, his literary plans and achievements, and his engagingly sincere and humble piety. His letters, too, are skillfully introduced to disclose his slow but steady development into the mighty "initiateur religieux" that he became. His services as a teacher, critic and historian of the French language and literature are fully set forth, as is likewise his influence in securing the separation of church and state in his native land. Critical estimates are furnished of the most important of his varied writings—his lyric, patriotic and religious verses, his works in literary criticism, his philosophical, dogmatic and ethical dissertations, his articles on the nature and constitution of the church—but not of his numerous posthumous publications. Owing much, in the formative period of his religious development, to Thomas Erskine of Scotland, and in his later philosophical attainments to Kant, he felt himself most powerfully drawn to the Frenchman Pascal: and like Pascal he has exerted his characteristic and most potent influence not by means of a well wrought out system of ideas but rather through the suggestive treatment of a number of seed-thoughts which were bound to bear fruit in the soil in which he planted them.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Zwingli und Calvin. VON AUGUST LANG. Mit 161 Abbildungen, darunter zwei mehrfarbigen Einschaltbildern. 1913. Bielefeld und Leipzig: Verlag von Velhagen & Klasing. 8vo; pp. 152. 4 M.

This is the thirty-first volume in Heych's *Monographien zur Weltgeschichte*. In its external features this book, like the rest in the series, presents, in spite of its low cost, a high standard of artistic excellence. The beautiful illustrations, reproducing practically all the available contemporary pictures directly pertaining to the two reformers and their most intimate friends and fellow-laborers, add immensely to the reader's interest in the biographical sketches.

The author, the well known Professor Lang of Halle, has succeeded in giving within the compass of a hundred and fifty pages an admirable characterization of Zwingli and Calvin in their relations to the great movements of thought and life in the stirring period of the early Reformation. The treatment of both heroes is comprehensive in spite of its conciseness, and every page shows the firm touch, the broad strokes, and the delicate shading of a master hand. Special attention is devoted to the formative influences in the development of the two leaders. Important passages from the sources are cited, though commonly no mention is made of the places from which the extracts are taken. Here and there—as in statements of the extent of Zwingli's indebtedness to Luther and Calvin's to Bucer—one desires a fuller presentation of the evidence. The discussion of the doctrinal peculiarities of the reformers is necessarily rather limited, but readers who are specially interested in this phase of the subject will be grateful for a number of summary statements that will commend themselves by reason of their incisiveness and their fairness. The representation of Calvin's personality, and the estimate of his services to the church and the world reflect the more favorable judgments in these matters which the monumental work of Doumergue has secured.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Triumphes de l'Evangile, ou l'histoire des souffrances, lutttes et victoires de l'église évangélique de France. Par HENRI FLIEDNER, un descendant des Huguenots, Nouvelle édition. Genève: J. H. Jeheber, Libraire-Editeur. 12mo; pp. 64.

This is a brief popular sketch, adorned with some thirty illustrations, of the external fortunes of the Reformed church in France from Calvin to the Revolution. The massacres of St. Bartholomew's, the cruelties perpetrated by the dragonades under Louis XIV, the devastations in the Cévennes, and the tortures inflicted upon the galley slaves and the prisoners in the dungeons are graphically portrayed as illustrations of the invincible power of the pure evangelical religion. Special sections are devoted to the labors of Antoine Court and Paul Rabaut. Neither Rousseau, nor Voltaire, nor the pope—concludes the author—but Christ alone can make France free.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Authoritative Life of General William Booth, Founder of the Salvation Army. By G. S. RAILTON, First Commissioner to General Booth. With a Preface by General Bramwell Booth. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1912. 12mo; pp. 331. \$1.00 net.

In a plain, straightforward style, quite devoid of excessive eulogy, the author sets forth the outstanding facts in the career of one of the most extraordinary and one of the best loved men of the last century. Doubtless the book will find eager and grateful readers in almost all

parts of the world. Made up in large measure of extracts from sermons, addresses, letters and official communications by "General" Booth, the narrative gives an excellent insight into his character and a fair basis for a proper estimate of his achievements as an evangelist and social reformer. One cannot peruse to its close this story of decades of noblest spiritual and philanthropic service in behalf of so many thousands of earth's unfortunates, without being forced to the conclusion that whatever may be the future of his "Army," Booth himself was one of the mightiest as well as noblest leaders of men whom England has given to the modern world.

Of special interest to many readers will be the chapters on the "financial system" the "organization," and the "spirit" of the Army.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell. In two volumes. Volume I: Autobiography of George Tyrrell, 1861-1884; arranged, with supplements, by M. D. PETRE. Illustrated. Second Impression. 8vo; pp. xvi, 280. Volume II: Life of George Tyrrell from 1884 to 1909, by M. D. PETRE. Illustrated. Second Impression. 8vo; pp. xii, 512. Index. London: Edward Arnold, 1912.

Those readers of George Tyrrell's writings (we confess ourselves among them) who have found them, despite their superficial brilliancy of style, neither an unalloyed pleasure nor particularly instructive,—who have felt in them a smooth hardness of surface beneath which it was difficult for interest to penetrate, and have been offended by their frequent inconsequences in argument, ambiguities of phrase, and general air of irresponsibility and wrongheadedness,—will be agreeably surprised when they open the pages of his autobiography. Here is a genuine human document of the highest interest, in which the note of sincerity rings with unmistakable clearness. We shall not, with Miss Petre, compare it with Augustine's *Confessions*: if it is self-accusatory like it, rather than self-justifying like Newman's *Apologia*, this may suggest to us Rousseau rather than Augustine as the type of its class. The real theme of Augustine is not himself, but the grace of God, which has rescued him from himself to the praise of Its own glory. This note is as far as possible from that struck by Tyrrell, who writes throughout in a minor key and seems to wish to be taken at the foot of the letter when he calls the life which he surveys, in words borrowed from the Curé d'Ars, a *pauvre vie*. Whatever he may have come to think of it later, whatever he may have been able to make of it during the short eight years that remained to it—and opinions may lawfully differ as to this,—when, at the age of forty (1901; he lived until 1909), he looks back over the course of his life thus far, the legend he writes over it is, Failure.

The Autobiography to our regret does not cover these forty years. It breaks off in the midst of them, when at the age of twenty-three he had just finished his scholastic course in the Jesuit schools, or, to date the epoch by an event which was much more significant to the

growth of his inner self, at the death of his mother. As disillusionment grew upon him what seems to have driven the iron most deeply into his soul was the intolerable thought, which at this moment seems naturally to have been most acute, that he had scouted those "God-given natural affections" which, says he bitterly, "even Jesuit asceticism can never wholly uproot". "Well I remember my last day at home," he writes in a passage which must be well nigh unique in the literature of regret, from the suppressed poignancy of feeling which it expresses, "my last day with those two now 'hid in death's endless night', who were my 'share of the world', the best this life has had for me; whom I forsook—for what? in the name of all that is sane and reasonable? For a craze; an idea, a fanaticism? or for a love of and zeal for the truth, the Kingdom of God, the good of mankind? Looking back on this crooked, selfish, untruthful past, is it more antecedently likely that my motive was interested or disinterested; pure or impure; truth or illusion? Can evil be the path of good? Had I been faithful to duty all along; had I worked hard at school and after; had I left aside problems that really did not concern me; had I stayed at home and supported my mother and sister, and made their sad, narrow lives a little wider and brighter, would not God have given me light had it been needful for my salvation? would not my chances of salvation have been better than they are now? Have I done so much good to others, who had no claim on me, as to atone for my neglect of those who had every claim? What have I given up or forsaken for the service of God, as I suppose some would call it, except my plain duty? These are the pleasant doubts which fill my mind at spare moments, and make me say, surely I have lived in vain!" "Perhaps," he writes again, seeking some alleviation for his sorrow,—“perhaps, had I stayed at home, instead of going on this wild-goose chase after abstractions and ideals, I might have made common what has remained sacred; I might have worn down an affection which separation fomented; I might have broken those hearts whose love was everything to me, and to which my love was everything. That is my faint hope and the salve of my conscience, when I think, with bitterness, how I abandoned the life of affection for the service of so barren a mistress as Truth, and let the substance of life escape me in the pursuit of shadows.”

No doubt there are elements even in these pathetic words which will strike a Protestant reader as not quite pure; there is too great an engrossment with personal salvation and too little simple trust in the wide mercy of God and too little appreciation of the relative value of the simple virtues. But no one can read such words without perceiving that in them there sounds the cry of a genuine heart which has awakened to a real sense of its own shortcomings. Perhaps the growing bitterness of those seventeen years of gradual disillusionment, from the death of his mother to his open break with the Society of Jesus, was too great to have been set down by so vivid a pen in autobiographical record; and it may be that we need not deplore too

deeply the sudden cessation of the autobiography at this point. As it stands it gives us a singularly searching account of the soul-history of a gifted but wayward boy from infancy up to his finding of his life-work. What is most impressive in it is what we may call its element of drift; for step by step Tyrrell appears to drift along into this and then into that attitude and action, until, almost despite himself, certainly not as the result of any profound movement of spirit, compelling action, he finds himself a fully trained Jesuit priest. He has not spared himself in the successive portraits he draws of himself in his progress; indeed in this respect his *Autobiography* may claim kinship with Augustine's *Confessions*—that, from his later standpoint, he seems to have painted his youthful follies in unnecessarily black hues. But through it all he manages to present to the reader's view an engaging personality, and we rise from his account of his ill regulated life with a positive affection for him—a tolerant appreciation of his character and gifts such as we should never have derived from his writings. The attractiveness of his *Autobiography* was probably enhanced to the present writer by the circumstance that it was read in conjunction with another autobiographical account of a conversion to Rome, which presents some superficial resemblances to it, notably in the apparent lack of enthusiasm lying behind and dictating so great a step. We refer to Monsignor Robert Hugh Benson's *Confessions of a Convert* (Longmans, Green & Co. 1913). Father Benson also brings before us an interesting personality; and we are far from saying that his account of how he became a Romanist is without value. But Father Tyrrell, as Father Benson does not succeed in doing, lets us live with him his life and see into his heart; we feel when we have read his *Autobiography* that we know him and, despite many unlovely qualities, we feel that he is at bottom loveable.

Miss Petre asks our sympathy with her as she undertakes to continue, for the twenty-five years of active life, the history for which Tyrrell has provided in his *Autobiography* so vivid a commencement. She scarcely needs it. Of course the tone of the presentation is changed. Tyrrell wrote in a mood of self-accusation: Miss Petre naturally writes from the point of view of an admirer. But so large and skilful a use has she made of Tyrrell's own accounts of himself—in "many letters and a few documents"—that we feel that in her pages we have what has almost the quality of an appreciative *Autobiography*. In particular, the whole course of Tyrrell's troubles with the Society of Jesus, of his rupture with it, of his suspension, of his excommunication, is traced in great detail, and obviously with equal fairness. The uncertainties of Tyrrell's temper, the changeableness of his moods, his steady drift to ever more radical positions are not glozed. But the sound heart of the man is kept steadily in sight. It belonged to the infelicities of his position as a member of the Society of Jesus and of the Church of Rome, that he should not be always quite able to separate between the revolt of his spirit against the ecclesiasticism by which he felt oppressed and the increasing departure of his thought

from fundamental Christianity. But it was not merely from the Society of Jesus or from Rome that he drifted.

How far he drifted, what was the actual position which in the end he occupied, it is not easy to determine with precision. We have of course in *Christianity at the Cross-Roads* a notable document. But even it is not free from that curious tendency to cling to the husk while discarding the kernel which characterized all his later life. Of course he had drifted away from everything distinctively Romish. "Needless to say" he could write at the end of 1908, "that I entirely deny the ecumenical authority of the exclusively Western Councils of Trent and the Vatican, and the whole mediaeval development of the Papacy so far as claiming more than a primacy of honor for the Bishop of Rome." If this had been all, what reasonable person could reproach him? But unfortunately he seems to have drifted equally away from everything distinctively Christian. When he writes in *Mediaevalism*:—"All that the fathers of the Church have said as to the inerrancy of the General Councils and of sacred tradition is as nothing to what they have said as to the inerrancy of those classical pages of tradition which we call the Bible; with all due deference to the Biblical Commission and the Holy Office, the hard and fast mechanical view of Scriptural inerrancy has yielded for ever to a much looser, more fluent and dynamic view of inspiration",—he is merely using the euphemisms of his class and really means to intimate that all authority has departed from the Christian Scriptures. "The walls of the Gospel," comments Miss Petre on his attitude in such matters, "could not shelter him from questions of ultimate value any more than the walls of the church" (II, p. 352). At the end (Feb. 20, 1909), this seems the position to which he had come: "Houtin and Loisy are right, the Christianity of the future will consist of mysticism and charity, and possibly the Eucharist in its primitive form as the outward bond: I desire no better." And even of mysticism he did not feel so very sure. "Mystics think," he writes Aug. 23, 1908, "they touch the divine when they have only blurred the human form in a cloud of words. The best mysticism is to submit to the limitation *consciously*; to realize that our best God is but an idol, a temple made with hands in which the Divine will as little be confined as in our Hell-Purgatory-Heaven (*rez-de-chaussée; entre-sol; premier-étage*) schematization." Miss Petre labors to save him some rags of Christianity's torn and bedraggled garment to cover the nakedness of his ultimate religious attitude withal (II. pp. 398 *e.g.*). We hope she is right. Perhaps he spoke more skeptically in the letters than he would have done in more considered writing: but certainly in his latest letters he gives us not obscurely to understand that he had left to him only a human Christ and a shadowy God and an ethics which was the mere expression of "the growing soul and conscience of humanity".

After all, however, the portrait of Tyrrell drawn in Miss Petre's narrative is from the personal point of view an engaging one. It was not easy to maintain an engaging personality through the dreadful

experiences of the loss of faith through which he was called upon to go. We have tried to point out how exceptionally engaging his personality manifested itself through his change of faith from Protestantism to Catholicism by comparing favorably his Autobiographical account with the *Confessions* of even so notably attractive a personality as that of Monsignor Benson. We may employ a like comparison here. We have had given us lately a voluminous account of his desertion of the Jesuits and lapse into much the same form of "liberal" faith as that to which Tyrrell drifted, by another man of notable quality. We refer to Count Paul von Hoensbroeck's *Fourteen Years a Jesuit* (1911). He tells us that to him Christianity came to be summed up in the words, "I am God's child and God is my Father," and Christ became only the man who has made the fatherhood of God known to us. Let those who would appreciate the essential sweetness of Tyrrell's disposition, and the unusual elevation of his mind, simply compare the two books.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

Alexander Henderson the Covenanter. By JAMES PRINGLE THOMSON, M.A., with a Foreword by Lord Balfour of Burleigh. Edinburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson and Ferrier. 1912. 12mo; pp. 160.

Mr. Pringle Thomson is quite right in supposing that no apology need be made for the appearance of a new sketch of the life of Alexander Henderson. Knox, Melville, Henderson,—under these three names the history of the Scottish Church, and of the Scottish people, for a hundred years of greatness may be written. Mr. Pringle Thomson's admiration for Henderson's high character and qualities leaves little to be desired, though his sympathy with the causes for which he wrought is imperfect. His narrative suffers a little from being neither quite a history of Henderson's times nor purely a personal biography of Henderson. The events in which Henderson took part are notified, rather than the man himself portrayed; and the events described are rather too sharply separated from the total movement of the times to be perfectly lucid to the incompletely informed reader. The story, however, is told straightforwardly and the book will help to keep alive the memory of "the genius of the second Reformation in Scotland," as Mr. Pringle Thomson calls him.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The Last Days of John Knox. By His Faithful Servitor, RICHARD BANNATYNE. With Notes by D. HAY FLEMING, LL.D. Edinburgh: The Knox Club. 1913. 8vo; pp. 23 (Knox Club Publications, No. 35).

"It has been said," remarks Dr. Hay Fleming in his brief Prefatory Note, "that no man is a hero to his valet; but every rule has its exceptions; and, to Bannatyne, Knox was a hero, a prophet, and a Christian statesman." What Bannatyne himself calls him is, "this man of God,

the light of Scotland, the comfort of the Kirk within the same, the mirror of godliness, and pattern and example to all true ministers in purity of life, soundness in doctrine, and in boldness in reproving of wickedness." Of Bannatyne's true reverence for Knox we could have no better proof than that which is afforded by this touching narrative of his last days; and the narrative is valuable as enabling us to see how in his weakness a great Christian can remain great. It is well that such a narrative should be given the wider circulation which its issue among the publications of the Knox Club insures for it. The Prefatory Note and the accompanying Notes afford all the help to understanding it that it requires.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

Hepburn of Japan. By WILLIAM ELLIOT GRIFFIS, D.D., L.H.D. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 238. \$1.50.

It is given to few men to render to the world a service of such wide influence as that of the pioneer missionary to Japan whose life is related in this interesting volume. At twenty-six Doctor Hepburn began work at Singapore, at twenty-eight he was located in China, at forty-four he began the chief labors of his life in Japan, at seventy-seven he finally returned to America, and before the close of his career enjoyed nearly twenty added years of rest and multiplied honors among his friends in the home land. The great achievements of his thirty-three years residence in Japan include his introduction of medical science into the Island Empire, his production of the great Japanese-English lexicon, the translation of the Bible into Japanese, the establishment of Ferris Seminary, and of the Meiji Gaku-in, or College and Theological school, which he served for years as president. The full title of this biography "Hepburn of Japan and His Wife and Helpmates, A Life Story of Toil for Christ," suggests the scope and purpose of the volume, and intimates the merited meed of praise which is given to Mrs. Hepburn, and also to their fellow workers in the various fields of their endeavor. The author was well equipped for his work both by his long residence in Japan and also by his peculiarly intimate relation with the great missionary whose life he here outlines with so much of appreciation and discrimination and sympathy. No one can understand the full story of the development of modern Japan without some such definite knowledge of the life and work of Doctor Hepburn as this sketch embodies.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

Mystik und geschichtliche Religion. Eine systematische Untersuchung von WILHELM FRESenius, Lic. theol. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1912. 8vo; pp. [2], 101. Index.

Licentiate Fresenius is an admiring pupil of W. Herrmann, and has

written this little book apparently for the purpose of defending the so-called "historical" conception of religion, held by Herrmann in common with his fellow Ritschlians, against the "mystical" conception of religion which is now again becoming very wide-spread. According to this so-called "historical" conception of it, religion is not a native possession of the human soul; it is something which meets man in the course of the process of living. It is an experience—an *Erlebnis*, something that occurs to him—which some day befalls him—*begegnet*, encounters him—when he finds himself face to face with goodness manifested in a personal life with such power that he cannot choose but utterly surrender himself to it. Religion is thus a fact which occurs in a human life, a transaction, a transaction of the man's own; yet it is rather produced in him than by him—through the might of the goodness revealed to his observation. "A man cannot make religion for himself; nor can he acquire it by labours or performances of any kind whatsoever,—he can neither earn it by works nor excogitate it by brooding. It has always itself laid claim to be a gift of God to man. Therefore, the only path to religion lies in observing and marking the experiences of our own life, if perchance there may speak to us in them a power of love and goodness which we cannot withstand. Experiences arise in our own life, however, only in our commerce with other men, with personalities in whom we are able to put trust, that is, from whom we receive the impression that they have risen above purely instinctive life to personal being. By their means we are turned to that which raised them out of their nothingness. We Christians accordingly speak of the Christian community as that with the existence, vitality and historical power of which the possibility of religious life is for us indissolubly bound up. And it is therefore that we designate religion, because it is attached to human intercourse and its historical, personal root, as historical religion" (p. 64). Religion, in this view, therefore arises in the soul of man in particular conditions of time and space, under influences brought to bear upon him from without—under the influences, to the more specific, of other personalities which impress him as good. In the formal definitions which Fresenius frames (p. 63): "Religion is the experience which the morally thinking man makes, when the power of the good so encounters him that he must surrender himself to it utterly"; and (p. 65) "the Christian religion is the experience which the morally thinking man makes of the Person of Jesus, when the power of the good so encounters him in it, that he must surrender himself to it utterly."

With this conception of religion as evoked in man by a quite specific experience, which comes to him from without, the mystical contention that we must look within ourselves to find God stands obviously in direct contradiction. "It is the characteristic of all Mysticism," Fresenius remarks in bringing this contradiction to view, "that it maintains the immediate presence of divine life in man, which needs only to be recognized and felt—and it is therefore that in

all mysticism it is contemplation which self-evidently forms the best way to God—while historical religion has always presented itself as the *new* life, which comes into being by the action of person on person and is not already (even though hiddenly) present in man" (pp. 50-51). It is not strange therefore that Fresenius looks with alarm upon the irruption of mystical ideas which seems at present in progress and posits the problem which is raised by this irruption in such phrases as these—"whether we are to be saved from the religious exigencies of our day by giving our attention to historical religion, to the Gospel of Jesus as the Reformers understood it, or by sinking ourselves into the feeling of infinity and by speculatively contemplating that which lives in our souls by nature" (p. 54). For Fresenius emphasizes that what the Mystic finds in the soul is merely its natural endowment. "We have heard religion—or rather its mystical form—," he says, "compared with the contemplation of nature and art; what we experience and feel in the enjoyment of nature, in gazing on a beautiful painting, in listening to a symphony by a master, that—so we have been told—is essentially related to religion, or rather is religion's self, because it is the apprehension and feeling of the eternal and imperishable. But just as surely as the enjoyment of nature and art can evoke mysticism, just so surely is the infinite which is felt in it not the God of religion. For Christian piety at least, God is not the Eternal, Imperishable which we feel, but the Power for Good which comes into contact with us, above time and eternity, in the personalities who evoke confidence (*Zutrauen*) in us,—which Power is not maintained by us to be God, but manifests itself to us as God. Where, however, God is sought and found in indefinite feelings, in experiences of the infinite, there He is nothing but a name for the unknown and incomprehensible which arouses that feeling. Man then humbles himself before a power which he does not know, but which, if he will not give himself the lie, he postulates, and from which he then, since he cannot get along without them, arbitrarily forms conceptions—which perhaps, however are actually derived from historical religion" (p. 82).

Obviously the debate between the Ritschlian, as represented by Fresenius, and the Mystic turns primarily upon the question of what, when the Mystic sinks himself into himself, he finds there. The Mystic says he finds God. The Ritschlian says he finds nothing but an indefinite and indefinable feeling of the infinite which he arbitrarily dubs God. This question at once, however, passes into another: the question of the conception of God. To the Mystic, Fresenius intimates, God is simply Immensity; to the Ritschlian He is the Good: to the former therefore He is a mere thing, to the latter He is a Person,—for when we say "good" we say Person. As over against all Mystical phantasies, therefore, the Ritschlian stands for "the personal God, who drawing near to us in religious experience, calls us to ethical, personal life" (p. 88). This great transaction takes place, of course, at a given point of time and thus the Ritschlian stands for

what he calls "historical religion." "Thus over against *historical* religion which springs out of personal life-experiences in the social organism there stands history-less Mysticism which forgets the social organism in arbitrarily produced feelings and phantasies" (p. 89). That the contradiction of these conceptions may be felt in its full force, however, the phenomenism which rules the Ritschlian conception must be borne in mind. To this phenomenism Fresenius manages to advert even in this brochure (p. 73), speaking with some contempt of the old Lutheran dogmatists who still believe in a substantial soul (it is "the thing in itself" he remarks in parenthesis) and, over against this human soul, in a substantial God. As they did not find the real nature of man in his activities, he complains, so they did not find God "in particular activities, in historical acts and personal operations" but postulated a somewhat behind these activities of which they endeavored to frame some conception and which they sought afterwards to bring somehow into connection with historical facts. For the "soul" of man he would substitute a series of activities under the conception of "Life" (*Leben*), and correspondingly for the substantial God he would substitute a series of activities also known as "Life" (*Leben*). And as God consists only in His activities, of course He can be known only in His activities, and it is idle to seek Him as lying inert in the human heart.

It certainly were hard choosing between two such one sided conceptions of God—a God who is bare Immensity (or "Reality" as it is the irritating habit of the Mystics to call Him), or a God who is bare Activity. Fortunately we are shut up to no such option. Nor can the question of what may be found in the human soul be thought to be closed by the unfortunate fact that many of those who have turned their contemplation in upon it have found there apparently nothing but a vague sense of immensity. There are mystics and mystics. Indeed Fresenius, as he addresses himself to the study of mysticism and the possibility of there being a mystical element in religion is oppressed no more by the multitude of the mystics who require to be taken account of than by the immense variety of definitions of mysticism which claim attention. *Quot homines, tot sententiae*. To ease his task Fresenius selects three recent writers of importance, whom he considers fair representatives of divergent types of Mystical thought and endeavors to derive from a study of them a working notion of what Mysticism stands for at the moment at least. These are Friedrich von Hügel, Nathan Söderblom, and Georg Klepl. To the first of these thinkers "Mysticism is the specifically Catholic ideal of piety" (p. 10); to the second, it is "the essential content of Christianity, and that precisely of Protestant Christianity" (p. 28); to the third (he does not employ the term) it is the abiding basis of all possible religion in these sophisticated times. As the result of his induction Fresenius strangely arrives at the conclusion that, as a phenomenon in the Christian Church at least, Mysticism is distinctively Catholic or at least Catholicizing. He had no doubt thrown Söderblom

out of consideration, somewhat arbitrarily one would think, because of his identification of mysticism with the general supernatural element in Christianity. But one would suppose that Klep¹—who does not, however, consider himself a Mystic—was as far as possible from a Catholicizing conception of religion.

The truth seems to be that Fresenius has not in the end been able to emancipate himself from his traditional Ritschlian conception here. Ritschl, Harnack, Herrmann are cited in support of his finding (p. 85) and the volume closes with a quotation from the well-known pages of Harnack's *History of Dogma* (E.T. Vol. vi. p. 99) in which he warns Evangelical Christians off from too complete a sympathy with Mysticism—merely because of their delight in the warm spiritual life which it exhibits—on the ground that it is essentially Catholic and cannot be Protestantized. Despite so great an array of authority we cannot help thinking this finding a mistake. The Evangelical Christian may be well put on his guard against Mysticism—to which he cannot unreservedly give himself, as Harnack truly observes, "if he has made clear to himself what evangelical faith is"; and no doubt the legalism and formalism of the Romish teaching have ever been powerful contributory causes to the production of Mysticism in the Catholic Church. But it finds its impelling cause clearly elsewhere and therefore it is not even exclusively an intra-Christian phenomenon. We can scarcely deny the name of Mystic to Plotinus or Jaláda 'd 'Din, to Greek or Persian, Muslim or Hindu saint. In the actual definition of Mysticism to which Fresenius comes, if it be considered merely as a definition of Mysticism within the limits of the Catholic Church we may nevertheless find our way. "Mysticism," says he, "is the ideal of piety which is necessarily formed on the basis of a legalistic, Catholic or Catholicizing conception of religion, by men, weary of the burden of ecclesiastical tradition and cold formalism, which seek after a personal experience and assurance of faith, and, utilizing religious tradition and customs as means to their end, find the goal of their search in an indefinite and indefinable feeling of the eternal which is arbitrarily maintained to be God" (p. 83-84). *Mutatis mutandis* the same might be said for Mysticism in the Protestant Churches, or for Mysticism among the Mohammedans or the Hindus. Everywhere Mysticism avails itself of the forms of religion and the theological formulas under which it grows up as means: everywhere it lays hold of the sense of the immense and the eternal which it finds in the soul. It remains still a question, however, whether its discovery of God through this feeling of the immense and the eternal is altogether arbitrary.

To go at once to the root of the matter, what Mysticism really is, is, at bottom, just natural religion. That its form has been given it so prevailingly—perhaps we ought to say, constantly—by the influence of Pantheizing thought may be treated here as accidental; though it must be confessed that it has much the look, historically, of an essential characteristic, in which case we should have to define Mysticism as pantheizing natural religion. Meanwhile we are not to be driven or

tempted from the position that men are by nature religious and will in any event have a religion; that there has been ineradicably implanted in them a *sensus deitatis* (as Calvin has taught us to call it) which inevitably becomes a *semen religionis*. Fresenius himself is compelled to allow the presence in man of "a religious disposition, or an inborn religious capacity" which provides the psychological possibility of religion (p. 60); and he freely admits that this "capacity for religion" has enabled multitudes to become actually religious under influences wholly unknown to us (p. 16). His contention only is that it must be called into action by influences coming from without and of a personal-ethical kind: it never, according to him, functions independently so as to produce religion. The Mystic, on the contrary, insists that it normally effloresces into actual religion whenever opportunity is given it to function. The difference here is fundamental and rests on divergent ontologies. If it be reduced to the single question of whether God approaches man only from without, through the medium of other personalities acting upon him by the way of a so-called "ethical" appeal; or rather Himself forms a part of man's spiritual environment in contact with Whom man exists and of Whom he has immediate experience, we must pronounce the Mystic certainly in the right. And this we may surely do without prejudice to complete rejection of the entire Pantheizing coloring of the common (or shall we say constant?) Mystical presentation. The mischief of Mysticism lies not in its claim to find God through the ineradicable natural instincts of the soul but in its persistent effort, being natural religion, to substitute itself for supernatural religion, that is to say, for Christianity. The relation of Christianity to natural religion seems to be very frequently, we might even say commonly, misconceived. They are not two religions, lying side by side of one another, of which one must be taken and the other left: whether with the Ritschlian we take Christianity (or rather, what they mistake for Christianity) and leave natural religion, or with the Mystics we take natural religion and leave Christianity. As what is called special revelation is superinduced upon and presupposes what is called general revelation, and these two form one whole, so Christianity is superinduced upon and presupposes natural religion and forms with it the one whole which is the only sufficing religion for sinful man. Although Mysticism is not Christianity, therefore, Christianity is mysticism. There are multitudes of Mystics who are not Christians, but there is no Christian who is not a mystic,—who does not hold communion with God in his soul, and that not merely as the God of grace by virtue of whose recreative operations he is a Christian, but as the God of nature by virtue of whose creative, upholding and governing operations he is a creature. We may or may not be able to make out a historical claim to the name of Mysticism to express this Christian mysticism the name may be preëmpted by something essentially different and any attempt to rescue it to this nobler usage may be productive only of confusion. We may think it futile to distinguish as has often been attempted (von Hügel quotes the distinction from Rauwenhoff, as

Charles Hodge quoted it from Nietzsche) between *Mystik* and *Mysticismus*, as designations respectively of the "white" and the "black" Mysticism. But the name apart, the thing lies at the very foundation of the Christian religion: there is no Christian religion where there is no inward communion with God.

As Christianity is mysticism without being Mysticism, so also is it a historical religion without being "Historical Religion" in the sense of Fresenius and his school. In calling religion "historical" Fresenius and his school mean nothing more than that its origin in every individual case is to be sought and found not in some innate disposition of the man but "in his own history," that is, as he explains (p. 21), "in the experiences of his life, in the effects of living personalities, in occurrences which can maintain their right before his clear ethical judgment." Their minds are not at all on the great historical occurrences by which the God of Grace, has intervened in the sinful development of the race by redemptive acts,—the incarnation, the atonement, the outpouring of the Holy Ghost—but merely on the life experience of the individual man, in the course of which, they affirm, religion is brought to him as one item in the temporal series of his experiences. Of the great redemptive acts of God by which Christianity is constituted and by virtue of which, lying at its heart, it is a "historical religion" they will know as little as the Mystic himself. To them, too, all religion, inclusive of Christianity, as a, or the, religion, is independent of all occurrences of the past and is purely a present experience of man. They differ with the Mystic here only in making it an experience, not of man's native life of feeling, but of his presently acting ethical will.

When remarking on this matter Fresenius carefully explains that "the deepest difference" between von Hügel the Mystic and Herrmann, the advocate of "historical religion," "lies here in this: that Hügel seeks to assign its place in the soul-life of man to religion as a given entity (psychological method), while Herrmann exhibits its origin in the spiritual ethical life of man and establishes it as a power which works from person to person and is therefore historical (historical, systematic method)" (p. 21). So eager is he not to be misunderstood, by the use of the term "historical" here to imply some recognition of the historical elements of Christianity as that term is ordinarily understood, that he attaches a note to the word to explain that he, like Wobbermin (*ZThK.* 1911), distinguishes between the two German terms *geschichtlich* and *historisch* and applies only the former, but never the latter, to his Christianity. To him Christianity has ceased to be a "historical" (*historische*) religion and the "faith" which he calls by that name is absolutely independent of all "historical" (*historische*) facts. This includes even the fact of Jesus. We must not be misled here by the place which "the Person of Jesus" holds in the "Christianity" of Herrmann and of course also in that of his pupil Fresenius. Fresenius has been at pains to explain to us that it is the *geschichtliche* Jesus, not the *historische* Jesus, that is here in question. It is a matter of indifference to him and all those of his way of thinking

whether there ever existed any *historische* Jesus: all that is important is that we shall have a genuine "experience" of Jesus, that He should come to us *geschichtlich*, that is, in a real encounter with our soul. This constitutes Him to us the point of inspiration needed to awaken us to religious life and it is indifferent to us whether He really ever lived on earth (*ZThK.* 1912, pp. 244-268.) Not merely have the incarnation, the atonement, the outpouring of the Spirit—all the redemptive acts of God—gone; the "historical Jesus" may go too. On no fact of the past whatever can Christianity rest: it is purely for each man an experience of his own.

Certainly no Mystic could cut himself more completely loose from the historical elements of Christianity than is done here. And, by virtue of the fact that all that makes Christianity that specific religion which we call Christianity lies precisely in these historical elements, the neglect or rejection of them is the rejection of Christianity. The whole life work of Herrmann may have been to show how a man of our day may still be a Christian; but unfortunately he has done this by adapting what he calls Christianity to the point of view of the "man of our day," and the outcome is that he solves the problem by dissolving Christianity. The "historical religion" which Fresenius offers us is therefore no more Christianity than the Mysticism of the most extreme of the Mystics, and brings us not a single step closer than it to a real Christianity. Of course if the whole difference between Mysticism and "historical religion" were reduced to the single question of whether Christianity is the product of the native religious sentiment or comes to man from without and is embraced by an act of his own ethical will, we should have unhesitatingly to give the right to "historical religion." We have not had to wait for the Ritschlian school to learn that faith comes by hearing; or that as believing implies hearing so hearing implies a preacher. By virtue of the very circumstance that Christianity is a historical religion and is rooted in facts which have occurred in the world and through which the redemption which has come into the world has been wrought out, it must be communicated. And nothing is more sure than that there can be no Christianity apart from the working upon the heart of these historical facts as proclaimed, appreciated and embraced in confident faith. The action of the ethical will in laying hold upon the Saving Christ is of the essence of Christianity and there is no Christianity without it.

What Fresenius brings into contrast in his discussion is, then, merely two extremely one-sided conceptions of religion: the religion of the mere feelings and the religion of the bare ethical will. Neither has any claim to the name of Christianity. For Christianity is a historical religion and neither of these conceptions of religion has any essential connection with history. The religion of the mere ethical will is just as purely a merely natural religion as is the religion of the mere feelings. The Christian may therefore stand by and watch the conflict of these standpoints with interest indeed but without concern. Each tendency—"Mysticism," "Historical Religion,"—is engaged in validat-

ing elements of the religious life, which enter into and find their due place in Christianity. But not only is each fatally one-sided in its exclusive insistence upon its own element of religious experience, but both in combination fall far short of even a complete account of natural religion; and neither has any place whatever in its system of thought for that supernatural religion which alone can avail for the needs of sinful men. The problem which presses on us is not whether, in the religious conflicts of our time, we should turn for rest and peace to "Mysticism" or to "Historical Religion"—to the religion of the feelings or to the religion of the ethical will: but whether there is not some more comprehensive religion which will take up into itself and engage the whole man, intellect, sensibility and will alike, and meeting him in his actual condition of weakness and corruption and guilt, rescue him from his lost state and renew him in all the elements of his being, to present him to God a new man. After all said Christianity remains the only religion which meets the case.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

The Church of To-morrow. By JOSEPH HENRY CROOKER. Boston: The Pilgrim Press. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 272. \$1.00 net.

Here is a serious endeavor to set forth what the Church must be in order to fulfill its supremely important task. The author is in no personal danger of incurring the stigma of being a Calvinist, a Trinitarian, or possibly a Christian. His suggestions relative to Christianity are in fact the vital defect of the book. He has much to say in reference to the dignity of man, but makes no intimation of the deity of Christ. For example, when declaring of the church that "Its great task is to reveal man to himself as the Son of God and open within him the deep and everlasting source of Eternal life," he never intimates that the church is "the pillar and ground of the truth" relative to the incarnate, crucified, risen, divine Christ in Whom is Life Eternal. Nevertheless he has much to say that is not only interesting, but of practical value, and some things which to-day need strong emphasis. In the first chapter, dealing with the method of the church, it is maintained that there is far greater need of unity in spirit than of unity in organization, or uniformity in ritual or unanimity in creed. The church of to-morrow must adopt principles of coöperation and comity. The task of the church is shown to be spiritual; it is "to feed the roots of life." In opposition to certain socialistic and other false views, it is shown that the true function of the church does not consist in bettering social economic and physical conditions, but in creating right hearts and producing moral character. It is next suggested that in carrying out this task there must be stimulated a sufficient and efficient thought of God, "the tap-root of religion."

This can best be done by maintaining public worship, and nurturing the spirit of prayer. The next chapter emphasizes the possible power of the pulpit and the need of preserving its prophetic character. The last chapter sounds out a call to the pew to support the pulpit and to strengthen the church by active participation in various forms of strictly religious service.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Pulpit and the Pew. By the REVEREND CHARLES H. PARKHURST, D.D., LL.D. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 195. \$1.50 net, postage 10 cents extra.

This volume contains the "Lyman Beecher Lectures delivered 1913, before the Divinity School of Yale University." In commendation it may be sufficient to say that they merit a place in the valuable course of which they form a part. They possess a marked individuality, and are characterized by the pungent epigrams, human interest, and vivid illustrations, which have made popular the public utterances of the author. The whole field of homiletics has been so frequently traversed by previous lectures on this same foundation that the present series suggests a conscious limitation and an intentional avoidance of some of the more usual topics relative to the art of preaching. The long experience of the distinguished metropolitan pastor would have assured a welcome from his hearers and readers had he chosen to discuss such obvious matters as the intellectual, social and spiritual life of the minister, the sources and structure of the sermon, or the relation of preaching to pastoral duties. It may also be felt that the treatment of the themes selected is at times too limited, and lacking in concrete and comprehensive instruction. However, there is so much of originality and value in the discussions as to suggest some of the reasons why the author has maintained, for more than thirty years, in a conspicuous New York pulpit, a place of such influence and power. The subjects of the lectures are as follows: "The Preacher and his Qualifications"; "Pulpit Aims"; "The Pulpit's Estimate of the Pew"; "Love Considered as a Dynamic"; "Ministerial Responsibility for Civic Conditions"; "Responsibility of the Church to the Life of the Town"; "Dealing With Fundamentals"; "The Sanctuary and Sanctuary Service."

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Spiritual Health in the Light of the Principles of Physical Health.

By HOWARD FOSTER WRIGHT, D.B., M.D., D.O. New York: The Shakespeare Press. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 142. \$1.00.

In accordance with the suggestion made by Professor Drummond in his "Natural Law in the Spiritual World," an endeavor is here made to show how therapeutic principles can be applied in spiritual healing. The writer who is a reverent Christian, and a practitioner of Osteopathy, seems to fall into the common error of identifying laws which are merely similar. He presents certain interesting illustrations, but seems tempted to treat analogies as established facts. It is, however,

gratifying to find one who is investigating science in the light of Christian faith, and is interested in healing both the bodies and souls of men.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The China Mission Year Book. Being "*The Christian Movement in China*" 1913. Edited by REV. D. MACGILLIVRAY, M.A., D.D. Shanghai: Christian Literature Society for China. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 430, 55, ccxxxvi.

Even a brief review of this volume indicates, as possibly no other publication can, the vastness and diversity of the Christian missionary work being done in China. This is the fourth year of its issue, and the rapidly increasing number of subscribers indicates an ever wider appreciation of the great value of this exhaustive and careful compendium of missionary enterprises and interests in the new republic. The titles of a few of the thirty-five chapters may indicate the wide field covered by this year-book: "General Survey," "Missionary Conferences of 1913," "Revolution in China," "Progress and Fruits of Christianity," "Evangelistic Work," "The Chinese Press," "The New Education," "Woman's Work," "Sunday School Work," "Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations," "Christian Literature," "Bible Translation and Circulation," "Roman Catholic Missions." The various appendices relate to a large number of missionary facts and statistics including a "directory of missionaries" arranged by missions, by provinces, and alphabetically. A careful index makes it possible to readily refer to practically any subject in connection with the evangelization of China.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Function of Teaching in Christianity. By CHARLES B. WILLIAMS, PH.D., Professor of New Testament Greek and New Testament Theology, Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, Fort Worth, Texas. Nashville, Tenn.: Sunday School Board, Southern Convention. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 260. \$1.00 postpaid.

The purpose of the author, as the title of this volume indicates, is to show the prominence and function of teaching in the Christian religion. In *Part I* he endeavors to show that Jesus, and the New Testament writers regarded Christianity as a school of thought and action. Jesus, the twelve apostles, Paul, and the bishops or elders of the early church were all teachers of religion. *Part II* considers the various classes of modern Christian teachers, such as parents, Sunday School teachers, teachers in schools, colleges, universities and theological seminaries. *Part III* sets forth the various functions of these Christian teachers, in directing the religious thinking of the world, and in leading the young to Christ as Saviour and Lord, in training Christians in lives of sacrifice and service, in suggesting methods of social betterment, in stimulating effort for the evangelizing of all nations.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Reports of the Boards and Permanent Agencies of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. 1913. Philadelphia: Witherspoon Building. Copies in paper covers sent free to ministers; but in Cloth 35 cents each. To other persons 40 cents in paper and 65 cents in cloth.

Few books of equal size are received annually by every minister of our Church, and few are less valued in comparison with their real worth. It is not to be expected that the long pages of financial returns will attract very close attention, but large sections of these volumes contain material of deep interest, carefully prepared illustrations, and matter which is of great value to all who desire to have an intelligent understanding of the vast work done by the various boards and agencies of our church. It may be well to commend to the thoughtful consideration of our pastors and other church workers the reports last issued. A valuable feature which appears again at the close of this volume is the combined statistical report, with the names of the churches and of the clerks of sessions. The church is to be commended for its loyal support of its Boards, but there is still need of stimulating wider interest by spreading information as to these various lines of missionary and benevolent service.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Letters to Edward. By MALCOLM J. MCLEOD. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 224. \$1.00 net.

To those who believe that the custom and art of correspondence have disappeared before the killing haste of modern life, these letters will come as a pleasing surprise. They were written, with no thought of publication, by a prominent New York pastor to a young friend in the ministry from who he was separated by illness and finally by death. As a memorial of this friendship they possess a deep human, and even a pathetic, interest. They are characterized by kindly humor, keen criticisms, and shrewd observations. They discuss a wide variety of topics, from golf and Muldoon to higher criticism and church unity. In a realistic way they reveal the unique and difficult conditions under which a modern metropolitan pastor must labor, and the methods by which one of these pastors is winning deserved success.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Wheel-Chair Philosophy. By the REV. JOHN LEONARD COLE. New York: Eaton and Mains. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 154. 75 cents net.

The lessons this recital sets forth were learned in the school of pain and disappointment and anguish. They are not the expressions of fancy but the facts of personal experience. One who has suffered from a distressing accident, and has known the sustaining power of Christian faith, and the joy of answered prayer, here gives at least the partial explanation of the message of the Apostle Peter, that the trial of faith is "more precious than gold which perisheth, though it be tried by fire."

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Devotional Life of the Sunday School Teacher. By J. R. MILLER, D.D. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Cloth, 16mo; pp. 110. 50 cents net.

As the author himself says: "The real power in Sunday-School teaching is not in methods, important as it is to have the best of these, nor in equipment, valuable as this is, but in the teacher's own spiritual life. 'Not by might nor by power, but by my Spirit,' is the divine revealing of the secret of power in all Christian work." With such a true conception in mind, Doctor Miller has left this little volume as a legacy to his fellow workers, and has emphasized the need and possibility of being under the continual and complete control of the Holy Spirit, if one is to be efficient as a teacher of spiritual truth. Such an experience is to be attained not only by prayer and the study of Scripture, but by a constant abiding in Christ and complete surrender to His Spirit. The manuscript of this volume was found among the papers of the author after his death. It is peculiarly characteristic and will be highly prized by the host of Doctor Miller's friends, for he was himself a devoted Sunday School worker, and was known as the most popular devotional writer of his age. This book reveals the secret of his power and will do much to perpetuate the influence and the inspiration of his life.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Learning to Teach from the Master Teacher. By JOHN A. MARQUIS, D.D., LL.D. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Board, 16mo; pp. 79. 35 cents net.

These chapters first appeared in the pages of *The Westminster Teacher*. They constitute primarily a message for Sunday School teachers. From the study of the methods and characteristics of Christ helpful suggestions are made in relation to the importance of the teacher's calling, the object which should be held in view, the method of gathering hearers, the need of a full knowledge of one's subject, the possibility of success in spite of discouragements, and the enthusiasm and personal magnetism which this high calling demands. This little volume is full of practical and inspiring suggestions for the modern teacher and throws into clear relief the divine skill and power of Christ.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Sevenfold Unity of the Christian Church. By the RT. REV. A. C. A. HALL, D.D., Bishop of Vermont. London and New York, Longmans Green and Co. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 63. 75 cents net.

This book contains the substance of addresses delivered at Retreats in the Autumn of 1910. It comprises an exposition of the seven unities described in the opening verses of the fourth chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians. At a time when the subject of the reunion of Christendom is so much discussed it is of interest and help to read such a statement of the vital spiritual unity which already unites in one body all the followers of Christ. It is only by recognizing and

emphasizing this existing unity that the various divisions of the Christian Church can be brought more closely together; and such a thoughtful and sympathetic discussion as this volume contains will do much toward promoting the larger sympathy and coöperation which all who love our Lord truly desire.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Men of the Gospels. By LYNN HAROLD HOUGH. New York: Eaton and Mains. Cloth, 16mo; pp. 98. 50 cents net.

These delicately drawn miniatures portray with fascinating power the chief features of several familiar New Testament characters. Among those passed in review are John the Baptist, Simon Peter, John the Beloved, Thomas, Judas, the Rich Young Ruler, Nicodemus, Caiaphas, Pilate, Herod, the Centurion at the Cross, and the Master Himself. The portrayal is vivid, original and suggestive.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Habeeb the Beloved. By WM. S. NELSON, D.D. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Cloth, 12mo; pp. 102. 75 cents net.

As Dr. Stanley White suggests in his introduction to this excellent story, the author not only sketches the character of his hero, but he lifts the curtain and reveals to us Syria, and enables us also to see how the work of the missionary in an oriental country is conducted. We can understand also the difficulties and hardships which a Protestant Christian may have to endure at the present day in the very land in which our Saviour was born. The book also indicates to us the transforming power of the Bible and more definitely of Christ whom the hero of the story found revealed in the Gospel. This little volume narrating the real experience of a Syrian Christian will not only prove of interest to the reader, but will suggest the need of missionary activity in that eastern land.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Mornings with The Master. By T. S. CHILDS,* D.D., Author of "Heritage of Peace," "Is Expiation a Fiction?" "Difficulties of the Bible as tested by The Laws of Evidence," "The Lost Faith," etc. Washington, D. C.: William Ballantyne & Son. 1913. Duod; pp. 108.

We have in this attractive booklet thirty-one brief but very helpful meditations, each on some familiar verse from Scripture, and each followed by an appropriate hymn or religious poem. Such aids to devotion are usually as commonplace as they are numerous. This is a distinct exception. It is, perhaps, unique in its class. Certainly the reviewer has found it most helpful, and specially along the lines that in these days need most to be emphasized. Clear in thought, chaste in style, writing out of an unusually long and deep experience, Dr. Childs

* Just deceased.

has succeeded, as few do succeed, in giving his readers the very marrow of the Gospel. Not least worthy of praise are the poetical selections. We could wish that all who love the Lord Jesus might share our enjoyment of this little book.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

GENERAL LITERATURE

The Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary. Referring to the notice of this Dictionary in the January, 1914, number of this REVIEW, the managing editor writes us that "the editors of the New Standard Dictionary do not prefer the forms *fizl* and *abuze* as inadvertently stated in the notice. . . . These forms are recorded, it is true, but the New Standard Dictionary's preferences are *fizzle* and *abuse*." Our statement was: "The simplified form is given the preference. Thus the word *fizzle*, given first, is defined under *fizl*; *abuse* under *abuze*." This statement evidently conveys an incorrect impression, regarding these two words, although it states the fact. The pairs are bracketed and the definitions naturally follow the second or subsidiary spelling, which in these two instances is the simplified spelling. However, the reviewer does not see why *abuze* is not quite as good a spelling as *surprize*, which is given the preference. At least it is put first. The position of the Dictionary in this matter is stated in the introduction: "In the spelling of words this dictionary generally prefers the simpler form when two ways of spelling the same word are used by acknowledged authorities," Introductory, p. xii. A further use of the Dictionary confirms and increases our estimate of its very great excellence.

JOSEPH H. DULLES.

Princeton.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Journal of Theology, Chicago, January: CHARLES W. GILKEY, Function of the Church in Modern Society; D. D. LUCKENBILL, The Hittites; ERNEST D. BURTON, Spirit, Soul, and Flesh. II In the Old Testament; R. H. STRACHAN, Idea of Pre-Existence in the Fourth Gospel; FRANK C. PORTER, Source-Book of Judaism in New Testament Times; J. M. POWIS SMITH, The Deuteronomic Tithe; RENDEL HARRIS, St. Luke's Version of Death of Judas; EDGAR J. GOODSPEED, The Freer Gospels.

Bibliotheca Sacra, Oberlin, January: HENRY A. STIMSON, Twentieth Century Congregationalism; GEORGE O. LITTLE, Addition to the Sum of Revelation, Found in Book of Esther; WILLIAM H. BATES, Religious Opinions and Life of Abraham Lincoln; EDWARD M. MERINS, The Jews and Race Survival; HAROLD M. WIENER, Studies in the

Septuagintal Texts of Leviticus, III; JOHANNES DAHSE, Is the Documentary Hypothesis Tenable? I; F. J. LAMB, "Studies in Theology" and Hume's "Essay on Miracles"; LESTER REDDIN, Christ's Estimate of the Human Personality.

Church Quarterly Review, London, January: ARTHUR C. HEADLAM, Emperor Constantine and the Edict of Milan; H. L. GOUDGE, Resurrection of Our Lord and the Relation of the Eucharist to the Mysteries; Separation of Church and State in France; W. R. MATTHEWS, Mysticism and the life of the Spirit; W. A. WIGRAM, Severus of Antioch; R. DEBARY, Natural Fruitfulness of Religion; HAROLD HAMILTON, Essentials of a Valid Ministry; ARTHUR C. HEADLAM, Notes on Reunion: the Kikuyu Conference.

Constructive Quarterly, New York, March: WILLIAM SANDAY, The Constructive Quarterly from Within; T. R. GLOVER, Unity in the Spiritual Fact; CARDINAL MERCIER, Towards Unity; BISHOP GORE, Place of Symbolism in Religion; FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL, Specific Genius and Capacities of Christianity, Studied in Connection with the Works of Prof. Ernst Troeltsch; A. VON SCHLATTER, Attitude of German Protestant Theology to the Bible; WILLIAM A. CURTIS, Faith and Its Place in the Christian Religion; PETER GREEN, Faith: Its Nature and Work; MICHAEL MAHER, Nature of Divine Faith: A Catholic Account; ARCH-BISHOP PLATON, Faith as it is Understood by an Orthodox Divine; W. TEMPLE, Education and Religion among Working-Men; F. HERBERT STEAD, The Labour Movement in Religion; T. EDMUND HARVEY, John Woolman.

East & West, London, January: HENRY RUNDLE, Medicine and Missions; HENRY S. HOLLAND, The Call of Empire; FRANK NORRIS, China and the Missions of To-Morrow; A. F. EALAND, Raison d'Être of Foreign Missions; E. R. MCNEILE, Truth and Error in Theosophy; The Anointing of the Sick; DR. GAILOR, Problem of the Racial Episcopate in America; A. D. TUPPER-CAREY, Intercessory Prayer in Behalf of Christian Missions; A. CROSTHWAITE, Hindu Hopes and their Christian Fulfilment.

Expositor, London, January: JOHN E. MCFADYEN, Old Testament and the Modern World; T. WITTON DAVIES, Words "Witch" and "Witchcraft"; W. EMERY BARNES, David's "Capture" of the Jebusite "Citadel" of Zion; B. W. BACON, Apostolic Decree against *πορνεία*; D. S. MARGOLIOUTH, Transmission of the Gospel; ALEXANDER SOUTER, Pastoral Epistles, Titus; J. B. MAYOR, Miscellanea; JAMES MOFFATT, Exegetica. *The Same*, February: H. A. A. KENNEDY, St. Paul and the Conception of the "Heavenly Man"; H. R. MACKINTOSH, Studies in Christian Eschatology, The Christian Hope; T. R. GLOVER, Discipline in Prayer; ALLAN MENZIES, Epistle to the Galatians; A. E. GARVIE, Notes on the Fourth Gospel; RENDEL HARRIS, Some Remarks on the Text of Apocalypse 3:17; EDWIN A. ABBOTT, Miscellanea Evangelica: a Reply; T. H. BINDLEY, A Study of 1 Corinthians 15; C. ANDERSON SCOTT, Early date of "Galatians": A Reply.

Expository Times, Edinburgh, January: JAMES IVERACH, Epistle to

Colossians and Its Christology; A. E. GARVIE, Can Literature of a Divine Revelation be Dealt with by Historical Science?; JOHN MACASKILL, A Swiss Shorter Catechism; W. ARTHUR CORNABY, Chinese Side-lights upon Scripture Passages. *The Same*, February: J. RENDEL HARRIS, The Blood-Accusations against the Jews in Southern Russia; JAMES IVERACH, The Epistle to the Colossians and its Christology; E. D. STARBUCK, The Psychology of Conversion.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, January: WILLIAM R. ARNOLD, Theology and Tradition; D. C. MACINTOSH, What is the Christian Religion?; W. S. ARCHIBALD, Religion in Some Contemporary Poets; JAMES Y. SIMPSON, Fitness of Environment; JOHN E. LE BOSQUET, The Modern Man's Religion.

Hibbert Journal, Boston, January: F. C. S. SCHILLER, Eugenics and Politics; J. B. BAILLIE, Self-Sacrifice; ELIZABETH MACADAM, Universities and the Training of the Social Worker; M. D. PETRE, Advantages and Disadvantages of Authority in Religion; R. L. ORR, Scottish Church Question; W. A. CURTIS, Value of Confessions of Faith; HUBERT HANDLEY, Ought there to be a Broad Church Disruption?; A. W. F. BLUNT, The Failure of the Church of England; J. ARTHUR HILL, Changing Religion; HENRY C. CORRANCE, Bergson's Philosophy and the Idea of God; T. RHONDDA WILLIAMS, Syndicalism in France and Its Relation to the Philosophy of Bergson; CHARLES W. COBB, Certainty in Mathematics and in Theology; J. E. SYMES, The Johannine Apocalypse.

Hindustan Review, Allahabad, January: Is Caste Essential to Hinduism?; S. A. W. KHAN, Proposed Amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code; BENOY K. SARKAR, Data of Ancient Indian Zoology, I; LEOPOLD KATSCHER, Education in Japan; S. AMBRAVANESWAR, Revolutionary France and Romantic Revival; E. M. WHITE, Women and Hinduism, II; S. RANGANATH, Chapter in Indian Economic History; SARADA PRASAD, Political Crimes in India; The Honorable Nawab Syed Mahomed Sahib; SUCHET SINGH, Commercial Education for Indian Youth.

Interpreter, London, January: EVELYN UNDERHILL, Mysticism and the Doctrine of the Atonement; WILLOUGHBY C. ALLEN, "What Think Ye of Christ?"; A. H. MCNEILE, Two Recent Theories about the Epistle to the Hebrews; EDWARD G. KING, Exposition of Ephesians 4:16; J. E. SYMES, Four Epistles to the Philippians; A. C. BOUQUET, The Case for the Sacraments; H. E. B. SPEIGHT, Michael Servetus; B. K. RATEY, Apocalyptic Hope in the Maccabean Age; G. HENSLOW, Proofs of the Christian Religion.

Irish Theological Quarterly, Dublin, January: CHARLES J. CALLAN, What Is Faith?, I; J. MACRORY, Occasion and Object of the Epistle to the Romans; J. KELLEHER, Land Reform; GARRETT PIERSE, Scriptural Theories of a Forgotten Father of the Irish Church; MATTHEW A. POWER, The Testing of Christ by the Devil; W. H. GRATTAN-FLOOD, The Dawn of the Reformation—A Reply; THOMAS GOGARTY, Rejoinder.

Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia, January: JOSEPH REIDER,

Prolegomena to a Greek-Hebrew and Hebrew-Greek Index to Aquila; MORRIS JASTROW, The So-Called Leprosy Laws; J. N. EPSTEIN, Two Gaonic Fragments; ISRAEL FRIEDLAENDER, The Rupture Between Alexander Jannai and the Pharisees; S. SCHECHTER, Reply to Dr. Büchler's Review of Schechter's 'Jewish Secretaries'.

Journal of Biblical Literature, Boston, December: GEORGE V. SCHICK, Stems Dûm and Damâm in Hebrew; GEORGE A. BARTON, "Higher" Archaeology and the Verdict of Criticism; PHILLIPS BARRY, Apocalypse of Ezra; PAUL HAUPT, Names of the Months on S. P. ii, 263.

Journal of Theological Studies, London, January: C. H. TURNER, Canons Attributed to the Council of Constantinople, A.D. 381, together with the names of the Bishops, from two Patmos MSS; ROSE GRAHAM, Relation of Cluny to Some Other Movements of Monastic Reform; MARTIN RULE, Queen of Sweden's 'Gelasian Sacramentary'; C. L. FELTOE, Saints Commemorated in the Roman Canon; M. R. JAMES, Apocryphal Ezekiel; J. L. JOHNSTON, Mysticism in the New Testament; G. H. WHITAKER, Chrysostem on 1 Cor. i.13; N. HERZ, Exaggeration of Errors in the Massoretic.

London Quarterly Review, London, January: P. T. FORSYTH, The Man and the Message; A Poet's Tragedy; H. R. MACKINTOSH, Ritschlianism Old and New; T. H. S. ESCOTT, Vicissitudes of the English Novel; ALFRED E. GARVIE, Freedom of Christian Thought; W. H. S. AUBREY, Industrial Unrest; JOHN S. BANKS, Augustine as Seen in His Letters; JOHN TELFORD, One of England's Noblest.

Lutheran Church Review, Philadelphia, October: EDWARD T. HORN, British Rule in India; PAUL H. HEISEY, Psychology of the Religious Revival; PRESTON A. LAURY, Jeremiah, 7.21-23; VON BEZZEL, Ministry of Service as the Christian Solution of Social Problems; H. E. JACOBS, George Frederick Spieker; T. KNAPPE, Dangers of Liberal Theology to the Lutheran Faith; GEORGE W. TRABERT, Will Israel as a Nation Accept Christ?; ADOLF HULT, Return to Scriptural Faith; OTTO L. SCHREIBER, Early Ecclesiastical Schools; MARTIN L. WAGNER, The Sunday School, and How Best to Maintain It. *The Same*, January: H. E. JACOBS, Principles of Theology; LEANDER S. KEYSER, Renaissance of Protestantism; ED. KÖNIG, Canaan and the Babylonian Civilization; JOHN W. HORINE, Religious Instruction in our Colleges; J. C. F. RUPP, Holy Spirit in Christian Theology; W. JENTSCH, Shakespeare's Attitude to the Bible; L. FRANKLIN GRUBER, Version of 1611: Propriety of calling it the "Authorized Version" or "King James Version"; W. J. FINCK, The Orphan House in the Salzburger Colony; Suppression of Opium in China against British Resistance; J. A. WEYL, Spirit of the World in the Church.

Lutheran Quarterly, Gettysburg, January: FREDERICK H. KNUBEL, The Logos; H. G. BUEHLER, The Bible in School and College; J. M. HANTZ, A Conception of the Laws of Conscience; LEANDER S. KEYSER, Christ's Witness to the Old Testament; D. S. MARGOLIOUTH, The Bible of the Jews; G. ALBERT BETTY, Lutheran Hymnology; CHARLES W. SUPER, The Dispensation of Justice; FRANK WOLFORD, Our Young

Men of the Future Ministry; JOHN WARNECK, The Special Endowment and Responsible Task of the Lutheran Church for World-Wide Missions.

Methodist Review, New York, January-February: W. F. WARREN, Comparative Religion, So-Called; R. T. STEVENSON, Lear-Pessimist or Optimist; J. M. DIXON, Gypsies and Religion; R. O. EVERHART, Engineering and the Millennium; F. C. LOCKWOOD, Burns; The Lyrist; DANIEL DORCHESTER, Christian Paganism; E. A. SCHELL, The Retention of the Philippine Islands; J. R. SHANNON, George Meredith, The Preacher's Poet-Novelist; JOHN LEE, Ulster Protestants and Rome. *The Same*, March-April: FRANKLIN HAMILTON, Life-Girding and the New Vision of the American University; J. A. GESSINGER, The Master Spirits; J. B. THOMAS, Dogmatization of "Evolution"; G. R. GROSE, Frederick Denison Maurice; J. A. FAULKNER, Dante the Theologian; MARY B. HOUSEL, Blue Bird Folks and Fancies; O. L. JOSEPH, Authority of the Church; PHILO M. BUCK, Edmund Rostand, The Tergiversist; J. SUMNER STONE, The Wandering Jew; S. G. AYRES, Sources of American Methodist History.

Methodist Review Quarterly, Nashville, January: P. T. FORSYTH, Christianity and Society; JOHN TELFORD, Annals of a Yorkshire Family; J. A. BAYLOR, Conference Evangelism; J. C. GRANBERY, Snapshots of Europe in Transition; RUTH W. ALEXANDER, Music and Religion; THOMAS CARTER, Keeping Step with God; W. K. MATTHEWS, Some Features of Higher Education in Germany; NINA H. ROBINSON, Woman and Women and Suffrage; JOHN W. SHACKFORD, A Demand upon the Christian Church and Her Ministry for a New Leadership; J. F. MORELOCK, Law Enforcement; R. E. DICKENSON, Alfred Tennyson and the Message of "In Memoriam"; D. E. CAMAK, Religion that Cares.

Monist, Chicago, January: BERTRAND RUSSELL, On the Nature of Acquaintance; FREDERICK G. HENKE, Wang Yang Ming, a Chinese Idealist; RICHARD GARBE, Christian Elements in Later Krishnaism and in Other Hinduistic Sects; A. H. GODBEY, Ceremonial Spitting; LEONARD T. TROLAND, Chemical Origin and Regulation of Life; PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN, Economy of Thought; KARIN COSTELLOE, Answer to Bertrand Russell's Article on Philosophy of Bergson.

Moslem World, London, January: JOHN TAKLE, Islam in Bengal; CHARLES T. RIGGS, Constitutional Government in Turkey; GEORGE SWAN, The Tanta Mûlid; PERCY SMITH, Plea for the Vulgar Arabic; S. M. ZWEMER, Dying Forces of Islam; ANDREW WATSON, Our Only Gospel; ROBERT THOMSON, Conditions in Bulgaria; L. V. SÖDERSTRÖM, Mohammedan Women in China; FRIEDRICH WÜRZ, The Bethel Conference.

Philosophical Review, Lancaster, January: ARCHIBALD A. BOWMAN, Problem of Knowledge from the Standpoint of Validity; JOSEPH A. LEIGHTON, Truth, Reality, and Relation; DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH, Hocking's Philosophy of Religion; W. P. MONTAGUE, Unreal Sub-sistence and Consciousness.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, January: JAMES STALKER, Christology of the Ancient Church; DOROTHY SCARBOROUGH, Religion in Recent American Novels; HENRY C. VEDDER, Dr. Wilkinson's Epics; WALTER LOCKE, St. John The Baptist; HENRY C. MABIE, The Baptist Message to Continental Europe; O. OLIN GREEN, Value of Art to the Preacher; J. L. ROSSER, Paul's Valuation of his Ministry; SALLY N. ROACH, The Education of Love.

Union Seminary Review, Richmond, December-January: J. S. LYONS, The Business of the Church; R. M. RUSSELL, The Mission of the Church; THERON H. RICE, The First Gospel; G. B. STRICKLER, Testimony of Christ to the Old Testament; J. GRAY MACALLISTER, Teachings of Great Features of the Bible; C. ALPHONSO SMITH, Presbyterians in Educational Work in North Carolina since 1813.

Yale Review, New Haven, January: HENRY A. BEERS, The Dying Pantheist to the Priest; ROBERT HERRICK, The Background of the American Novel; ARTHUR L. CORBIN, The Law and the Judges; WILLIAM OSLER, Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy; FREDERICK LYNCH, Peace and War in 1913; HENRY S. CANBY, Noyes and Masfield; WILLIAM E. HOCKING, Significance of Bergson; H. D. SEDGWICK, Boccaccio, an Apology.

Bilychnis, Roma, Gennaio: ASCHENBRÖDEL, "Boanerges" o i Gemelli celesti; ROLAND D. SAWYER, La Sociologia di Gesù. Gesù e lo Stato; Religione ed arte. Il nuovo Tempio Valdese a Roma; ROMOLO MURRI, Religione e Politica; ERNESTO RUTLI, Vitalità e vita nel Cattolicesimo; WILFRED MONOD, Una domanda attuale.

La Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Enero-Febrero: ALBERTO COLUNGA, Crisis de la crítica Pentateuco; JOSÉ D. GAFO, Las Cortes y la Constitución de Cádiz; FRANCISCO MARIN-SOLÁ, La homogeneidad de la doctrina católica (con.); IGNACIO G. MENÉNDEZ-REIGADA, Un novelista de hogaño.

Recherches de Science Religieuse, Paris, Janvier-Février: ALBERT CONDAMIN, L'influence de la Tradition juive dans la version de saint Jérôme; MARIUS CHAINE, Le canon des livres saintes dans l'Église éthiopienne; HIPPOLYTE LIGEARD, La crédibilité de la Révélation d'après saint Thomas; PIERRE ROUSSELOT, Réponse à deux attaques; LOUIS LAURAND, Deux mots sur les idées religieuses de Cicéron; LOUIS MARIÈS, Un commentaire de Didyme publié sous le nom de Diodore; AUGUSTIN NOYON, Notes bibliographiques sur quelques théologiens du moyen âge.

Rendiconti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei, Roma, Gennaio: CONTI ROSSINI, I Mekan o Suro nell'Etiopia del sud-ovest, e il loro linguaggio; CASTALDI, Il discorso contro l'Aristo di Filippo Sassetti; DUCATI, Sulla cronologia della idria di Midia e dei vasi affini; GABRIELI, Indice alfabetico di tutte le biografie contenute nel Wāfi-bi-l-wafayāt) di al-safadi nell'esemplare fotografico dell'on.

Révue Bénédictine, Paris, Janvier: G. MORIN, Qui est l'Ambrosiaster Solution nouvelle; P. BLANCHARD, Un monument primitif de la Règle cistercienne; U. BERLIÈRE, Les évêques auxiliaires de Liege; G. MORIN,

L'opuscule perdu du soi-disant Hégésippe sur les Machabées; DE-BRUYNE, Une lettre inédite de s. Pierre Damien.

Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, Lausanne, Janvier: GEORGES VOLAIT, Sur l'objet de l'histoire de la philosophie; EMILE LOMBARD, Freud, la psychanalyse et la théorie psychogénétique des névroses; MAURICE GOGUEL, Les études sur la quatrième évangile.

Revue de Théologie et des Questions Religieuses, Montauban, Décembre: Rapport de M. le doyen Doumergue sur l'année scolaire 1912-1913; E. BRUSTON, La Prophétie du Serviteur de l'Éternel dans le second Ésaïe et l'idée de la Rédemption; ANDRÉ ARNAL, Le Professeur Auguste Wabnitz; H. CHAVANNES, La Relativité des lois physiques et une hypothèse eschatologique à en tirer; CH. BRUSTON, Les Prophètes d'Israël et les religions de l'Orient; CH. BRUSTON, Le Fondateur de l'Église luthérienne de Paris, Jonas Hambræus; JACQUES DELPECH, Le Christianisme en Corée.

Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, Paris, Janvier: M. DEMUNNYNCK, Introduction générale à l'étude psychologique des phénomènes religieux; M. S. GILLET, Les harmonies de la Transsubstantiation: le sacrement de l'Eucharistie; M. JACQUIN, Le "De corpore et sanguine Domini" de Pascase Radbert; M. D. ROLAND-GOSSELIN, Ce que saint Thomas pense de la sensation immédiate et de son organe.

Theologische Studiën, Utrecht, XXXII Jaargang, Aflev. 1: TH. L. W. VAN RAVESTEYN, Jeremia 4:5-6:30; D. PLOOY, Minucius Felix een Modernist?

Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, Innsbruck, XXXVIII Band, 1: HEINRICH MAYER, Geschichte der Spendung der Sakramente in der alten Kirchen-provinz Salzburg, II; BERNARD DUHR, Der Olmutzer Zensur-Streit.

